Background Guide
United Nations Security Council

Topic: Peacebuilding on Korean Peninsula

声生不息 和合共赢
Our Voice Our Future
# Contents

- **Welcome Letter** ................................................................................................. 1
- **Introduction to the Committee** ......................................................................... 2
- **General Introduction to the Topic** ................................................................. 3
- **Current Situation** ............................................................................................. 4
  - Overview of the Current Situation ................................................................. 4
  - Development of Nuclear Capabilities in North Korea ....................................... 5
    - NPT and IAEA .......................................................................................... 7
    - International Sanctions ............................................................................. 8
  - Six-Party Talks ............................................................................................... 10
  - Inter-Korean Efforts for Peace .................................................................... 12
- **Key Issues** ....................................................................................................... 14
  - Security Concerns ......................................................................................... 14
  - DPRK’s Nuclear Program ........................................................................... 14
  - US-ROK Alliance/US military Presence in Korea .......................................... 15
  - Sanctions Against North Korea ................................................................... 18
- **Possible Solutions** .......................................................................................... 20
  - Double Suspension of Freezing Nuclear Development and Military Exercise ...... 20
  - Double-track of Denuclearization and Building Peace Regime ....................... 21
- **Bloc Positions** ................................................................................................ 24
  - North Korea .................................................................................................. 24
  - South Korea ................................................................................................... 25
  - The United States .......................................................................................... 26
  - China ............................................................................................................. 27
  - Japan ............................................................................................................. 27
  - EU ................................................................................................................... 28
  - Russia ............................................................................................................ 29
  - Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) ....................................................... 29
- **Questions to Consider** .................................................................................. 31
- **Bibliography** .................................................................................................... 32
Welcome Letter

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) of Beijing International Model United Nations 2021 (BIMUN 2021). The Directors of UNSC would like to extend our sincerest welcome to all the delegates in our committee.

The Korean War left the Korean Peninsula in a bitter division. The armistice signed in 1953 brought a semblance of peace, but the long-term stability in the region is impossible without a peace treaty. Pressured by the economic blockade, diplomatic isolation and military threats posed by the United States and its allies, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) commenced its nuclear build-up.

To prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and maintain international peace and security, the international community has been devoted to achieving denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. History witnessed remarkable moments when peace talks and negotiations were conducted and confidence was gained, as well as regrettable moments when mass sanctions were imposed but resulted in escalating tension. In recent years, North Korea declared its shift of strategic focus from nuclear build-up to socialist economic construction and denoted its willingness to achieve denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. However, there is still a long way to go before a permanent peace regime can be built, and it is the goal of the UNSC to consolidate the hard-won progress and carry on with peacebuilding in the region and beyond.

Our topic of discussion features issues of extreme intricacy and entangled interests among stakeholders. This Background Guide will provide you with a brief introduction to the issue. Yet, this guide cannot illustrate all the nuances of the issue and we encourage every delegate to conduct your own research on this topic. We welcome all your unique insights and practical proposals.

The Directors wish you all an enjoyable and fruitful journey in UNSC, BIMUN 2021. Should you have any questions, feel free to contact us.

Best Regards,
Directors of UNSC
BIMUN 2021
Introduction to the Committee

The UNSC is one of the six main organs of the United Nations established in 1945 under the UN Charter. The Security Council undertakes the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The Council is composed of 15 member states, including five major states, namely China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States. The five major states are granted the special status of Permanent Member States, along with special voting power known as the “right to veto.” If any one of the five permanent members casts a negative vote in the Security Council, the resolution or decision would not be approved. Non-council member states that are stakeholders of the issue can also be invited to participate in the discussion, albeit without the right to vote.

The Security Council takes the lead in determining the existence of a threat to the peace or an act of aggression. It calls upon peaceful settlement of disputes, prevents escalation of conflicts, provides platforms for multilateral conversations, and puts forward corresponding peace proposals. The UNSC is the only UN organ with the mandate to require member states to comply with its decisions. In cases where certain countries refuse to comply with the resolutions, the Council may resort to sanctions or even the use of force to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Since the North Korean nuclear issue emerged as a destabilizing factor in North-East Asia, the UNSC has played a major role in facilitating multilateral dialogues and pursuing peace, stability and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. To combat the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons, the UNSC unanimously adopted resolution 1540 on 28 April 2004 and established the Non-Proliferation Committee (also known as the 1540 Committee) as the Council’s subsidiary branch. In response to North Korea’s repeated nuclear tests which escalated the tension within and beyond the Peninsula, the UNSC imposed multiple sanctions to contain the rising hostility on both sides and bring the situation under control.

As always, the UNSC strives for a peaceful, comprehensive, diplomatic and political approach to building a stable and lasting peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.
General Introduction to the Topic

The Korean Peninsula is in a critical geopolitical position in North-East Asia, whose peace and stability concerns the strategic interests of not only neighbouring countries like China, Japan, and Russia but also countries across the globe. The North Korean nuclear issue has long been a destabilizing factor in the region, arousing grave tension among countries and blocking international cooperation and communication. Therefore, it is of great significance to prevent nuclear proliferation and promote peacebuilding on the Peninsula.

Stakeholders and international organizations have made multiple attempts to resolve the issue, including but not limited to applications of multilateral frameworks such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), restrictive measures such as UN-based international sanctions, communication platforms such as the Six-Party Talks, peace proposals such as the “Double-Track” and “Double Suspension”, and other bilateral and multilateral initiatives.

Despite the arduous efforts made, problems remain and hinder the peacebuilding progress. The inherent contradiction and lack of confidence between the US and DPRK are hard to be eliminated in the short term, and the hostility against each other trapped both parties in a downward spiral. The international sanctions that aimed to promote denuclearization lack humanitarian considerations. Instead of bringing positive results to the situation, they seem to have caused more negative impacts, exacerbating tension on the Peninsula.

To jointly prevent nuclear proliferation and promote long-term peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, we will focus on addressing both parties’ security concerns by promoting denuclearization, adjusting sanctions and military exercises, and finally building a permanent peace regime in the region.
Current Situation

Overview of the Current Situation

The North Korean nuclear crisis has been one of the major security challenges in the 21st century. As tensions peaked among the major stakeholders in 2017-2018 when the DPRK conducted its sixth nuclear test and mastered the capability to launch nuclear attacks on the United States via Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), the official announcement from the DPRK to suspend all its nuclear testing that followed seemed to have brought the decades-long conflict to a moratorium. The multiple diplomatic efforts made by countries concerned thereafter further reinforced the international expectation towards a peaceful and stable Korean Peninsula.

Nonetheless, what should have been a halt in the crisis eventually witnessed a new round of tension gradually building up above the Korean Peninsula and the Pacific, as the DPRK announced in late 2019 that it was “no longer bound by” its self-imposed nuclear test moratorium.1

On the other hand, the DPRK shouldn’t be the only party held accountable for the escalated tension. The aforementioned friendly signals released by the DPRK through promising to drop its nuclear aggression was not greeted with a better international environment to develop the country’s economy, since the previous United Nations sanctions on the DPRK were not lifted as its national leaders hoped. Furthermore, the diplomatic milestones achieved among the DPRK, Republic of Korea (ROK), and the United States did not seem to lower the frequency of military exercises conducted in the region, reflecting the fact that the DPRK was still on the United States’ radar. This once again provided reasons for the DPRK to hold on to its nuclear program.

