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Beijing International Model United Nations 2024

Background Guide

The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations

Topic: Reform of UN Peacekeeping (1995)

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Welcome Letter

Dear delegates,

Welcome to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations at Beijing International Model United Nations 2024! The Directors would like to extend our warmest greetings to you all.

The discussions in our committee will be located on the critical period of transition from second-generation to third-generation peacekeeping operations (1995), during which the United Nations had suffered setbacks in peacekeeping, including the failures of the UNPROFOR, UNAMIR and UNOSOM, which had been challenged to respond to and implement reforms of peacekeeping operations.

United Nations peacekeeping operations began with the establishment of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in 1948. UN peacekeeping has become an effective tool for global crisis management and armed conflict management.

In this process, one of the questions that always accompanies dimension and action is: what are the effects of dimension and action? Can UN peacekeeping be replaced? UN peacekeeping operations are at least one of the essential options for curbing the spread of armed conflicts and maintaining international stability. The question of where dimension and action are successful and which are present becomes an important issue for both the research and policymakers involved. In the conference, the tension between national interests, the authority of the United Nations and humanitarianism will be played out on the floor.

This Background Guide aims to provide delegates with elaboration on the dilemma faced by the peacekeeping and offer preliminary ideas on how these issues could possibly be solved. Delegates of all countries decide whether to take on more responsibilities or to return to the "holy trinity" of peacekeeping principles. While our committee has striven hard to address both the symptoms and the root of the problem, our provision of insights and solutions is not without its limits. Delegates are therefore encouraged to conduct extended researches on the topics and complement our imperfections with your own creativity.

The Directors sincerely wish you all a memorable and fruitful academic journey with us in BIMUN 2024 this May!

Warmest Regards,

Directors of The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations

February, 2024

Introduction to the Committee

The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, also known as the C34, is a subsidiary body of the Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly.

As a unique, multilateral body consisting of 157 Member States, the C34 brings together a wide range of peacekeeping stakeholders, including the Permanent Members of the Security Council, police-contributing countries, leading financial contributors to the peacekeeping budget, several host states and others. The C34 is mandated to carry out a comprehensive review of all issues relating to peacekeeping operations. In this role, it makes recommendations, by way of annual reports that are adopted by consensus, to peacekeeping stakeholders. In response, the Secretary-General publishes an annual report on the implementation of these recommendations, outlining the measures taken by the Secretariat.

UN peacekeeping is a unique global partnership. It brings together the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Secretariat, troop and police contributors and the host governments in a combined effort to maintain international peace and security. Its strength lies in the legitimacy of the UN Charter and in the wide range of contributing countries that participate and provide precious resources.

UN Peacekeeping helps countries navigate the difficult path from conflict to peace. We have unique strengths, including legitimacy, burden sharing, and an ability to deploy troops and police from around the world, integrating them with civilian peacekeepers to address a range of mandates set by the UN Security Council and General Assembly.

Peacekeeping has proven to be one of the most effective tools available to the UN to assist host countries navigate the difficult path from conflict to peace.

United Nations Peacekeeping began in 1948 when the Security Council authorized the deployment of UN military observers to the Middle East.¹ The earliest armed peacekeeping operation was the First UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) deployed successfully in 1956 to address the Suez Crisis.²

In the 1960s and 1970s, the UN established short-term missions and started longer term deployments in many areas. In 1988, UN peacekeepers were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. At that time, the Nobel Committee cited the Peacekeeping Forces through their efforts have made important contributions towards the realization of one of the fundamental tenets of the United Nations. Thus, the world organization has come to play a more central part in world affairs and has been invested with increasing trust.

¹ UN, "What is the peacekeeping-OUR HISTORY," *United Nations*, Jan 30,2024 Accessed, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/our-history>.

² *Ibid.*

General Introduction

With the end of the Cold War, the strategic context for UN Peacekeeping changed dramatically. The nature of conflicts also changed over the years. UN Peacekeeping, originally developed as a means of dealing with inter-state conflict, was increasingly being applied to intrastate conflicts and civil wars. UN Peacekeepers were now increasingly asked to undertake a wide variety of complex tasks, from helping to build sustainable institutions of governance, to human rights monitoring, to security sector reform, to the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants.

UN Peacekeeping's goals were primarily limited to maintaining ceasefires and stabilizing situations on the ground so that efforts could be made at the political level to resolve the conflict by peaceful means. Those missions consisted of military observers and lightly armed troops with monitoring, reporting, and confidence-building roles in support of ceasefires and limited peace agreements. Troops and police came from a relatively small number of countries, and they were almost exclusively men.³

These three high-profile peacekeeping operations came under criticism as peacekeepers faced situations where warring parties failed to adhere to peace agreements, or where the peacekeepers themselves were not provided adequate resources or political support. As civilian casualties rose and hostilities continued, the reputation of UN Peacekeeping suffered.

The setbacks of the early and mid-1990s led the Security Council to limit the number of new peacekeeping missions and begin a process of self-reflection to prevent such failures from happening again.⁴ The Secretary-General commissioned an independent inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and, at the request of the General Assembly, provided a comprehensive assessment on the 1993-1995 events in Srebrenica in the former Yugoslavia.⁵ The circumstances that led to the UN withdrawal from Somalia were also carefully examined. In the meantime, UN peacekeepers continued their long-term operations in the Middle East, Asia and Cyprus.

With continuing crises in a number of countries and regions, the essential role of UN Peacekeeping has to be emphatically reaffirmed.

³ UN, "HISTORICAL TIMELINE OF UN PEACEKEEPING," *United Nations*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/historical-timeline-of-un-peacekeeping>.

⁴ UN, "UN PEACEKEEPING: 70 YEARS OF SERVICE & SACRIFICE", *United Nations*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/un-peacekeeping-70-years-of-service-sacrifice>.

⁵ *Ibid.*

Current Situation

Review of Policy Advocacy

a. History and Original Aim of Peacekeeping

The historical backdrop of UN peacekeeping can be traced back to 1948 when its most memorable peacekeeping activity was a tactical spectator bunch in the Middle East, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). This aims to monitor the ceasefire between the Palestinians and neighboring Arab states. Since then, UN peacekeeping has evolved and expanded many times, going through several distinct phases:

1. Early Observation Operations (1948-1956):

The primary component of the initial peacekeeping operation was the deployment of military observers to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire agreement.⁶ The deployment of military observers for monitoring the implementation of a ceasefire agreement is in line with the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter. The relevant Charter basis for peacekeeping operations can be found in Chapter VI and Chapter VII. In the context of the statement, the deployment of military observers to monitor a ceasefire agreement aligns with the idea of using peaceful means to settle disputes and prevent the resumption of hostilities. Article 42 empowers the Security Council to take military action to restore international peace and security. However, the use of force is typically a last resort and is only authorized after all non-military means of resolution have been exhausted.⁷

In the context of the statement, the deployment of military observers is more in line with the initial stages of peacekeeping under Chapter VI, focused on monitoring and preventing the resurgence of hostilities rather than taking direct military action.

In summary, the deployment of military observers for monitoring the implementation of a ceasefire agreement aligns with the principles outlined in both Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, emphasizing the preference for peaceful means to settle disputes and maintain international peace and security.⁸

2. First Generation Peacekeeping Operations (1956-1988):

The original peacekeeping tasks were set apart by the Suez Canal crisis in Egypt in 1956 and the ensuing making of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I). Such peacekeepers are usually deployed after an explicit ceasefire agreement, neutral, and limited to monitoring, patrolling, and separating parties to the conflict.

3. Second Generation Peacekeeping Operations (1988-present):

Since the late 1980s, the international community's expectations of UN peacekeeping have changed, with peacekeeping operations taking on more tasks such as civilian affairs, election monitoring, human rights protection, and aid distribution. The United Nations Security Council may mandate more robust peacekeeping operations. These are "multidimensional peacekeeping operations," reflecting their complexity and multifaceted mandates.