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Development of Nuclear Capabilities in North Korea

### Table 1 Major North Korean nuclear sites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nuclear Site</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Pakhkon</td>
<td>Location of a uranium mine and milling facility (known as the April Industrial Enterprise), declared to the IAEA in 1992. The uranium milling facility reportedly processes ore from mines in the Sunchon area. Current status is unknown.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Pyongsan</td>
<td>Location of uranium mining and a uranium milling facility, declared to the IAEA in 1992. The milling facility in Pyongsan reportedly processes ore from the Pyongsan and Kumchon uranium mines. Current status is unknown.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Pyongyang</td>
<td>Laboratory-scale hot cells, provided by the Soviet Union in the 1960s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Sinpo</td>
<td>Location of two 1,000 MW(e) light water reactors being constructed by the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) under the terms of the Agreed Framework, which set a 'target date' of 2003 for completion of the project. Various events have delayed the project. Construction began in mid-1997. The major non-nuclear element for the first reactor, defined in the Agreed Framework as a 'significant portion' of the LWR project, was scheduled for completion by mid-2005. KEDO 'suspended' the project for one year in December 2003.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Taechon</td>
<td>Location of an incomplete 200MW(e) graphite-moderated nuclear power reactor. Construction began in 1989 and was frozen in 1994 (under the 1994 Agreed Framework). Current status is unknown, but there are no reports of major construction resuming after North Korea renounced the nuclear freeze in December 2002.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Yongbyon</td>
<td>Location of a Nuclear Research Centre, comprising a 5MW(e) graphite moderated research nuclear power reactor, an unfinished 50MW(e) graphite moderated prototype power reactor, reprocessing facility, uranium conversion plant fuel fabrication plant, and spent fuel and waste storage facilities. Also location of a Soviet-supplied RT research reactor and radionuclide laboratory. Operation of the 5MW(e) reactor; the uranium conversion plant, the fuel fabrication facility and the reprocessing plant were frozen in 1994, along with construction of the 50MW(e) reactor. Since 2002, North Korea has restarted the 5MW(e) reactor and reportedly reprocessed some or all of the 8,000 spent fuel rods at the site. No resumption of work on the 50MW(e) reactor has been reported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Youngdoktong</td>
<td>Reported location of site (active in the 1990s) for nuclear weapons-related high-explosive testing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Sunchon</td>
<td>Location of an important uranium mine. Other mines reportedly located in Kumchon, Pyongsan, and Hwangsan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DPRK’s nuclear program was a direct product of its survival anxiety. The program dates back to the 1950s when North Korea signed an agreement on nuclear cooperation with the Soviet Union which included a series of technical and scientific aid, basic training for North Korean personnel, and the construction of the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center.² The agreement granted DPRK the basic training and technology to start its weaponized nuclear program. In particular, the agreement allowed it to take a glance at and eventually master the technologies in terms of plutonium production and separation. The North Korean nuclear program reached a second phase in 1980 when it started its

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³ Ibid.
secret indigenous plutonium production program. It was not until 1992 that the relevant facilities were exposed and went under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguard. From 1994 to 2002, the country's nuclear program entered a period of nuclear freeze as a result of the US-DPRK Agreed Framework in 1994, which promised a step-by-step normalization of the US-North Korean relations if the DPRK would replace its indigenous nuclear power plant with light-water reactor power plants which were less likely to be weaponized. However, this third phase nuclear freeze gradually fell apart as a result of the post-Cold War international relations, and eventually broke in 2002 when the North Korea nuclear program reached the fourth phase where multiple tests were conducted to build its nuclear arsenal.

If the Cold War era gave the DPRK a motive to try developing nuclear weaponry, the late/post-Cold War international relations would give the nation every reason to clutch on to its nuclear arsenal and view it as the Aegis of the country's survival. The fall of the Soviet Union as well as the reconciliation between China and the west in the 1970s put the DPRK in an isolated position more than ever before. Meanwhile, such a shift in the balance of power encouraged the United States to pressure North Korea even harder on its nuclear program, with a series of foreign policies implemented by different presidencies targeting the complete annihilation of the DPRK's nuclear capabilities. A combination of threats and promises is employed in these policies in an attempt to achieve the “complete, verifiable, and irreversible” disassembly of its nuclear arsenal. As a result, the promises did not win North Korea's concession due to Washington's lack of credibility from Pyongyang's point of view, and the threats only made the DPRK feel more insecure. As the North Korean leaders see the US invasion of Libya and Iraq, they viewed nuclear weapons as a much more reliable guarantor of national security than the political promises from the United States.

Apart from these external factors, North Korea's inferiority in its conventional arms capabilities also leads to the country's anxiety. Although the DPRK used to have a land force superiority over South Korea in the early stages of the Cold War, such advantage began to fall apart in the 1990s when the United States demonstrated the dominance power of guided missiles technology in the Gulf War. Fearful that the United States and its allies would invade it using their superior conventional arms, the DPRK eventually decided to restart its nuclear program and put everything it had into achieving its nuclear deterrent capabilities, which was the only way to compensate for its aging conventional arms. In 2003, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT for the second time. In 2006, it successfully conducted its first nuclear test, and five more nuclear tests were conducted thereafter from 2009 to 2017. In its sixth nuclear test in 2017, North Korea successfully launched and exploded a hydrogen bomb carried by an ICBM. It was assessed that the nuclear-armed ICBM aforementioned was capable of hitting mainland USA and thus entitling the DPRK to a nuclear deterrent on the United States. This incident

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4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
triggered the 2017-2018 North Korean nuclear crisis, which ended up with a new round of sanctions imposed on the DPRK. In 2018, North Korea once again announced that it would cooperate with the international community in the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula after it successfully conducted its latest nuclear test and decided to focus on its economic development. North Korea further promised to abandon and destroy its Punggye-ri nuclear test site to demonstrate the transparency of its denuclearization. However, the official news agency of the DPRK announced in December 2019 that the country was conducting "an important test", which was later reported to be ICBM related. This incident was interpreted as a response to the US sanctions that were not lifted after its 2018 promise to abandon its nuclear arsenal.\(^\text{11}\)

To be concise, the major stakeholders in this issue have always been trapped in a downward spiral where one party's move to address its lacking sense of security would eventually become a source of that of the others. The pressure from the United States forces the DPRK into a corner, which is why North Korea wants to establish its nuclear deterrence. Such deterrence puts the lives of South Korean and US civilians under the so-called nuclear blackmail of the DPRK. The United States thus calls North Korea a "pariah state" and further pressures North Korea, inducing another round of tension. Such a paradoxical situation results in a rapid expansion of military arms, a continual escalation of regional tension, and eventually a potential threat to international security.

At its very core, this downward spiral is fed by the mutual distrust between the DPRK and the west, which was predominantly caused by a distinction in their socio-economic systems and ideologies. The socialist economic structure of the DPRK makes the United States and its allies more than reluctant to approach it. Deeply influenced by the Democratic Peace Theory, the western stakeholders and their public opinions have always been anxious about the credibility and stability of DPRK's current regime, and vice versa. As there is no quick-fix to the clash of different political systems, to escape the downward spiral and thereby appeasing the ongoing crisis, finding a feasible way to rebuild trust and provide a sense of security for the major stakeholders that transcend the conflicts in political values becomes a key issue.

**NPT and IAEA**

NPT went into force in 1970, providing a pragmatic framework for the nuclear disarmament process, which consists of a first-step limitation to the spread of nuclear weapons and the weapon technologies related, and the long-term visions towards the “general and complete nuclear disarmament.”\(^\text{12}\) It is a multilateral treaty built upon the credibility of the five internationally recognized nuclear-weapon States. The Treaty established a safeguard system under the IAEA mandate to verify compliance to the Treaty via inspections. NPT states that the Treaty members have the right to withdraw under extreme circumstances when the country deems its supreme national interest is offended by matters related to the Treaty, but should inform the other stakeholders and the UNSC three months in advance.\(^\text{13}\)

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13 Ibid.
The DPRK joined NPT in 1985, but it did not report to the IAEA about its nuclear facilities until 1992. From 1992 to 1994, its nuclear facilities were under IAEA’s inspections, but the DPRK did not grant access to IAEA personnel when they demanded special inspections under the safeguard protocols. In 1994, the DPRK agreed to freeze its nuclear program as a result of the Agreed Framework and recognized IAEA’s verification of the freeze. However, as the Agreed Framework did not work out as the stakeholders expected, the DPRK announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, after which multiple nuclear tests have been conducted by the country.

Critics of the NPT argue that it creates an unbalanced and discriminative situation where only the major powers could own nuclear weapons as opposed to the international consensus that all sovereignties are supposed to be equal. Besides, the five recognized nuclear-weapon States have contributed very little in the general and complete nuclear disarmament as called for by the NPT. In the case of the North Korean nuclear crisis, such unbalanced status is amplified by the isolated position of the DPRK, which reinforces its sense of insecurity. Therefore, it wouldn't be a surprise that the DPRK withdrew from the NPT.

**International Sanctions**

North Korea is currently under heavy sanctions from multiple actors, ranging from the UNSC to the United States. Since 2016, the UNSC has passed altogether 10 resolutions imposing increasingly stringent sanctions against North Korea to halt its nuclear development progress.

In October 2006, North Korea conducted its first nuclear test. In response, the UNSC passed Resolution 1718, which requires North Korea to stop nuclear tests or develop ballistic missiles, imposes an arms embargo, assets freeze, and travel ban on persons involved in the DPRK’s nuclear programme. Crucially, Resolution 1718 establishes a Security Council Sanctions Committee, also known as the “1718 Committee,” which oversees all sanctions against North Korea henceforth. At this stage, the sanctions are only directed at specific targets related to North Korea’s nuclear development, which is why they are called targeted sanctions, or “smart sanctions”.

At the beginning of 2016, North Korea conducted 4 nuclear tests and launched long-range missiles. The Security Council passed Resolution 2270 in March and initiated comprehensive sanctions. Resolution 2270 imposes inspection on cargo destined to and originating from the DPRK, launches financial measures including an asset freeze on the Government of the DPRK and its Workers’ Party entities associated with prohibited programmes and activities. The resolution also requires other states to close existing DPRK bank branches in their territories and limit the export of natural resources to North Korea, as attempts to deprive North Korea of international resources.
After North Korea's first hydrogen bomb test and intercontinental ballistic missile test in 2017, the UNSC passed 4 resolutions, Resolution 2356, Resolution 2371, Resolution 2375, Resolution 2397, with sanctions of unprecedented magnitude and severity. A total ban was imposed on North Korea's export of minerals such as coal and iron, textiles, and seafood, which were the top 3 export items accounting for 36.5%, 33%, and 9.3% respectively of the total export volume of the country. The resolutions also banned hiring and paying of additional DPRK labourers used to generate foreign export earnings and required other states to expel residing North Korean workers within 2 years. Furthermore, an embargo was imposed against the supply, sale, or transfer to the DPRK of all industrial machinery, vehicles, iron, steel, and other metals, as well as energy products such as liquefied natural gas. The sanctions greatly harmed the export of North Korea. For example, China made up 95% of North Korea's trade volume. China's import from North Korea was 2.5 billion dollars in 2016 and 1.7 billion dollars in 2017 but suddenly dropped to only 200 million dollars in 2018 after the sanctions came into effect.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Principle Sanctions</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Resolution 1718</td>
<td>Established Security Council Sanctions Committee (1718 Committee) Imposed an arms embargo, assets freeze, and travel ban on persons involved in the DPRK's nuclear programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Resolution 1874</td>
<td>Banned all imports and exports of weapons with the DPRK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Resolution 2087</td>
<td>Prohibited any further development of technology applicable to North Korea's ballistic missile programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Resolution 2094</td>
<td>Aimed to exclude the DPRK from the international financial system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Resolution 2270</td>
<td>Expanded the arms embargo, imposed an asset freeze on government entities, expanded the financial sanctions, called for cargo inspections related to the DPRK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Resolution 2321</td>
<td>Further expanded economic sanctions on the DPRK by prohibiting the country from selling minerals completely and coal that exceeded an annual cap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Resolution 2371</td>
<td>Banned the export of coal, iron, and iron ore Banned hiring and paying of additional DPRK labourers used to generate foreign export earnings Prohibited the export by the DPRK of seafood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Resolution 2375</td>
<td>Banned textile exports, capped refined petroleum product imports, capped refined petroleum products, natural gas and condensate imports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Resolution 2379</td>
<td>Further capped petroleum imports, capped crude oil imports</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 Major UNSC Sanctions (Chart made by the authors of this Background Guide)

17 Li Tintin, “聪明制裁’之后联合国对朝制裁的经济效果评估,” 现代国际关系, February 2019, 42.
19 ibid.
20 ibid.
Countries including Australia, Canada, China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and Switzerland have taken measures according to UNSC resolutions, but the United States has unilaterally imposed various sanctions on North Korea beyond the scope of UN's mandate. Most notably, in 2017, President Donald Trump signed an executive order which prohibited the United States from conducting business activities with entities and individuals that trade with North Korea, giving US Department of Treasury the power to sanction “Any individual or entity engaged in major trading activities with North Korea in fields of goods, services, or technology”. Effectively, the measure expects any actor to choose between the US and North Korea and is a typical manifestation of American unilateralism and long-arm jurisdiction.

In conclusion, the international sanctions have restricted North Korea's communication and trade with the outside world, denied its access to resources and machinery, deprived the country of income and foreign reserves, and harmed its economic as well as societal wellbeing. For example, due to a lack of agricultural machinery and medical resources, well over half of the people in the DPRK suffer from major insecurities of food and medical care, including a very large number of women and children under five who are at risk of malnutrition and nearly a quarter of its total population suffering from chronic malnutrition.

Six-Party Talks

The Six-Party Talks are a series of multilateral talks conducted among the six major stakeholders related to the North Korea nuclear program, namely China, DPRK, the United States, Japan, the Russian Federation, and the Republic of Korea, the goal of which is to find a course of action to bring security and stability to the Korean Peninsula following the DPRK's withdrawal from the NPT in 2003. Talks to address the North Korea nuclear issues were first initiated by the DPRK, who breached the Agreed Framework, attempted to develop its nuclear weapons, and hoped to have bilateral talks with the United States. The latter requested the talks to involve all six stakeholders of the issue, and thus facilitated the Six-Party Talks thereafter. There had been six rounds of talks under this framework by 2009 when North Korea decided to pull out from it. Since then, the Six-Party Talks have come to a halt. All six rounds of talks were held in Beijing, China.

The Six-Party Talks served as an important platform for the stakeholders to exchange their opinions on the issue. China and Russia held a consistent position in these talks and urged for the dismantling of North Korea's nuclear weaponry, and proposed their solutions for regional stability. The major concern of Japan and South Korea was to protect their national security from possible nuclear explosions or even armed conflicts. In addition, South Korea also hoped to create a political atmosphere under which the reunification of the North and the South can be achieved. As the two major parties in the conflict, North Korea urged the United States to guarantee its national security, while the United States called for the dismantling of the DPRK nuclear weapons. The United States also had the obligation to protect South Korea in accordance with the Mutual Security Agreement.

25 Ibid
26 Ibid.
Throughout its active period, the Six-Party Talks contributed to facilitating a set of fundamental consensuses on the issue. For instance, in the first-round talk in 2003, a consensus was reached to address the issue peacefully and to pave the way for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula step by step. It was also mentioned that the United States ought to guarantee North Korea’s national security. These consensuses served as guidelines for the feasible solutions proposed afterward. Apart from the guiding principles, the Six-Party Talks also saw the attention to technical details. In the fifth-round talk, the “Action Plan” was adopted by the major stakeholders, which included specific plans for the shutdown of a North Korean nuclear facility and a list of the aid it would receive in exchange. During the talks, the major stakeholders dived further into the details on the denuclearization process, urging the United States to support the DPRK with technical and financial assistance, since the dismantling of nuclear weapons was a rather complex process that required large amounts of resources.