⁶ Wheeler, Nicholas J, "Reflections on the Legality and Legitimacy of NATO's Intervention in Kosovo," *The International Journal of Human Rights*, Jan 18, 2024 Accessed, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13642980008406897>.

⁷ John, "Encouraging Peace: Forgetting September," *American Task Force on Palestine*. Aug 9,2011, Jan 18, 2024 Accessed, http://www.americantaskforce.org/daily_news_article/2011/08/09/1312862400_9.

⁸ *Ibid*.

Even though the military remained the backbone of most peacekeeping operations, including administrators, economists, police officers, etc. They were deployed to help implement complex peace agreements, stabilize security, re-organize the military and police, elect new governments, and build democratic institutions.

UN Peacekeeping underwent a period of reevaluation in the middle of the 1990s. The general success of previous missions exceeded UN Peacekeeping's ability. This was especially true in the 1990s when the Security Council could not provide sufficient resources or authorize broad mandates.⁹

In war-torn areas, such as the former Yugoslavia - UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), Rwanda - UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), and Somalia - UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), missions were established. In these areas, the guns had not yet fallen silent. These three high-profile peacekeeping activities went under analysis as peacekeepers confronted circumstances where fighting gatherings neglected to stick to nonaggression treaties or where the actual peacekeepers were not given satisfactory assets or political help. As nonmilitary personnel setbacks rose and threats proceeded, the standing of UN Peacekeeping endured.

The difficulties of the early and mid-1990s drove the Security Council to restrict the number of new peacekeeping missions and start a course of self-reflection to keep such disappointments from reoccurring.

b. Basic Principles and Original Concepts

Three principles are inter-related and mutually reinforcing:¹⁰

1. Consent of the parties

The main conflicting parties must consent before UN peacekeeping operations can be deployed. This requires the council to take responsibility for political interaction. The UN has the political and physical freedom it needs to carry out its mandated tasks because of its acceptance and agreement on a peacekeeping operation.

Without such consent, it risks becoming involved in the conflict and being drawn toward taking enforcement action. As a result, it loses sight of its primary function, which is to maintain peace. For instance, MONUSCO, previously known as the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, enters the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the consent of and in cooperation with the local government.

2. Impartiality

Impartiality is crucial to keeping up with the assent and participation of the fundamental , yet it ought to be particular regarding lack of bias. When carrying out their duties as peacekeepers for the United Nations, they ought to be impartial as opposed to neutral.

A United Nations peacekeeping operation should not condone actions by the parties that violate the peace process's commitments or the international norms and principles it upholds.¹¹

⁹ Wheeler, Nicholas J, "Reflections on the Legality and Legitimacy of NATO's Intervention in Kosovo," *The International Journal of Human Rights*, Jan 18, 2024 Accessed, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13642980008406897>.

¹⁰ UN, "International Day of United Nations Peacekeepers – MAY 29," *United Nations*, Jan 30,2024 Accessed, <https://acelebrationofwomen.org>.

¹¹ UN, "Principles of peacekeeping," *United Nations Peacekeeping*, Jan 30,2024 Accessed, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/principles-of-peacekeeping>.

3. Non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate¹²

UN peacekeeping operations can be authorized under any circumstances. Nonetheless, assuming they are acting justifiably and to protect the order, they might utilize strategic power with the endorsement of the Security Council. The Security Council has given UN peacekeeping operations “robust” orders to “use all necessary means” to stop violent attempts to disrupt the political process, protect civilians from imminent physical attack, and help national authorities keep order in certain volatile situations.¹³

There are some other fundamental principles, including sovereign equality, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-use of force or threat of force, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, cooperation, and promotion of human rights.

c. Governance Experience and Existed Disagreements

Over the past five decades, UN peacekeeping has achieved a lot. Since 1948, the United Nations has coordinated effective peacekeeping operations in a number of nations, including Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mozambique, Namibia, and Tajikistan,¹⁴ in order to support peace and end conflicts. Reflecting on the past efforts, there are some experiences.

1. Eliminating Ambiguity

In both the Somalia and Rwanda operations, there was ambiguity about responsibility, in terms of the mission's mandate, the scope of its mandate, and the rules and limits on what peacekeepers could do. In the case of Somalia, the ambiguity arose from the changing nature of the mission, as reflected in:

Shifting mandate: The initial UN mission in Somalia was to protect humanitarian relief operations and help maintain peace, but the involvement of the US-led coalition force (UNOSOM II) gradually shifted the focus to the fight against the aided forces, a change that shifted the mission from impartial peacekeeping to a certain party to the conflict, and to some extent involved in domestic political struggles that went well beyond its original mission of providing humanitarian relief. As UN forces lost their previous impartiality, the deteriorating situation led to more violence, including the 1993 “Black Hawk Down” incident that killed and injured US soldiers.

Insufficient mandate: Peacekeepers were not given sufficient mandate to actively intervene in the conflict to restore security and order, limiting their ability to deal with outbreaks of violence and protect civilians.¹⁵ Similarly, in the case of Rwanda, the ambiguity of the mission's mandate indirectly led to the tragedy. The rules and guidance of the United Nations Assistance Mission (UNAMIR) in Rwanda explicitly limited the peacekeepers' ability to intervene in the conflict with force or to stop the ongoing slaughter.

In summary, unclear responsibilities and limited mandate have led to an apparent disconnect between the objectives and means of peacekeeping operations. This makes

¹² Hasegawa Peacebuilding Academy, “The Peace Support Operations under the Basic Principles of UNPKO and the Agricultural Transformation in Economic Development,” *Hasegawa Peacebuilding Academy*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <http://www.shasegawa.com/archives/10181>.

¹³ UN, “Principles of peacekeeping,” *United Nations Peacekeeping*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/principles-of-peacekeeping>.

¹⁴ Vajams, “India to train ASEAN women in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,” *Vajramias*, Jan 18, 2024 Accessed, <https://vajramias.com/article/india-to-train-asean-women-in-united-nations-peacekeeping-operations/6475af8cc302e73674468a3b/>.

¹⁵ Lyons, Scott, “New Robust Peacekeeping,” *International Peacekeeping*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://doi.org/10.1017/amp.2019.12>.

the operations less effective when implemented. It also makes it difficult to intervene effectively in emergency and out-of-control situations, even in Rwanda, where it was unable to stop or substantially reduce the ongoing genocide.

2. Gaining Local Support

The success of peacekeeping operations largely depends on the support of local populations and governments. Without the input and support of local groups, it is challenging to sustain peacekeeping operations for a long time. For example, in Somalia, the UN peacekeeping approach was criticized for seeming to favor some local factions while losing support from others.¹⁶ Also, a lack of sufficient consideration of local cultural and political dynamics resulted in a lack of cultural sensitivity and reduced the likelihood of acceptance by the local population.

Although the UN received warnings before the massacre, the lack of an effective international response and appropriate resource allocation prevented the UN forces from gaining the necessary support from local governments or communities. In Rwanda, the lack of local support prevented timely and effective intervention to prevent the massacre.

In summary, in both Rwanda and Somalia, UN forces did not fully gain local support for a variety of reasons, including perceived bias in their conduct, a lack of cultural sensitivity, and limited capacity and authority. The lack of local support, in turn, resulted in limited effectiveness of peacekeeping operations.

From these experiences, the United Nations has learned that peacekeeping operations need to seek the support, cooperation, and participation of local groups and governments more actively, as well as better understand and respect local cultures and socio-political structures. There also needs to be a more in-depth analysis of potential factional conflicts and their consequences when preparing for peacekeeping operations.

3. Combination of Political and Military Practices

In the peacekeeping operation in Somalia, with the deepening of military involvement, the UN's action lacked a clear political strategy and process coordinated with military operations. The lack of political objectives led to the ineffective integration of peacekeeping operations. At the same time, the different command and control of forces in the case of troop contributions also affected the effective integration of military and political operations. In the Rwandan genocide, the UN Security Council did not immediately strengthen the political and military mandate of UNAMIR, which resulted in a very limited ability to do so.¹⁷

In these two peacekeeping operations, the disconnection between political and military operations led to the failure of peacekeeping operations to achieve the expected goals.¹⁸

These experiences show that in any peacekeeping operation, it is essential to establish professional political leadership and strategic guidance. At the same time, revising the operation mandate to adapt to changes in the situation on the ground and strengthening the force command structure and rules to ensure a quick and efficient response to the crisis are issues that need more attention to in future peacekeeping operations.

Nonetheless, a few conflicts upset the execution of UN peacekeeping. For instance, during the UNAMIR, the significant powers driven by the US mediated in the Assembled

¹⁶ Krishnasamy, Kabilan, "Pakistan's Peacekeeping Experiences," *International Peacekeeping*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://doi.org/10.1080/714002736>.

¹⁷ Darren, "Dissecting Darfur: Anatomy of a Genocide Debate," *International Relations*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117807087241>.

¹⁸ Peace and Security, "Peace and Security in Central Africa Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo: Is it relevant to have a UN Mission?" *IPSS*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://ipss-addis.org/event/peace-and-security-in-central-africa-republic-and-democratic-republic-of-congo-is-it-relevant-to-have-a-un-mission/>.

Countries' peacekeeping activities. The major powers and the United Nations had very different ideas about how to get involved in local issues, and the joint task force led by the United States repeatedly used military force to solve the Somali problem. In addition, the UN's responsibilities are sometimes far removed from reality, lack support from all sides, lack focus and need to be strengthened.

Reflection of Past Efforts

Since the founding of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine in 1948, there have been 47 years of United Nations peacekeeping practice.

Over the past half-century, peacekeeping operations have had outstanding achievements while also revealing many problems, especially in 1995 when the three peacekeeping operations, UNPROFOR, UNOSOM, and UNAMIR were carried out in the same period. These operations occur in different regions, comprising different cultural, political, and historical factors that possess different and classic characteristics while imposing.

a. UNPROFOR

Yugoslavia is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country governed by a multi-party system. UNPROFOR is an operation implemented in Yugoslavia. Since the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1991, which triggered large-scale conflict and violence, the Security Council decided to establish the United Nations Protection Force with a massive capacity of more than 14,000 people in order to reduce tension.

The main missions of UNPROFOR were to maintain public order and to confirm the composition of the existing police forces. However, due to the rapid and violent deterioration of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Security Council decided to expand the strength of UNPROFOR. As of March 1995, the force had grown to 167 personnel, including 3 military observers and 159 other military personnel.

Moreover, the United Nations Security Council also granted UNPROFOR more power to prevent violence and promote peace. Since 15 May 1992, UNPROFOR has taken over the protected areas in accordance with the United Nations peacekeeping plan, monitoring certain other areas of Croatia ("pink zones"), and additionally, has been monitoring the implementation of cease-fire agreements signed by the Government and local authorities, such as the Geneva Agreements signed on 23 November 1991¹⁹. In the following years, UNPROFOR's strength kept increasing in order to ensure the security and functioning of the airport at Sarajevo, deliver humanitarian relief, and protect convoys of released civilian detainees.

UNPROFOR was established for 12 months in its earliest years, but was gradually extended by subsequent Council resolutions, culminating in the overall termination of its mandate in March 1995²⁰ with the exception of those whose continued presence in the Republic of Croatia²¹. What followed the withdrawal of UNPROFOR is the establishment of UNCRO, UNPREDEP, and UNPF-HQ, which took charge of the security of the Republic of Croatia²² and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia²³.

19 UN, "Letter dated 24 November 1991 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council," *UN. Secretary-General*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/132435?ln=en>.

20 UN, "Resolution 947 (1994) / adopted by the Security Council at its 3434th meeting, on 30 September 1994," *UN. Security Council (49th year: 1994)*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/161994?ln=en>.

21 UN, "Resolution 982 (1995) / adopted by the Security Council at its 3512th meeting on 31 March 1995," *UN. Security Council (50th year: 1995)*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/174656?ln=en>.

22 UN, "Resolution 981 (1995) / adopted by the Security Council at its 3512th meeting, on 31 March 1995," *UN. Security Council (50th year: 1995)*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/174991?ln=en>.

23 UN, "Resolution 983 (1995) / adopted by the Security Council at its 3512th meeting, on 31 March 1995," *UN. Security Council (50th year: 1995)*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/174992?ln=en>.

The total estimated expenditure of the whole process is around \$4,616,725,556, and the fatalities are about 167 deaths, consisting of 3 military observers, 159 other military personnel, 1 civilian police, 2 international civilian staff, and 2 local staff.²⁴

b. UNOSOM

UNOSOM, in hope of bringing peace and stability in Somalia, has been operating since 1992. Under the governance of President Siad Barre, the prevalence of UNOSOM has created tensions with neighboring countries. Following his downfall in 1991, a civil war broke out in Somalia between the faction supporting Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed and that supporting General Mohamed Farah Aided, which threatened nearly 5 million people's lives and security²⁵.

1. UNOSOM I

On 24 April 1992, the United Nations adopted resolution 751²⁶, which was generally regarded as the commencement of the first UNOSOM mission. 50 military observers and 500 peacekeepers were dispatched to promote the immediate cessation of the war, the maintenance of the ceasefire, and the provision of humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, a committee composed of Council members was established to supervise the arms embargo on Somalia. However, the effect of all these actions on the humanitarian aspect was limited.

On 3 December 1992, due to the ineffectiveness of previous actions, resolution 794²⁷ was adopted to authorize a multinational force to form the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to enter Somalia, and requested that countries in a position to do so should provide the corresponding military forces.

Generally speaking, UNOSOM had a positive effect on alleviating the humanitarian crisis. However, with the occasional violent attacks, a secure and stable society was not brought to Somalia.

2. UNOSOM II

The second period of UNOSOM started with the adoption of resolution 814²⁸, which expanded the capacity to 3,000 and prolonged the mandate. The mission was enlarged to include the repatriation of refugees, the protection of UN relief personnel, and the assistance in rebuilding Somalia's political institutions, police and judicial system, etc.

Nevertheless, the operation of UNOSOM II offended the interests of certain factions and, therefore, caused the resistance to peacekeeping forces. The conflict in Somalia shifted from the one between armed factions to the one between the Aided faction and UNOSOM, which aroused high levels of xenophobia among the Somali people, resulting in numerous casualties on both sides.

The operation ended with 154 fatalities in total and an estimated expenditure of \$1.6 billion, being one of the UN' most extensive peacekeeping operations in terms of expenditure.

²⁴ UN, "Former Yugoslavia - UNPROFOR," *United Nations Peacekeeping*, Jan 30,2024 Accessed, https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unprof_p.htm.

²⁵ UN, "Somalia - UNOSOM Background," *United Nations Peacekeeping*, Jan 30,2024 Accessed, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/unsom1backgr1.html>.

²⁶ UN, "Resolution 751 (1992) / adopted by the Security Council at its 3069th meeting, on 24 April 1992," *UN. Security Council (47th year: 1992)*, Jan 30,2024 Accessed, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/141599?ln=en>.

²⁷ UN, "Resolution 794 (1992) / adopted by the Security Council at its 3145th meeting, on 3 December 1992," *UN. Security Council (47th year: 1992)*, Jan 30,2024 Accessed, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/154648?ln=en>.

²⁸ UN, "Resolution 814 (1993) / adopted by the Security Council at its 3188th meeting, on 26 March 1993," *UN. Security Council (48th year: 1993)*, Jan 30,2024 Accessed, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/164678?ln=en>.

c. UNAMIR

UNAMIR is an operation aiming to improve the humanitarian situation in Rwanda.