In 2009, however, the mechanism came to a halt as the DPRK pulled out after the international community criticized a North Korean satellite launch in April, which was suspected to be the test for an ICBM. Soon after the incident, North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test.

The Six-Party Talks failed because the stakeholders all pushed the DPRK to abandon its nuclear weaponry without building trust among the DPRK and other countries or addressing its national security concerns. During the years when the mechanism was active, the countries all tried to find a solution where the DPRK would agree to disarm its nuclear weapons and get economic benefits in return. However, the underlying condition, namely the DPRK may give up its nuclear weaponry, wouldn’t stand unless its national security was guaranteed. Ironically, with the absence of mutual trust between the DPRK and the United States, the only guarantee of security for the DPRK is to hold on to its nuclear arsenal. Therefore, it was impractical to find stability for the Korean Peninsula by mere political promises or exchanges of benefits.

Nonetheless, the Six-Party Talks remain an ideal platform for future talks on the issue should the stakeholders approach it with open minds and start recognizing the fact that North Korea may never abandon its nuclear arsenal. With this precondition for multilateral talks, the Six-Party Talks could play its part in bringing the countries back together to the negotiation table once again. As for now, China, Russia, and South Korea are all positive about restarting the Six-Party Talks.


The Agreed Framework was a bilateral agreement signed by the United States and North Korea in Geneva on October 21st, 1994, after North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT. The agreement was the major policy implemented by the Clinton Administration to ensure the denuclearization of the DPRK and attempt to eliminate regional tension.

28 Ibid.
The agreement contained four major parts. In the first part, both sides promised to cooperate to replace the DPRK’s graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities (which were suspected to be related to a covert nuclear weapon program) with light-water reactor (LWR) power plants that were proliferation-resistant. This was to prevent the DPRK from developing nuclear weaponry under the disguise of building regular nuclear power plants. It is worth noting that the United States assured to undertake the implementation of the project. The United States also promised to provide heavy oil to the DPRK as alternative energy before the completion of the LWR. In return, the DPRK promised to freeze the graphite-moderated reactors within one month of the date of the Agreed Framework, whose implementation would be monitored by the IAEA. The DPRK further agreed that it would eventually dismantle the related facilities. In the second and third part of the agreement, both sides promised to “move toward full normalization of political and economic relations,” and to “work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.” In the last part, both sides said they would work together to strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

The Agreed Framework seemed fairly promising on paper, but history has proved that it barely contributed to the peacebuilding efforts, predominantly due to the Clinton Administration's incompetence to fulfil its promises. First, the LWRs were never built since the US-led consortium was poorly financed. Some senators criticized Clinton for "understating their cost while overstating how much US allies would contribute to funding them." Additionally, the promised heavy fuel shipments were often delayed. In terms of the US-North Korean relations, DPRK kept being on the list of state sponsors of terrorism until 2008. No sanction was lifted until six years after the agreement was signed. Lastly, the United States took no action to formally end the Korean War.

With the absence of concrete measures taken to benefit the already-compromised DPRK, the Agreed Framework became another exemplar of empty promises and eventually fell apart in the early 2000s when the DPRK restarted its nuclear weaponization program.

**Inter-Korean Efforts for Peace**

The inter-Korean relations after the Korean War have always been a rollercoaster. Despite the ever-so-sensitive tension between the two countries, some past efforts toward peace facilitated by both the North and the South are worth highlighting.

The diplomatic deadlock after the Korean War first began to change in the late 1980s when South Korea's first democratically elected president Roh Tae-Woo took office and implemented the "Nordpolitik" policy. Through this policy, the South managed to establish diplomatic relations with the DPRK's allies and eventually built trade relations with the North in 1989. In 1991, the two Koreas signed the Basic Agreement as a first step toward building a peace regime. This was followed by a joint declaration issued by the two countries on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. When the first North

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30 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
Korean nuclear crisis emerged in 1993, the new South Korean administration was not always hostile to the North and planned a summit with Kim II Sung after several hard-line attempts failed. Unfortunately, such a summit was never realized due to South Korea's failure to send a condolence message when Kim II Sung died shortly before the planned date of the summit.

The halt in regional dialogue came to an end when Kim Dae Jung took office in South Korea, who instituted the “Sunshine Policy” to promote reconciliation with the DPRK. South Korea began aiding the North which was in a severe famine. In 2000, the inter-Korean relations met a breakthrough when Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jung Il had the first presidential summit between the two countries. Tensions between the two sides decreased to a historic low and they agreed to begin a family reunion. The Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) was established near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) as a symbol of goodwill between the separated countries. The KIC was under the governance of the DPRK but the South Korean personnel were granted access to commercial activities in it. The Sunshine Policy was praised for separating political disputes from economic and humanitarian cooperation. This policy was continued by the next ROK presidency from 2003 to 2008 who facilitated more aid from the South to the North and more government-sponsored investments in the KIC.

However, the tension began to build again after the DPRK’s nuclear tests in 2006. South Korea suspended the aid to the North thereafter. Although the hostility decreased after the Six-Party Talks showed some progress, few bilateral efforts were made to bring the two sides back together. The relations kept deteriorating in the years that followed as the DPRK conducted more nuclear tests. It was not until 2017 when the inter-Korean relations met another breakthrough as the newly elected South Korean President Moon Jae-In is expected to return to the Sunshine Policy.

Kim Jong-Un and Moon Jae-In eventually met in a summit on April 27th, 2018, where both parties conducted sincere conversations and reached a set of meaningful agreements including the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and matters related to an official end of the Korean War. The Panmunjom Declaration was adopted by the two sides. Later in May, the two countries synchronized their time zones to demonstrate their will toward reunion, and loudspeakers at the border were removed. This historic summit also paved the way for a series of summits held among the major stakeholders of the issue including the Trump-Kim summit in 2018.

These continual attempts toward peace by the two countries represent both sides’ goodwill toward a peace regime in the region, but the fragility and sensitivity of the inter-Korean relations are also demonstrated as the dialogues were often interrupted by incidents between the two countries that were not necessarily significant if accessed under a different context. This once again shows that only by addressing the stakeholders’ security concerns can peace and stability eventually be found.

34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
Key Issues

Security Concerns

Security concerns underpin the root cause of tension on the Korean Peninsula. For the US and ROK, the major concern is the DPRK’s nuclear capabilities, which can only be alleviated by denuclearization. The DPRK, on the other hand, worries about the US military presence in South Korea and their joint military exercises. The reduction of US military in Korea and suspension of military exercise can help ease DPRK’s worries.

DPRK’s Nuclear Program

The DPRK used to be one of the contracting parties to the NPT. In January 2003, it withdrew from the NPT, becoming the only country in the world to have broken international norms on prohibiting nuclear weapons testing. The DPRK’s development of nuclear weapons caused a series of regional security and diplomatic issues and has aroused strong condemnation from the international community.

The DPRK’s past rhetoric and behaviour indicate a series of overlapping external political and military goals over time. Some of these goals (such as gaining international recognition) pose political challenges for South Korea and the United States, while others (such as limited conventional military attacks based on nuclear threats) pose significant threats to the security assurance of the US-ROK alliance.

One of the DPRK’s most explicit goals of nuclear weapons development is to deter any preventive or pre-emptive strike by the United States that might threaten the regime’s survival. Since the DPRK cannot undermine the United States’ ability to strike, peacetime deterrence is almost entirely based on Pyongyang’s ability to respond with penalties that the United States cannot afford. If the United States conducts a preventive strike, especially with the purpose of regime change in North Korea, Pyongyang could launch a nuclear attack on South Korean, Japanese and American forces stationed in the region, as well as on the mainland of the United States.39

The most ambitious and risky goal that the DPRK hopes to achieve with the use of nuclear weapons is the feat of reunifying the disunited Korean Peninsula under its leadership.40 Even if it is unlikely for Pyongyang to take actual actions to attempt the riskiest or most difficult targets, political discussions in the United States and South Korea have made it clear that policymakers still have concerns.

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Therefore, the US-ROK alliance prefers to strengthen its defensive and offensive military capabilities to deter future aggression or coercion from Pyongyang as a precaution. Such as deploying new weapons to strike Pyongyang, building new missile defence systems, and/or deploying additional US nuclear facilities in/near South Korea. However, the latest dynamic shows that any measures are also likely to elicit a chain reaction in the region. In 2017, for example, after the decision to allow the United States to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system on its territory, South Korea received economic penalties from other countries with security concerns.

**US-ROK Alliance/US military Presence in Korea**

With the signing of the Mutual Defence Treaty in October, 1953, the US-ROK Alliance was forged in direct response to pressing security needs on the Korean Peninsula. ROK’s vulnerability to renewed attack from DPRK, and its strategic importance as a bulwark against the spread of the Soviet Union aggression in East Asia, knit US and ROK’s needs together. If the original purpose of the alliance was to avoid war, then the US somehow did provide a security guarantee to a weak South Korea.

The issue of operational control is the hinge that makes the US-ROK Alliance so unique, and maybe the most significant reason why the DPRK has been so hostile to all previous military exercises held by the alliance as well. According to the treaty, South Korea has operational control of its military under armistice conditions, but the United States would take over in wartime. It is reflected in the structure of the Combined Forces Command (the alliance’s war-fighting command), headed by a US four-star general while a South Korean four-star general serves as deputy commander. If the armistice is violated and a war breaks out, the US combatant commander would be able to direct, assign or suspend the duty of subordinate South Korean commanders or forces.

With 28,500 American soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines in South Korea, USFK is a primary presence in the region and a major manifestation of the US government’s aim in Asia-Pacific area\footnote{United States Forces Korea, “Organization of USFK,” United States Forces Korea, accessed Jan.16th 2021, https://www.usfk.mil/Organization/.}. Its mission is to exercise operational control of US forces from the United States Indo-Pacific Command. USFK’s mission also includes planning non-combatant evacuation operations to ensure that US and other allied countries’ citizens can be removed from harm’s way if the situation changed.
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<td>Seventh Air Force</td>
<td>Osan Air Base, South Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commander Naval Forces Korea</td>
<td>Yongsan Garrison, South Korea</td>
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<td>Marine Forces Korea</td>
<td>Yongsan Garrison, South Korea</td>
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<tr>
<td>Special Operations Command Korea</td>
<td>Camp Kim, Yongsan, South Korea</td>
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</table>

Table 3 Components of USFK

The two major war games that USFK hold are “Exercise Ulchi-Freedom Guardian (UFG)” and “Exercise Key Resolve and Foal Eagle”, and both simulate how to respond to a potential nuclear attack from the DPRK. In addition to the USFK and ROK Armed Forces, there is also a selection of Sending States from the United Nations Command participating in the drills. In 2016, for example, nine countries -- Australia, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, France, Italy, Philippines, United Kingdom and New Zealand -- took part in the Exercise Ulchi-Freedom Guardian.

Exercise Ulchi-Freedom Guardian was initiated in 1976 and is conducted annually during August or September. The number of participants is usually around 80,000 every year. It is featured as the world's largest computerized command and control implementation. UFG typically incorporates a Crisis Management Exercise, a Senior Leader Seminar and a two-week Computer Assisted Exercise. The exercise culminates in detailed senior leader level After-Action Reviews.

Key Resolve, previously known as Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, Integration (RSOI), is conducted between February and April. It focuses on United States Indo-Pacific Command Operation Plans that support the defence of South Korea, and was combined in 2001 with another annual military drill "Foal Eagle" as "Exercise Foal Eagle and Key Resolve". Unlike Exercise Ulchi-Freedom Guardian, Exercise Foal Eagle and Key Resolve focuses on field maneuvers. The number of soldiers involved ranged from tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands. In 2012, about 200,000 South Korean soldiers participated, while the exercises in 2016 involved more than 300,000 ROK and 15,000 US armed forces. Besides, the exercises often involve large-scale surface combatants and sophisticated weaponry. In 2015, the US deployed a Littoral Combat Ship to train with the ROK Navy and the US Navy’s Seventh Fleet for the first time. In 2016, the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier John C. Stennis took part in the drills.

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44 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
Although the allies have stressed that these joint exercises are purely defensive in nature, it still has been a source of controversy between the US-ROK Alliance and the DPRK. Pyongyang routinely regards the exercises as a provocative escalation of tensions on the Korean Peninsula and denounces it as a preparation for war. In response to Exercise Key Resolve and Foal Eagle 2008, North Korea's Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland stated that “Dialogue and confrontation, peace and war can never go together. We will sternly take self-defensive steps to defend peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula.”

In 2018, after the summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un in Singapore, US President Trump halted the war games on the peninsula. But Trump also stressed that the military exercises could start immediately if the denuclearization talks with the North break down. After the DPRK–US Hanoi Summit in February 2019, the United States Department of Defence announced that the alliance decided to conclude the Exercise Key Resolve and Foal Eagle. They were replaced by the Dong Maeng joint military exercise in 2019, which was intended to be a smaller-scale version of the Key Resolve and Foal Eagle exercises.

According to Patrick Shanahan, the acting Secretary of Defence at the time, the scaled-down exercise was designed to reduce tensions and support US diplomatic efforts to achieve complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a final, fully verified manner. And it mostly involved computer simulations, not mobilization of troops or military equipment. The Exercise Dong Maeng was held March 4 thru 12 of 2019, and the second was held August 5 thru 20 of 2019.

However, North Korea said it launched two projectiles, suspected of being short-range ballistic missiles, and condemns the exercise as a rehearsal for an invasion. North Korea warned that going ahead with the exercise would undermine a commitment made by the US President Donald Trump to the North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un and could adversely affect working-level negotiations with the United States.

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52 Ibid.
Sanctions Against North Korea

As described in the current situation, North Korea has been under heavy sanctions from the international community. Advocates of sanctions believe that they could serve as a warning to North Korea and could thereby drive it out of its nuclear aggression. Sanctions on the DPRK have carried a message that the country would continue to be economically punished until it suspends its nuclear programs and embraces the rest of the international community. Major stakeholders in the Security Council hoped that these sanctions would force the DPRK into believing that it would be a much better option to comply with the international community in which case its economic development would be less disturbed, thus denuclearizing the country. Meanwhile, optimists believe that the sanctions targeting its industrial raw materials would nerf North Korea’s heavy industry which is essential for the development of nuclear weaponry. These sanctions may also stress out North Korea’s government budget and therefore forcing the country to defund its nuclear program.

However, recent progress of the event manifests that the sanctions so far, rather than ending the nuclear program of the DPRK, have more or less reinforced the country’s belief that maintaining a nuclear arsenal is essential to its survival. The lack of enforcement aside, these sanctions fail for some more profound reasons.