For decades, constant conflicts between the Rwandan Government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front have been going on. By 1990, Arusha Peace Agreement was signed, and both sides called for a neutral international force to be implemented²⁹.

In June 1993, the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda was established to monitor the border and verify that no military assistance reached Rwanda³⁰. The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda³¹ was also set up to monitor the observance of the ceasefire agreement, the security situation, and the process of repatriation of Rwandese refugees. The mission further included investigation and humanitarian assistance. Both of the mandates of the missions were prolonged in succession. It was only in 1994, when many Member States held the opinion that peacekeeping operations had little effect in Rwanda, that the United Nations set out to downsize the scale³². On 6 April 1994, the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi were killed in an attack on their aircraft, which intensified the relationship between the Rwandan Government and the Rwandan Patriotic Front, and thus led to a massacre of the Tutsis.

Broadly speaking, peacekeeping operations in Rwanda can be divided into two phases.

The goal of the first phase mainly focused on ceasefire. The Security Council simply believed that war was a source of chaos and paid insufficient attention. Instead of sending a force of about 4,500 personnel as required, the United Nations only dispatched 2,500 men to operate the mission. With inadequate personnel and a very restricted scope of authority, the first phase of peacekeeping operations failed to obtain an ideal result.

The second phase took place after the hinge. The incident triggered the persecution towards several politicians, including the Prime Minister³³. Nonetheless, on account of the order from headquarters to use force only in self-defense, UNAMIR has done little to prevent the occurrence of slaughter. In fact, they sided with the Rwandan government and turned a blind eye to some of the genocide, declining to shelter victims to avoid the conflict with Hutu. One of the Judges has also been abducted by the Presidential Guard, and United Nations guards have made no move to come forward and stop them in the face of abductions or beatings³⁴. Meanwhile, in Camp Kigali, the United Nations peacekeeper could hardly escape from the atrocity, ending up with a number of Belgian soldiers being tortured and brutally killed. As the situation kept deteriorating in Rwanda, the Security Council considered that the immediate priority for Rwanda was a ceasefire between the Government forces and the RPF, where the United Nations had a minimal role to play, so resolution 912 was adopted to withdraw the Mission. Therefore, the United Nations decided to retake action and increase the number of UNAMIR to 5500³⁵. However,

29 UN, "Letter dated 14 June 1993 from the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council," *Rwanda*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/197258?ln=en>.

30 UN, "Resolution 846 (1993) / adopted by the Security Council at its 3244th meeting, on 22 June 1993," *UN. Security Council (48th year:1993)*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/197262?ln=en>.

31 UN, "Resolution 872 (1993) / adopted by the Security Council at its 3288th meeting, on 5 October 1993," *UN. Security Council (48th year:1993)*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/197341?ln=en>.

32 UN, "Resolution 928 (1994) / adopted by the Security Council at its 3391st meeting, on 20 June 1994," *UN. Security Council (49th year :1994)*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/197581?ln=en>.

33 UN, "Letter dated 15 December 1999 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council," *UN. Secretary-General*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/405039?ln=en>.

34 UN, "Letter dated 15 December 1999 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council", *UN. Secretary-General*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/405039?ln=en>.

35 UN, "Resolution 912 (1994) / adopted by the Security Council at its 3368th meeting, on 21 April 1994.", *UN. Security Council (49th year : 1994)*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/197526?ln=en>.

by 25 July, more than two months after the adoption of the resolution on the increase, the actual strength of UNAMIR was only 550 personnel.

Table 1

time	93.10.5	94.4.21	94.5.17	95.6.9	95.9.9
Number	2548	270	5500	2330	1800

Number of military personnel mandated by UNAMIR³⁶

³⁶ UN, "Rwanda - UNAMIR Facts and figures", *United Nations Peacekeeping*, Jan 26, 2024 Accessed, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unamirF.htm>.

Problems to be Solved

Losses and Harms of Current Guidance and Action

a. Massive Civilian Casualties and Infrastructure Damage

The UN peacekeeping operations have long emphasized the importance of protecting civilians in war-torn regions, but the transformation from theoretical emphasis to actual implementation is still faced with problems. The areas where peacekeeping missions occur often have a large population density, and belligerents sometimes intentionally involve civilians in their conflicts to achieve the deterrent effect and pose a threat to other parties. These lead to the vulnerability of civilians faced with military conflicts. The loopholes in current peacekeeping operations, including strategy design, personnel deployment, etc., are worsening civilian conditions and increasing casualties.

Besides, the belligerent parties, especially those opposed to the intervention of peacekeeping operations and terrorist groups, are likely to mislead peacekeepers by spreading disinformation. Some armed groups disguise themselves by hiding among civilians, which is hard to distinguish for peacekeeping troops. Civilians are involved in war zones, and peacekeepers may accidentally injure or even kill civilians during their mandates.

A representative example is the failure of the UN peacekeeping operations in Rwanda in 1994. The involved countries and their troops made some efforts, but most of them remained on the sidelines and failed to prevent the deaths of more than 800,000 Tutsi and Hutu civilians.³⁷ The UNSC gave the first explicit mandate to protect civilians in Rwanda, but only after almost all peacekeepers in UNAMIR were withdrawn during the genocide.³⁸ UNAMIR was only instructed to "contribute to the security and protection of civilians in Rwanda."³⁹ Still, few capable troops were provided, and the mandate made little difference to the suffering conditions of Rwandan civilians. The late decision led to late and insufficient action. The peacekeeping operations did not prevent or reduce civilian casualties but instead resulted in more fatalities and disasters in the region. With more coordination between decision-makers and local peacekeepers and earlier strategy design, the losses in Rwanda would have been minimized.

Another case is the Srebrenica Genocide, the largest racial atrocity after WWII, during the regional war in the Balkans in 1995, which claimed the lives of around 8,000 Muslim men and boys.⁴⁰ The UN set security zones called "safe havens" in the region but did not have enough troops to maintain order. Several commanders and consultants suggested the UN assign around 100,000 additional troops to safeguard civilians, but the UNSC only recommended 27,500 and eventually approved a force of 12,000 soldiers.⁴¹ The potential risks and different opinions among the UN staff led to the deterioration of the situation. Meanwhile, the Muslim military forces were expecting international organizations such as NATO to help defend against the attack of the Serbs. Consequently, a disaster was inflicted on innocent Muslim civilians in the region.

³⁷ HISTORY, "Rwandan Genocide," *HISTORY*, Oct 14, 2009, Updated May 19, 2023, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://www.history.com/topics/africa/rwandan-genocide>.

³⁸ Kseniya Oksamytna, Lisa Hultman, Charlie Hunt, et al., "Protection of Civilians," *International Peacekeeping*, no.4 (2023): 426.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 427.

⁴⁰ UN, "From the field: A genocide timeline; Srebrenica massacre remembered," *UN*, Jul 20, 2021, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/07/1096092>.

⁴¹ Lewis MacKenzie, "The Real Story Behind Srebrenica," *The Globe and Mail*, Jul 14, 2005, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, https://www.oldsite.transnational.org/SAJT/features/2005/MacKenzie_Srebrenica.html.

The UN has realized the importance of sub-national level engagement, and peacekeepers in regions such as South Sudan are building connections with local communities, not confined to central government and principal officials.⁴² The liaisons in communities help deal with peacekeeping mandates and reduce the risk of violence by utilizing investment and organizing short-term programs. The problem exists in the combination of local and central workings. Confrontations in small areas are considered within the specific areas instead of being integrated into a larger scale. Current peacekeeping operations on the regional scale should be more flexible and innovative.

Early warning can help peacekeepers know potential risks and predict possible conflicts. The peacekeeping staff are short of better training with more technology to respond to the potential threats posed by armed groups.⁴³ The environment in war zones is not conducive to information analysis either. Satellite images and remote sensing cannot provide a consistent data stream due to the hostile conditions and malicious destruction by local armed groups. Staff in Rwanda noted that they had little access to information acquisition and assessment channels and were "reacting to, rather than anticipating, what was going to happen."⁴⁴ Without joint research and collaboration on data collection and evaluation, they cannot take the initiative to deter, prevent, and respond to armed attacks. They don't have the capacity to do so since they are not well-equipped.

The wrong information also misleads civilians, causing dissatisfaction with peacekeeping operations. If public opinion gradually becomes aggressive, fierce misunderstandings will occur between civilians and peacekeepers, sometimes resulting in more injuries and casualties of civilians. In Rwanda, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Yugoslavia, etc., attacks against civilians happened because the peacekeeping staff were unprepared and used the wrong strategies. Since the peacekeeping staff did not have sufficient consultants and experts to advise during their mandates, civilians could not be protected as expected.

The performance of peacekeepers has been a controversial issue, and their malpractice, in turn, provides more opportunities for belligerents to use their military power to achieve specific intentions. Under this circumstance, growing extremism triggers more casualties and damage. Though international organizations try to provide humanitarian assistance to civilians, the lack of supervision in logistic support reduces the chance of meeting people's demands. Armed groups may intercept and capture the supply to complement their reserve.

Under the unfolding catastrophe, necessities, including food, drinking water, etc., are less available, and people's living conditions will worsen. Some strategies focus on military deterrence and bringing back regional security but ignore the basic needs of civilians. Some rivers and transportation routes are blocked due to continual chaos, challenging the survival of innocent civilians. Cross-regional and international imports and exports are hampered due to the blockade of commercial routes, and the decrease in trade adds a heavy economic burden to the conflict countries and regions.

Additionally, civilians are vulnerable to natural disasters and climate change. Current peacekeeping mechanisms only aim to protect civilians from battlefield threats, but factors such as climate variability are often neglected. Among the 16 countries most likely to be affected by climate change, nine host peacekeeping mandates, including Haiti,

⁴² Kseniya Oksamytna, Lisa Hultman, Charlie Hunt, et al., "Protection of Civilians," *International Peacekeeping* 30, no.4 (2023): 436.

⁴³ UN, "UN flag no longer offers natural protection to peacekeepers, says report on mission casualties," *United Nations*, Jan 22, 2018, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/un-flag-no-longer-offers-natural-protection-to-peacekeepers-says-report-mission-casualties>.

⁴⁴ Kseniya Oksamytna, Lisa Hultman, Charlie Hunt, et al., "Protection of Civilians," *International Peacekeeping* 30, no.4 (2023): 441.

Somalia, Mali, Congo, etc.⁴⁵ Most operations in these countries are deployed in unstable climate conditions and security crises. Confronting the dual fragility, it is vital to combine natural and political problems into a systematic working pattern, and protecting civilians not just for their life security concerning wars is challenging.

Infrastructure construction assistance has always been critical in peacekeeping operations, but sometimes, improper implementation of the mandates will be more of a hindrance than a help. Infrastructures will inevitably be damaged in military conflicts, especially those in cities and towns. Peacekeeping troops have more advanced weapons and devices, but the regulations and restrictions on their application lack clarity.⁴⁶ Consequently, with improper use of the tools, their entrance into the conflict areas may expand the scale of the conflict. Bombings will likely damage infrastructures involving residential buildings, schools, and hospitals, and the electricity supply cannot be ensured. Besides, the investment of the UN in some regions is not well utilized, and the infrastructure assistance process has been hampered. For instance, Haiti's continual faction and humanitarian crises indicate that ineffective input cannot solve the problems.

The responsibility distribution during reconstruction after conflicts is ambiguous. Usually, the UN peacekeeping troops and working groups will withdraw after the disputes are controlled and social order is back to normal. However, the standard of "normal" is not clear and set by consent, and the long-term reconstruction of a region is complex to complete. That is to say, civilians may still live with limited resources and damaged infrastructures under challenging conditions. During their mandates, peacekeepers are responsible for maintaining the security and order of a region. Manipulation by local powers is prevented to the most significant extent. However, after they depart from the area, the duty of protecting political justice ends, and the power transfer to the host nation is hampered because local factions may again reach an impasse and be stuck in confrontations. It is essential to establish a close rapport with local government and community, build their capacities, and construct a safer and more peaceful environment for civilians.⁴⁷

b. Humanitarian Disasters and Ethical Trauma

The concept of humanitarian disasters refers to the actions that result in the death, physical injury, or mental trauma of a large number of innocent civilians without killing the target enemies.⁴⁸

During the conflicts, a large number of innocent people are involved. The peacekeeping operations can deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political solution of regional issues and protect civilians under threat by robust peacekeeping, which is different from peace enforcement. The former is a tactic with the authorization of the UNSC and the host nation's consent, while the latter does not require the consent of the main parties and is normally prohibited.⁴⁹ Currently, the standards and supervision mechanisms cannot

45 "Climate shocks set to worsen already fragile hotspots, Security Council hears," *United Nations*, Jun 13, 2023, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/06/1137637>.

46 Kseniya Oksamytna, Lisa Hultman, Charlie Hunt, et al., "Protection of Civilians," *International Peacekeeping* 30, no.4 (2023): 426.

47 United Nations Peacekeeping, "Improving the Protection of Civilians in UN Peacekeeping Transitions," *United Nations*, May 26, 2021, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/improving-protection-of-civilians-un-peacekeeping-transition>.

48 World War Wings, "What Makes a Weapon Inhumane? —How Far Is Too Far?" *World War Wings*, Sep 3, 2024, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://worldwarwings.com/makes-weapon-inhumane-going-far/#:~:text=The%20Geneva%20convention%20banned%20weaponry%20included%20biological%20weapons%2C,but%20having%20an%20effect%20on%20a%20civilian%20population.>

49 UN, "Principles of peacekeeping," *United Nations*, Jan 25, 2024 Accessed, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/principles-of-peacekeeping>.

ensure the differentiation of the two concepts, leading to disputes on a larger scale. The operation mechanisms cannot protect people from becoming dispersed and refugees after the war ends. Peacekeepers cannot deal with issues resetting previous residents in mission areas.

Additionally, the fundamental human rights of some people are violated by peacekeeping operations and peacekeepers, which is precisely the opposite of the protection of civilians. Since the 1980s, international and regional documents concerning human rights have combined survival rights, development rights, sustainability, and inclusiveness.⁵⁰ People should be entitled to all rights and freedoms regardless of their race, sex, religion, etc. The UN peacekeepers should be impartial in their dealings with the parties to the conflict but not neutral in the execution of their mandate.⁵¹ Some peacekeepers receive insufficient training and have the wrong thinking patterns regarding their responsibilities and duties. Besides, leaders of a mandate are not willing to take responsibility if the peacekeepers violate the regulations under their command. Sexual abuse occurs in some cases against women, adolescent girls, and other vulnerable groups, and the UN staff may also discriminate against local people. Their biased decisions will impose mental and physical burdens on civilians, leaving a long-term negative impact.

In the regulation provided by UN, peacekeeping personnel should treat host country inhabitants with respect, courtesy, and consideration.⁵² Unfortunately, some peacekeepers become the catalysts or direct participators of misconduct and local humanitarian disasters. The UN has taken measures to prevent peacekeepers from committing sexual violence, including sending battalions in question home, raising funds for victims and their children, and establishing platforms for victims to report their experiences safely.⁵³ Nevertheless, the management of such platforms and the investigation of involved personnel should be more practical. Community engagement and contact are currently vacant, and the operations entail more consultants on women's protection and female peacekeeping staff.

The ambiguous implementation of impartiality and neutrality may also undermine the credibility and legitimacy of peacekeepers and the UN, and the withdrawal of consent resulting from it may cause further political problems.