As a politically and ideologically isolated country, North Korea couldn’t simply switchgear and comply in the absence of trust-building with the west. Survived and thrived under the anxiety that the western powers would threaten its national security and regime survival, North Korea has established a sense that keeping a nuclear arsenal is the fundamental guarantee for the country’s well-being. In other words, compromising to the sanctions and embracing the world may or may not buy the DPRK a better economic environment, whereas keeping the nuclear program definitely guarantees its security. For North Korea today, taking the chance to trust the west and disarm itself is way too risky. Even if the North Korean government deems the west trust-worthy and believes they can trade nuclear-guaranteed national security for the economy, the former is still more likely to be the top priority without which the latter would be a luxury. Therefore, the decrease in government budget would not be compensated by cutting nuclear programs. It’s unrealistic to discourage and defund the DPRK’s nuclear program using economic sanctions. As academic John Delury put it, “if Kim and his generals have to tighten their belts, the nuclear and missile programs are about the last things they will cut. On the contrary, in the absence of diplomatic talks and under intensified pressure, Pyongyang is likely to double-down on its nuclear deterrent, which it sees as its best guarantee of national security and regime survival.”

These sanctions, apart from being less than helpful in terms of denuclearizing the DPRK, are potentially making matters worse as the deeper isolation they impose on North Korea might someday trigger the country’s catastrophic overreaction.

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A major lesson-learned from the failure of international sanctions is that a long-term strategy centering on trust-building and dialogues is urgently needed to draw the different parties out of this dilemma. It’s fair to consider approaches other than sanctions to diffuse tensions and resolve disputes, such as denuclearization and the establishment of peace regimes.

Withdrawing sanctions is also one of the most immediate and important demands of the North Korean, and its ultimatum was the end of 2019. This is because according to UNSC resolution 2375, North Korean migrant workers must return to North Korea before the end of 2019, which will greatly reduce North Korea’s overseas remittance and foreign exchange earnings. On Dec. 2019, China and Russia proposed that the UNSC lift the ban on North Korea exports of seafood and textiles, as well as the repatriation of North Korean workers by the end of 2019. But the US insisted that no sanctions can be lifted before North Korea gave up its nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

Since North Korea is greatly hurt by existing sanctions and eager to have them lifted, withdrawing sanctions is a crucial quid pro quo in negotiation with North Korea. Removal of sanctions against North Korea can be the counterpart on the US side to denuclearization on the North Korean side as mentioned before, and a crucial component of a lasting peace regime on the Korean Peninsula as will be mentioned later.

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Possible Solutions

Double Suspension of Freezing Nuclear Development and Military Exercise

Due to the security dilemma in the region, neither the DPRK nor ROK would be willing to concede if no guarantee of equivalent move on the other party was provided. In other words, mutual trust and understanding are needed to resume the negotiation. Therefore, the “Double Suspension” may offer help.

“Double Suspension” requires that the DPRK suspend its nuclear and missile program on the one hand while the ROK and US suspend large-scale military exercise on the other. This would help remove the current security dilemma that has been hindering talks among all parties. It has been proposed in 2017 and has actually contributed to reconciling the DPRK with ROK. Under the guidance of “Double Suspension” and “Double-track”, “Double Postponement” was agreed on the Korean Peninsula. The Pyeongchang 2018 Olympics served as a perfect opportunity for communication between the North and the South and resulted in restraint on both parties. Bilateral talks continued after the event, the heads of states met twice in April and June and agreed on concrete measures on both sides. The DPRK didn’t continue its nuclear and missile program while the US-ROK joint military exercise was postponed. To recognize the joint effort, the US Department of Defence announced the “indefinite suspension” of military exercise with ROK, even though such exercise resumed later on a smaller scale.

"Double Suspension" provides the negotiation premise. The mechanism clearly identifies that both the nuclear program of the DPRK and the US-ROK military exercise hinder the peacebuilding of the peninsula. Unfortunately, both the US and ROK refused to accept the proposal of “Double-track” and “Double Suspension”. The Blue House recently made an announcement over the Korean nuclear issues which highly corresponds to the above-mentioned mechanism, but it only made a vague statement of “a phased package approach is needed” from President Moon Jae-in.

Moreover, the temporary solution of “Double postponement” can only calm the situation, but not address the issue fundamentally in the long run. The problem in the Korean Peninsula lies in the deep sense of insecurity on both sides, which can be alleviated by a sustainable peacebuilding process, such as the “Double-track” mechanism.

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Double-track of Denuclearization and Building Peace Regime

After all parties are once again committed to negotiation, ultimate peacebuilding can be completed under the “Double-track” mechanism. The first track refers to the denuclearization of the DPRK, while the other implies the eventual peacebuilding and normalization of the US-DPRK relations. Although the latter may be realized by removing security dilemma and imposing sanctions, relevant parties all refuse to make the first move due in part to different concerns, hence, a parallel solution is the most feasible way forward. The “Double-track” mechanism combines denuclearization and peacebuilding, tackling all critical issues at once.\(^9\)

Complete and verifiable denuclearization requires that North Korea adopts transparency regarding disarming its nuclear infrastructure, rejoins the NPT, and resubmits sites to inspection by the IAEA. North Korea must also be prepared to disclose the size of its nuclear stockpile, and reveal all the sites of enrichment, reprocessing, storage, assembly, and other related for fissile material and warheads, and submit these sites to IAEA inspection.\(^60\)

Pyongyang must conform to UN Security Council resolutions banning it from nuclear testing. A step further would be North Korea rejoining the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which would be an important step to limiting and eventually giving up its nuclear weapons capability as well as facilitating its reintegration with the international community.

Likewise, North Korea must agree to limits on weapons systems capable of delivering nuclear payloads, disclose missile stockpile numbers and production sites. Conform to the UN Security Council ban on space launches so long as it is pursuing nuclear weapons. North Korea must also agree to cease its proliferation of ballistic missile technology and address concerns about the potential transfer of nuclear material or technology to other parties.

An agreed roadmap for phased denuclearization could be comprised of the following stages:

- North Korean ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and its elimination, under agreed verification and monitoring procedures, of all nuclear weapons test facilities;
- A halt to production of nuclear weapons;
- Disablement and then destruction under IAEA supervision of all production facilities;
- An end to all nuclear design and research activity in this area, with a particular focus on the North Korea’s ICBM\(^61\) program;
- The end of production of weapons-grade fissile materials, closure and eventual dismantlement of certain facilities; and limitation and reduction of nuclear charges.\(^62\)

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\(^60\) Elizabeth Philipp, “Resuming Negotiations with North Korea,” North Korea Nuclear Policy Brief from Arms Control Association, June 24, 2016.

\(^61\) An ICBM is a missile with a minimum range of 5,500 kilometers (3,400 mi) primarily designed for nuclear weapons delivery.

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<th>Specific facilities or activities</th>
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<th>ELIMINATE or SET LIMITS-long term-6 to 10 years</th>
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<td>(covert)Centrifuge Facility</td>
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Table 4 Nuclear weapons, missiles and materials\(^{67}\)

The other track, building the peace regime, is also crucial because the international community can only expect North Korea to de-nuclearize by eliminating its motivation of developing nuclear weapons, namely, security. Proposals that seek to establish lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula have to address the legitimate security concerns on all sides.\(^{68}\)

The armistice signed on July 27, 1953, only marked a “truce” on the Korean Peninsula, whereas the war did not end in the legal sense. The Neutral Nations Supervision Committee and the Korean Armistice International Management Committee established by the armistice have ceased operation, and North Korea has announced that it would no longer be bound by the armistice.\(^{69}\)

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\(^{63}\) An intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) is a ballistic missile with a range of 3,000–5,500 km (1,864–3,418 miles), between a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) and an ICBM.

\(^{64}\) A submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) is a ballistic missile capable of being launched from submarines.

\(^{65}\) A launch vehicle or carrier rocket is a rocket-propelled vehicle used to carry a payload from Earth’s surface to space, usually to Earth orbit or beyond; and a launch system includes the launch vehicle, launch pad, vehicle assembly and fueling systems, range safety, and other related infrastructure.

\(^{66}\) High-Enriched Uranium is a type of uranium in which the percent composition of uranium-235 (written \(^{235}\)U) has been increased through the process of isotope separation.