Peacekeeping operations also leave ethical trauma to diverse groups of people. The missions are set based on the intention to end the conflict in a particular area efficiently, which contradicts the humanitarian principles. For local troops and civilians, the stress and fear resulting from wars are hard to reduce, and some may spend the rest of their lives in psychological disorders.

The peacekeeping operations have inadequate regulations on health issues, and no specific groups are in charge of monitoring the hygienic quality. The sanitary conditions are exacerbated after the peacekeeping troops enter the regions. Some peacekeepers lack work ethics concerning environmental protection and receive inadequate training. Therefore, during the missions, they cannot behave and utilize resources in an environment-friendly way. The inappropriate use of water and resources increases the possibility of pollution and infectious diseases, to which civilians are most vulnerable and susceptible. The legislation framework currently cannot monitor and evaluate these behaviors, especially in new fields related to the modern energy system.

50 鲁广锦：《历史视域中的人权：中国的道路与贡献》，《红旗文稿》，2021年第一期，10-18页。

51 UN, "Principles of peacekeeping," *United Nations*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/principles-of-peacekeeping>.

52 United Nations Peacekeeping, "Standards of conduct," *United Nations*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/standards-of-conduct>.

53 UN, "Does UN Peacekeeping work? Here's what the data says," *United Nations*, Dec 10, 2022, Jan 29, 2024 Accessed, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/12/1131552>.

Child protection is at the heart of peacekeeping. Many children are killed and maimed during armed conflicts, and the intervention of peacekeeping does not bring compensation and resettlement policies for children. In the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Mali, etc., some children haven't been released by parties to the conflicts or trained as child soldiers confronting a dangerous situation.⁵⁴ In the annual reports and strategy design, the training for adviser teams is lacking.

Many people participate in armed conflicts, and a large proportion of them die or become disabled. As a result, the number of orphans surges. Their education, health, and even survival will face an uncertain future. Orphans in South Sudan have to beg in markets to obtain food, and formal education is beyond reach for most of them.⁵⁵ The UN peacekeepers cannot solve the root political cause; they can only provide food and clothes to a small proportion of these children.

c. Deepening Religious and Political Tensions

The UN peacekeeping holds the original intention to find political solutions to regional issues, and military intervention is a method of promoting political negotiations. Much importance is attached to the effect of peacekeepers' activities on fostering peace and non-coercive mechanisms.⁵⁶ There is no doubt that peacekeeping operations after the Cold War have made some progress in easing regional conflicts. Peacekeepers departed after they succeeded in more than half of all mandates.⁵⁷ They reduced the risks of civil wars' breakout and helped reach peace agreements. Though the countries are no longer at war, many problems are unsolved. In other cases, peacekeeping operations aggravate the conflicts even further instead of solving problems and alleviating tensions.

Religious and racial contradiction is the root of many regional conflicts. Peacekeeping operations should find the root cause and fundamental conflict of interest to relieve the situation. Meanwhile, religious and racial groups are often hard to persuade and unwilling to negotiate since their stances are connected with their religions and races, which are their most essential features. Based on this prerequisite, the intervention of peacekeeping operations in their conflicts will be regarded as a violation of their affairs. For instance, peacekeeping operations were thwarted by local parties due to faction confrontation and racial tensions.⁵⁸ The troops failed to follow up, influencing the later implementation of UNOSOM projects.

When peacekeepers enter a region without thorough negotiation with belligerents, they may be regarded as a party of the conflict instead of a mediator. Each party believes that the UN peacekeepers are to help other parties gain victory, and fierce contradictions will occur. Confronting the pressure from major powers, the actions of peacekeeping troops sometimes are not impartial, exasperating the belligerents to a large extent.

A dilemma appears: on the one hand, major powers affect and even dominate peacekeeping operation procedures and local armed groups. On the other hand, impartiality should be prioritized as one of the three principles of peacekeeping operations. The values existing within the UN are paradoxical, making the peacekeeping workings confusing and ineffective.

54 United Nations Peacekeeping, "Child protection," *United Nations*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/child-protection>.

55 United Nations Peacekeeping, "Being an orphan in Torit: The quest to keep one's head above water," *United Nations*, Dec 28, 2018, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/being-orphan-torit-quest-to-keep-ones-head-above-water>.

56 Kseniya Oksamytna, Lisa Hultman, Charlie Hunt, et al., "Protection of Civilians," *International Peacekeeping* 30, no.4 (2023): 430.

57 UN, "Does UN Peacekeeping work? Here's what the data says," *United Nations*, Dec 10, 2022, Jan 29, 2024 Accessed, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/12/1131552>.

58 赵宏：《试析联合国索马里维和行动（UNOSOM）》，外交学院硕士论文，2005年6月，第10-11页。

Major powers often affect missions to ensure their interests in certain regions, and their allies in the conflict will receive preferential treatment. Some countries criticized the U.S. government as interfering too much in other countries' affairs, considering its policies in Somalia. Some even predicted that the U.S. would participate in the conflicts to gain more power to extract oil in this area. Remarks alike demonstrated how the intertwined interests meet in a peacekeeping operation, making the confrontation of political stances more serious.

For instance, the malpractice of peacekeeping operations in Rwanda worsened the situation. Due to the failure in the Battle of Mogadishu in Somalia, i.e., the "Black Hawk Down" event, the U.S. government did not want to participate in the peacekeeping operations in Rwanda. Losing the support of a superpower, the UN showed a pessimistic attitude toward the Rwanda Genocide. Only a tiny proportion of peacekeepers were left in the area, only trying to mediate to achieve a ceasefire and provide humanitarian assistance. Major powers worldwide, including France, were involved in the dispute, charged as indifferent to the regional catastrophe and even helping some plotters of the genocide to escape.⁵⁹

From 1989 to 1994, to solve regional political issues with a better-informed and well-trained peacekeeping team, the UNSC deployed around 20 new missions worldwide and raised the number of peacekeepers from 11,000 to 75,000.⁶⁰ The increased personnel reduced the working pressure on individuals and strengthened the peacekeeping troops. Still, implementing peace treaties, reorganizing local administration, and reconstructing a secure and stable situation are still of low efficiency and unsatisfactory substantial results. The core components, such as coordination, are still understaffed, while the number of peacekeepers is too much. The expectation and ideal arrangement of peacekeeping is more than its actual capacity.

Given the inadequate ability to hold negotiations and mediate among different parties, the operations cannot advance political solutions to a conflict and enhance the political impact of peacekeeping efficiently. Though the parties' consent is one of the principles of peacekeeping, the intervention in peacekeeping operations cannot gain the universal consent of all conflict parties.⁶¹ Consequently, the sustainability of political order in a region cannot be ensured. There will be a security vacuum after the peacekeepers depart from the areas, and the political tensions are recurrent, even consisting of political violence.⁶²

Gradually, the tensions will expand beyond the limitation of direct participants in the conflict to various countries and organizations worldwide. The competition between major powers, especially during the Cold War and post-Cold War era, and the different interests and stances of relatively powerful and weak countries all entail further discussions on the conduction of peacekeeping operations.

d. Impairment of UN Peacekeeping Action and Reputation

Current defects of peacekeeping mechanisms bring losses to the UN as an international organization in many different aspects. They are obstacles to the future development of the UN and peacekeeping operations.

59 HISTORY, "Rwandan Genocide," *HISTORY*, Oct 14, 2009, Updated May 19, 2023, Jan 30,2024 Accessed, <https://www.history.com/topics/africa/rwandan-genocide>.

60 United Nations Peacekeeping, "Our History," *United Nations*, Jan 30,2024 Accessed, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/our-history>.

61 UN, "Principles of peacekeeping," *United Nations*, Jan 30,2024 Accessed, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/principles-of-peacekeeping>.

62 Kseniya Oksamytna, Lisa Hultman, Charlie Hunt, et al., "Protection of Civilians," *International Peacekeeping* 30, no.4 (2023): 439.




Figure 1 Fatalities of peacekeeping staff in different regional missions⁶³




Figure 2 Fatalities of peacekeeping staff in different years⁶⁴

The military actions with insufficient training, planning, and equipment lead to massive injuries and casualties of peacekeepers. According to the statistics from the UN, from the establishment of peacekeeping to the year 1995, thousands of peacekeepers died in their missions, and the peak appeared in 1993 (with 252 peacekeepers sacrificing themselves on the battlefield), a year consisting of several regional conflicts and peacekeeping operation disputes.⁶⁵ The missions with the most significant number of peacekeeper casualties in this period are ONUC (peacekeeping operations in Congo), UNIFIL (in Lebanon), and UNPROFOR (in Yugoslavia).

The strength of peacekeeping is sharply reduced due to the decrease in personnel, and recruiting new staff needs more time and effort. Witnessing colleagues' deaths, those peacekeepers who are still alive also bear a heavy mental trauma, losing momentum to conducting future missions and fulfilling the goals of peacekeeping.

⁶³ United Nations Peacekeeping, "Fatalities," *United Nations*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/fatalities>.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

The losses in staff and tools negatively influence the economic development of the UN. The UN peacekeeping has long been bearing a financial burden. It reached a state of crisis in the 1960s as a result of the refusal of several Member States to pay their share of the expenses of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) and the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC).⁶⁶ In the following sessions, Member States agreed on the funding issues regarding the Cyprus situation. Countries sending troops, the Cyprian government, and countries providing financial support voluntarily should jointly take the funding responsibility. However, this is just a solution for one regional conflict. There still lacks a clear standard about the fund sources and administration of peacekeeping operations. The UN should not cut the expenses on peacekeeping for higher efficiency while ignoring the necessity of enough money and resources.⁶⁷

Regarding public opinion on peacekeeping operations, the UN faces an uncertain future. The inflated expectations of what peacekeeping operations and peacekeepers can achieve sometimes lead to protests calling for peacekeepers to withdraw because they cannot reach the expectations. The paradox demonstrated that reflections, improvement, and changes should be considered. According to broadcasts about regional tensions in Rwanda, the area was in complete chaos.⁶⁸ Men, women, and even babies were hacked to death by not only Hutu adults but also young teenagers. Through real-time coverage, mass media, including BBC, CNN, CBS, etc., tried to urge governments to take prompt action. Still, international society, including the UN, did not pay enough attention to their broadcasts.⁶⁹ When countries realized the critical situation and decided to intervene to prevent the genocide, it was too late.

With past lessons and criticism from the public, the UN should gain experiences and apply them in the future. The strategy design process and the content of operation mechanisms need to be improved to avoid massive casualties and losses and achieve ideal goals simultaneously. This period of reform is at the turn of the century, witnessing technological development and a new world order. From this standpoint, applying new technologies to train peacekeepers and set new plans for peacekeeping operations is essential.

Optimizing current mechanisms according to the principles and suggestions passed by the UN and the UNSC can increase the ability to evaluate conflict situations, plan and manage peacekeeping operations, and respond to tasks immediately and effectively. The troop deployment and supervision should be enhanced in detail. Given the status quo that many major powers failed in peacekeeping operations, calling the international society to build trust with a wide range of global entities, regain confidence, and fulfill their political commitments in peacekeeping workings remains challenging.

The establishment of the UN demonstrated the international society's willingness to solve global issues together and build a stable world order through joint efforts. Still, several unsuccessful missions seem to prove that there are loopholes in the operation mechanism of the UN, and its credibility, transparency, and international identity are doubted. Some staff receive kickbacks and earn excessive salaries due to poor

66 Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, "Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations," *Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, https://casquebleu.org/index.php?title=Special_Committee_on_Peacekeeping_Operations#:~:text=The%20Special%20Committee%20on%20Peacekeeping%20Operations%2C%20or%20C-34%2C,by%20the%20Fourth%20Committee%20of%20the%20General%20Assembly.

67 钱思文: 《【专题报道】联合国维和事务负责人:“维和行动仍是推动和平与稳定的重要手段”》, 联合国, 2018年7月30日, <https://news.un.org/zh/story/2018/07/1014532>.

68 Evie Salomon, "From the archives: Reporting on the Rwandan genocide," CBS News, Apr 7, 2014, Feb 2, 2024 Accessed, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/from-the-archives-reporting-on-the-rwandan-genocide/>.

69 Jared Bredeson, "The CNN Effect: Mass Media and Humanitarian Aid," *Liberty University*, Feb 2, 2024 Accessed, <https://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1248&context=honors>.

supervision and governance.⁷⁰ The trust fund could not reach civilians in need, and some peacekeeping staff abused their power to gain profits from mandates. Some related countries prevent the investigation and disposal of misconduct and malpractice. Controversies concerning malpractice, corruption, and the manipulation of major powers, especially the P5, harm the reputation of peacekeeping operations and the UN as a pivotal international entity.

Difficulties and Challenges of Changes

a. Interventions by Major and Regional Powers

As for the United Nations, the permanent five countries contribute more than 1/3 of the regular budget⁷¹, nearly 1/5 of the personnel to peacekeeping forces⁷², and possess the veto in the Security Council. Due to the diversity of personnel implementing peacekeeping mandates and the mechanism of the United Nations, several countries, especially some from P5, have a certain degree of influence in peacekeeping efforts. They have been trying to dominate peacekeeping operations, especially on regional matters of interest to them. Historical peacekeeping operations have demonstrated that major and regional powers influence the conduct of peacekeeping operations by utilizing the following three main methods.

1. Intervening in the operations of national peacekeepers

Although peacekeeping operations are usually guided by the commanders appointed by the United Nations, the decisions of government and domestic public opinion still have a massive impact on peacekeeping personnel. Many countries are reluctant to fully authorize the United Nations to use armed peacekeeping forces because of various concerns like the security of peacekeepers and relevant national interests in conflict areas.

In the case of the peacekeeping operation in Rwanda, Belgium unilaterally withdrew its peacekeepers because of the crucial abuses against Belgian peacekeepers⁷³. Since the Belgian peacekeepers were one of the best-equipped units in UNAMIR, their withdrawal also affected the resolve of the other peacekeepers. Other countries followed Belgium's example, which created great difficulties for peacekeeping operations.

Apart from the withdrawal of Belgium, increasing the country's troop contribution is also a way of influencing peacekeeping operations. Under the circumstance of the unsuccessful implementation of UNOSOM I, the United States proposed to adopt military action to establish Unified Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia⁷⁴. With the authorization of the United Nations⁷⁵, a military force of 28,000 personnel, directed by the United States, was deployed to Somalia. After Somali militants killed four U.S. soldiers, the U.S. announced that it would never withdraw its troops from Somalia without disarming the Somali ethnicity, and decided to send an elite force of 400 troops to reinforce. Because of Somalia's strategic importance, the United States was willing to take advantage of the opportunity to support

70 郭河驹：《联合国深受腐败问题困扰》，《中国纪检监察杂志》，2015年第23期，第59页。

71 "Assessment of Member States' contributions to the United Nations regular budget for 1995.", *United Nations*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/173376?ln=en>

72 "Monthly Summary of Troop Contributions to Peace-keeping Operations as of 31 December 1995", *United Nations*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/dec-1995.pdf>

73 Belgium, "Letter dated 13 April 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council.", *Belgium*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/197536?ln=en>.

74 UN, "Letter dated 29 November 1992 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council.", *UN. Secretary-General*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/155099?ln=en>.

75 UN, "Resolution 794 (1992) / adopted by the Security Council at its 3145th meeting, on 3 December 1992.", *UN. Security Council (47th year : 1992)*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/154648?ln=en>.

a pro-American regime, and thus to expand its influence in the region and the continent. By doing so, the United States actively intervened in international affairs in the hope of imposing an impact on the world and acquiring interests of itself.