\(^{67}\) This graph is a simplified version of the report of “A technically-informed roadmap for North Korea’s denuclearization” from Center for International Security and Cooperation Stanford University, with aim of demonstrating the main aspects of negotiation. The blanks signify the possible solutions.


Effectively, the armistice is dysfunctional and no alternative mechanism for peace exists. Furthermore, the US doesn’t see North Korea as a legitimate country and routinely threatens it with regime change. Historical lessons amplify such fear. Even though Libyan leader Gaddafi gave up nuclear weapon development, the US and its European allies help rebels overthrow its government in 2011. The fact that President Trump unilaterally withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, also known as the Iran nuclear deal, less than 3 years after the US signed it, raises doubts concerning the credibility of American commitment.

Taking the aforementioned facts into consideration, any viable peace proposals will have to be lasting, institutional and unaffected by the change of administrations. More specifically, the package of peace treaties may include the Korean War that clarifies the status, obligation and rights of all parties, a “North Korea-South Korea Agreement” based on the “North Korea-South Korea Basic Agreement” in 1991, and the “US-North Korea Agreement” that normalizes their relations and assuages security worries.

On the North Korean side, peace proposals can offer security and also facilitate participation in the international community, thereby ending diplomatic isolation and economic difficulties. After obtaining reliable security guarantees, North Korea can gradually abandon its nuclear weapons under the supervision and inspection of the IAEA and other relevant international organizations. The country can further commit to never develop nuclear weapons under the precondition of safety. In this process, North Korea will incrementally become a full-fledged and trusted member of the international community, thereby eliminating the motivation for developing nuclear weapons in the first place.

On the US and South Korean side, since they claim that American military installation in South Korea mainly responds to North Korean threat, the establishment of peace regime should remove the legitimacy of such military presence and exercises. The United States should also put its “Four Nos” promises into practise, namely, not seek to change or destroy the Korean regime, not to accelerate the reunification of the peninsula, not to find excuses for stationing troops north of the military demarcation line, and not to aggravate the suffering of the North Korean people. Both US and South Korea should find ways to guarantee that their commitments would not be affected by the change of government administrations.

However, daunting difficulty lies ahead of the realization of peace proposals. Quick opening and integration with the outside world might destabilize North Korean societies, or help western attempts of “peaceful evolution”. To maintain its hegemony in Asia-Pacific, the US has always wanted a Korean Peninsula with controllable tension, to perpetuate its presence and domination over its allies. Even as it pushes North Korea to give concessions on denuclearization, the US itself is not enthusiastic about resolving disputes and achieving permanent peace in the region. Compared with denuclearization and lifting sanctions, peace proposals remain long-term pursuits.
Bloc Positions

North Korea

As the focal point of all contentions, the DPRK is in the key position to break the deadlock and ensure peace and security on the Peninsula. However, its attitude towards nuclear power is ambivalent and its strategy varied over time. In the long term, to denuclearize is the optimal result, but in the short term, to “nuclearize” provides considerable leverage.

Deeply influenced by its former leaders, Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-Il, North Korea upholds Juche Idea and Songun Policy as the overriding theme. Its strategic priority is to guarantee national sovereignty and political stability that lay the foundation for its socialist construction. Its major concern lies in the asymmetric regional security structure and the persisting US hostility. The presence of the US forces in South Korea poses an overwhelming threat to the DPRK, while the repeated US-ROK joint military exercises are deemed as a flagrant provocation. With lessons drawn from its precedents, namely the collapse of the Saddam regime and the Qaddafi regime to the US withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal, North Korea became increasingly aware that developing nuclear weapons is the only way to deter western intervention. In this context, the DPRK is unwilling to compromise its nuclear deterrence until the US withdraws its forces, ceases the joint military exercises, and ends the hostile policy.

Through decades of negotiations, it has virtually become a customary tactic for North Korea to alternate between developing nuclear power as a means of deterrence, and making compromises in exchange for the sanction lifting or international assistance. However, such a tactic could neither satisfy the fundamental demands of North Korea nor promote denuclearization on the Peninsula. With a growing sense of security brought by its improved defence capabilities, North Korea gradually shifted its strategic focus from solely pursuing its nuclear build-up to simultaneously promoting economic construction and nuclear development and then to fully concentrating on the construction of its socialist economy. Nevertheless, the external environment remains unfavourable without the normalization of North Korea's diplomatic relations.

International recognition is one thing North Korea has long been pursuing, especially since Kim Jong Un labelled the DPRK as a “responsible nuclear power”. Recently, North Korea has attempted to start multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament to indirectly legitimize its nuclear possession, and has expressed its hope to build a world free from nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, being fed up with empty promises and repeated delays in easing sanctions, the DPRK decided to make no more unilateral compromises, and demanded quid pro quo from the United States.

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South Korea

As one of America's key allies in North-East Asia, South Korea used to be highly dependent on financial support and military shelter from the US. The financial and military dominance came along with America’s political influence, subordinating South Korea's foreign policy to America’s national strategies. In recent years, however, South Korea has been reinforcing its self-reliance by building a ROK-led self-defense system based on the US-ROK alliance. Furthermore, despite their common stances against North Korea, the gap between South Korea and the US has widened in terms of their proposed solutions to the issue and their vision for the Peninsula. North Korea is inclined to a peaceful and Peninsula-centered resolution led by the ROK and DPRK, while the US insists upon its intervention and dominance in the issue to fulfill its own demands under the Asia-Pacific strategic framework.

The Inter-Korean relationship plays a critical part in the peacebuilding on the Korean Peninsula. Despite their differences in social system and ideology, there is a broad range of common interests between the two sides, including economic cooperation, reunion of separated families, national unity, and the peaceful unification of the Peninsula. Even as the ultimate goal of denuclearization remains constant, the approaches of different South Korean administrations swayed greatly. Towards North Korea, South Korea oscillated between cooperation and confrontation. The key difference is whether to hold political concessions (denuclearization) as an absolute precondition for economic cooperation or to proceed with both issues separately. Conservative administrations are more friendly towards the US and Japan, while progressive administrations are more critical.

Still, with the accumulation of North Korea's nuclear power, South Korea cannot but rely on the US to defend its national security, constituting a balance of terror. Meanwhile, South Korea actively negotiates with geopolitical partners (including China and Japan) to mediate the dispute and ease the tension. On the whole, it remains a national vision and security objective of South Korea to promote a peaceful and prosperous Korean Peninsula.

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The United States

The United States policy towards North Korea was in a close bond with its Asia-Pacific strategies. The Korean War rang an alarm bell for the United States to reinforce its military presence in North-East Asia to maintain its dominant status in this region. To this end, fostering a robust constellation of allies and partners became the optimal way to extend its power.\(^{76}\) The US installed its military forces in South Korea and held joint military exercises annually to safeguard its allies and put pressure on North Korea. It also strove to bring South Korea and Japan closer to each other to strengthen their trilateral alliance.

The principles and goals have also been to prevent nuclear proliferation and maintain dominance. Since the end of the Cold War, to curb and press became the keynote of the US policy towards North Korea, manifested by the continually imposed military threats, economic sanctions, and diplomatic isolation. Since the 9/11 incident struck the United States with horror, the American government has regarded terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) as grave threats to its national security. “Unfriendly” countries, including North Korea, Iraq, and Iran, were listed as “State Sponsors of Terrorism” and even targets of America’s pre-emptive strikes.\(^{77}\)

US shows not just sticks, but also carrots sometimes when the US promised to partly lift its sanctions and provide food, energy, financial, and humanitarian aid for the DPRK in exchange for its suspension of nuclear tests. The DPRK-US Agreed Framework in 1994 was one example. However, despite the consensus on the principle of “verbal to verbal, action to action”, both sides constantly failed to fulfill their obligations. Due to the constraint from the US Congress and a misjudgment that there would be a rapid collapse of the DPRK, the US provision of aid was delayed and thus brought a confidence crisis between the two parties.\(^{78}\)

In short, hostility between the US and DPRK dates back to the Cold War, consisting of not only military but also political, ideological, and socioeconomic elements. The United States upheld its principle of “preserving peace through strength” and refused to withdraw its troops from South Korea or lift its unilateral sanctions until North Korea achieves “Complete, Verifiable, and Irreversible Denuclearization” (CVID). Such hostility exacerbated the conflict and repeatedly triggered crisis and tension on the Peninsula.


China

China is one major stakeholder in the North Korean nuclear issue. North Korea's nuclear tests posed severe threats to China's national security, while the US-ROK joint military exercises continued to generate tension in North-East Asia. What’s particularly intolerable was the US installation of the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system in South Korea. The THAAD system includes a radar that places China under its detection range, and is capable of conducting “hit-to-kill" operations that could be used to track and intercept Chinese missiles, which gravely undermines China's national interests. Therefore, such an action aroused fierce nation-wide opposition in China, and put the bilateral relationship between China and South Korea under pressure.

China's policy towards North Korea consists of two dimensions. On the one hand, China takes a firm stand with the international community against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, exemplified by its affirmative votes for the latest UNSC sanctions against North Korea's nuclear activities. On the other hand, China is fully aware and supportive of the legitimate concerns and interests of North Korea. Based on these considerations, China promotes a peaceful resolution based on multilateral dialogues and negotiations. Working together with South Korea and others, China conducted frequent diplomatic mediation to bring North Korea back to the Six-Party Talks. To break the current deadlock between the US and North Korea, China has proposed the “Double Suspension” and “Double-track” solution.

Japan

As the only country in the world that has ever suffered a nuclear strike, Japan is particularly sensitive to the nuclear threat posed by North Korea. North Korea’s November 2017 ballistic missile launch that flew over Japan was regarded an “intolerable provocation" that posed an “unprecedented, grave and imminent threat" to its national security.

Japan's strategic goal is to strengthen its political leverage in North-East Asia through increased participation and contributions to the North Korean nuclear issue. But contrary to the government’s expectations, Japan is still less involved in the negotiations on the North Korean nuclear issue compared with China and South Korea. Especially since 2018, when North Korea commenced peaceful dialogues with most of the other stakeholders, Japan became increasingly marginalized and isolated.

There are obstacles from both the past and the present that hindered the communication between Japan and North Korea. The 1970s-1980s abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korea aroused fierce public resentment in Japan. The returning of all abductees was left unsolved and was brought up by the Japanese government as a precondition for any negotiation on the North Korean nuclear issue or the normalization of Japan-DPRK relations.

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relations. Historical disputes, along with the strong influence of the US strategies, made the Japanese attitude towards North Korea relatively tough in the early phase, imposing strict sanctions that failed to produce any favourable result. Furthermore, North Korea preferred direct dialogues with the US and therefore rejected Japan’s communication attempts.

To prevent being marginalized, Japan made adjustments to reduce the aggressiveness of its diplomatic strategies and strengthened its relationship with the US, China, and South Korea. Based on its successful experience participating in the former Six-Party talks, Japan decided to promote a peaceful solution through bilateral and multilateral dialogues.

EU

The European Union (EU) holds a policy of Critical Engagement towards North Korea, imposing pressure through sanctions on one hand while seeking communication and dialogues on the other. Its major goals include promoting a complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization, reducing tensions on the Peninsula and beyond, and building a global non-proliferation regime. The EU works in concert with the UNSC to apply restrictive measures targeting the DPRK’s nuclear-related, WMD-related, as well as ballistic missile-related programs. It supports the UN-based sanctions while adopting additional autonomous measures as complements. Many EU member states are promoting dialogues through diplomatic channels, thus providing a solid foundation for the EU to develop a more proactive role in the issue. Meanwhile, proliferation with the humanitarian impacts that the restrictive measures have brought to North Korea. Sanctions on the transfer of goods and funds have somehow blocked the channels for humanitarian aids to enter North Korea, impeding its procurement and delivery. To address this problem, the EU strives to accelerate the approval process for the exemptions from UN sanctions for humanitarian assistance related transfers.

Russia

The Russian Federation seeks to maintain a favourable balance of power in Northeast Asia in general and to prevent the US from over-expanding its military presence in particular. The growing tension gave rise to an arms race where Japan and South Korea sought to strengthen their own deterrence against the nuclear threat, thus providing chances for the US to strengthen its alliance and extend its dominance in the region. In this context, Russia tries to avoid escalation of the matter, works with China to promote multilateral dialogues under the framework of the Six-Party Talks, and firmly supports a complete and peaceful denuclearization on the Peninsula. Furthermore, Russia strives to build a new security architecture in Northeast Asia that would take into account the legitimate interests of all states in the region, including the DPRK itself, and is more or less opposed to the tough sanctions imposed by the US and Japan that are regarded as attempts to improve the security of the US and its allies at the expense of that of the DPRK.  

Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs)

Ever since the DPRK conducted its first nuclear test in 2006, intergovernmental organizations showed great concern and imposed sanctions. Apart from the UNSC sanctions as mentioned before, the NPT established in 1968 also plays an important role in resolving the DPRK nuclear issue. However, the NPT has lost its power over the DPRK since it withdrew from the treaty in 2003, which demonstrated the great obstacle in the future of the NPT regime. Throughout the escalation of tension, the NPT kept calling for the DPRK’s return and shutdown of its ongoing nuclear programs.

In support of the resolutions adopted UN Security Council Resolutions, another important intergovernmental organization, the IAEA also decided that the DPRK's nuclear program is a serious security concern and should be abandoned immediately. Though the above-mentioned withdrawal prohibited the IAEA from investigating its domestic institutions directly, the organization never stopped calling upon the DPRK for cooperation and acceptance of full inspection.

After the initiation of the ad hoc monitoring and verification arrangement in July 2007, the Director-General of IAEA submits a report to the Board of Governors annually with the topic of Application of Safeguards in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The reports include the verification of DPRK's nuclear facilities and the future intentions of the Agency. However, at the behest of the DPRK, the monitoring and verification arrangement was ceased on 15 April 2009 which prevented the IAEA from providing further conclusions since then. Throughout the 14 reports released so far, the IAEA generally recognized  


the shutdown of some nuclear facilities in the DPRK but also showed concern over the indications of enriched uranium production at Yongbyon. More importantly, the report always reinstates the position of the IAEA: The Director-General continues to call upon the DPRK to fully comply with its obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions, to come into full compliance with the NPT.

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Questions to Consider

How can we encourage both sides (the DPRK and the US-South Korea) to negotiate when the security dilemma is not guaranteed to be removed?

How can the IGOs stay engaged in the issue after the DPRK withdrew from the NPT which prevents it from being thoroughly investigated?

Do you think economic sanctions against North Korea have been effective? If not, what measures can be the alternatives?

What are the short and long term goals of North Korea's nuclear program?

From North Korea's standpoint, why is the US not to be trusted historically?

Different administrations of the United States implemented a variety of foreign policies toward the DPRK. What do these policies share in common? How have they evolved?

Is there a possibility for the DPRK to abandon its nuclear arsenal as the international community calls for? If yes, under what circumstances would that happen; if not, are any other compromises possible?

What is the major barrier between the US and DPRK that kept them from progressing with peaceful dialogues? And through what approaches can we break it down?

What lessons can we draw from the multiple peaceful attempts made in the past?

What are the results of imposing international sanctions against North Korea? Can these sanctions affect a radical cure of the problem?
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