2. Using the right of veto

Initially, the right of veto was established to take into account the concerns of the major Powers on security issues and to avoid the recurrence of large-scale war conflicts in the world. However, during the Cold War, the veto sometimes became a political tool for some powers. Suppose the Security Council needs to adopt certain draft resolutions. In that case, it has to gain approval (or at least not rejection) of the P5, which means every peacekeeping operation must be in the national interest of the major powers. Because of the different stances of the P5, sometimes it would be hard to acquire all of the recognitions. Once the operations are perceived to threaten their vital interests, some major powers will use their veto power to prevent them from implementation. This situation was common during the Cold War when the United States and the Soviet Union, under the pressure of bipolar confrontation, frequently used their veto power, making peacekeeping operations particularly difficult.

Table 2

Date	Draft	Written Record	Agenda Item	Permanent Member Casting Negative Vote
30 January 86	S/17769/Rev.1	S/PV.2650	The situation in the occupied Arab territories	USA
17 January 1986	S/17730/Rev.2	S/PV.2642	The situation in the Middle East	USA
15 November 1985	S/17633	S/PV.2629	The situation in Namibia	UK USA
13 September 1985	S/17459	S/PV.2605	The situation in the occupied Arab territories	USA
12 March 1985	S/17000	S/PV.2573	The situation in the Middle East	USA
06 September 1984	S/16732	S/PV.2556	The situation in the Middle East	USA
04 April 1984	S/16463	S/PV.2529	Letter dated 29 March 1984 from Nicaragua to the President of the Security Council	USA
29 February 1984	S/16351/Rev.2	S/PV.2519	The situation in the Middle East	USSR
27-28 October 1983	S/16077/Rev.1	S/PV.2491	The situation in Grenada	USA
12 September 1983	S/15966/Rev.1	S/PV.2476	Letters dated 1 September 1983 from the USA, the Republic of Korea, Canada and Japan to the President of the Security Council and Letter dated 2 September 1983 from Australia to the President of the Security Council	USSR
02 August 1983	S/15895	S/PV.2461	The situation in the occupied Arab territories	USA
06 August 1982	S/15347/Rev.1	S/PV.2391	The situation in the Middle East	USA
26 June 1982	S/15255/Rev.2 (as corrected)	S/PV.2381	The situation in the Middle East	USA
08 June 1982	S/15185	S/PV.2377	The situation in the Middle East	USA

Security Council - Veto List(from 1982 to 1986)⁷⁶

⁷⁶ UN, "UN Security Council Meetings & Outcomes Tables", *United Nations*, Jan 30,2024 Accessed, <https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick/veto>

3. Threatening by means of contributions

The financial support for the United Nations peacekeeping operations comes from the major powers. Therefore, they often use the arrears of assessed contributions to influence the Security Council's decisions. According to the data, the countries with the highest assessed contributions to the United Nations in 1995 were the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom⁷⁷. If these countries refuse to give financial support, peacekeeping capacity will be weakened, and thus, the chances of success of peacekeeping operations are greatly reduced.

During the Reagan administration, the United States began to default on its contributions to the United Nations in order to request the Organization into complying with the will of the United States and fulfilling its demands⁷⁸. By the end of President Reagan's second term in 1988, the United States was in arrears by more than \$1 billion, which had a serious impact on the conduct of United Nations peacekeeping operations⁷⁹.

Currently, there are two primary funding sources for United Nations peacekeeping operations. One is borne by the countries concerned, and the States Members of the United Nations bear the other. The second consists of three different ways: fund, assessed contributions, and voluntary contributions. In 1992, the United Nations established a Peace-keeping Reserve Fund to ensure the rapid response to the organization to the needs of peace-keeping operations. It is decided that the level of the Fund shall be 150 million⁸⁰, which is apportioned to each Member State following the apportionment set out in resolution 45/247. If the fund could not cover the cost, assessed contributions based on the ad hoc apportionment and voluntary contributions will be raised for extra expenditures.

During the Reagan administration, the United States began to default on its contributions to the United Nations in order to request the organization into complying with the will of the United States and fulfilling its demands⁸¹. By the end of President Reagan's second term in 1988, the United States was in arrears by more than \$1 billion, which had a serious impact on the conduct of United Nations peacekeeping operations⁸².

b. Mutual Constraints of UN Agencies

Generally speaking, peacekeeping operations are usually associated with plentiful agencies of complexity, consisting of the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Secretariat, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the headquarters, troop and police contributors and the host governments⁸³.

The relationship between different agencies and the Secretary-General is intricate. Every UN peacekeeping operation is deployed only when the Security Council determines to adopt a resolution containing details of the mission. Then the budget and resources are subject to General Assembly approval. The Secretary-General accounts for the appointment of the Head of Peacekeeping Operations who is required to report to the

77 UN, "Assessment of Member States' contributions to the United Nations regular budget for 1995", *United Nations*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/173376?ln=en>

78 “中美缴纳联合国会费的比较分析”，杨佐航，外交学院硕士论文，2016年6月。

79 “冷战结束后美国对联合国政策探析”，王煜，外交学院硕士论文，2016年6月。

80 United Nations Peacekeeping, "Establishment of a Peace-keeping Reserve Fund : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly", *UN. General Assembly (47th sess. : 1992-1993)*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/159156?ln=en>.

81 “中美缴纳联合国会费的比较分析”，杨佐航，外交学院硕士论文，2016年6月。

82 “冷战结束后美国对联合国政策探析”，王煜，外交学院硕士论文，2016年6月。

83 United Nations Peacekeeping, "WHAT IS PEACEKEEPING", *United Nations Peacekeeping*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/what-is-peacekeeping#:~:text=UN%20peacekeeping%20is%20a%20unique%20global%20partnership.%20It,combined%20effort%20to%20maintain%20international%20peace%20and%20security.>

Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations at the UN Headquarters. The Secretary-General also needs to provide regular reports to the Security Council, which will decide the implementation of the mission mandate⁸⁴.

As a result, it is true that when it comes to decision-making, multiple aspects are concerned to make peacekeeping more impartial and comprehensive. However, the massive scale of agencies and their complicated responsibilities also caused many problems, hindering peacekeeping missions from operating effectively.

It is universally believed that peacekeeping operations must adhere to the Security Council's authority since it will reflect the views of as many states as possible. Nevertheless, when an urgent and unpredictable incident occurs in the country concerned, it often delays the launching of a peacekeeping operation because of the time required for reporting and decision-making by the Security Council.

At the time of the outbreak of the Rwandan genocide, UNAMIR did not undertake effective operations immediately owing to the lack of a United Nations authorization. On April 12, 1994, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium met with the Secretary-General and stated that Belgium had decided to withdraw the Belgian peacekeepers in Rwanda, while the Permanent Representative of Belgium to the United Nations hoped to persuade the Security Council to withdraw UNAMIR. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has discussed the matter and drafted two solutions, which were submitted to UNAMIR and the Secretary-General. The Security Council and UNOMUR held different stances, and maintained continuous communication on the mandate of UNAMIR. Eventually, the Security Council adopted a resolution on May 17 to increase troop strength to 5,500. However, it had been a month since the genocide began.⁸⁵

Even for regular process, the procedure of operations involving multiple parties still greatly reduces efficiency. In the event of a dilemma, the information needs to be reverted from Headquarters to DPKO, which reports to the Secretariat. Through this complex process, the time consuming is greatly increased while the efficiency is reduced.

c. Lack of Military and Financial Support

For decades, inadequate funding has constrained the effective conduct of peacekeeping operations. The lack of appropriate equipment, materiel, and specialized military training leads to a lower capacity to participate effectively in military operations, which causes unremarkable peacekeeping results and increases the casualties of peacekeepers.

However, some countries are unable to submit their contributions promptly because of less developed economies or war and social instability. Some countries view the assessed contributions as an additional burden and do not fulfill their obligations to peacekeeping operations.⁸⁶ For example, in the case of UNAMIR, which has a mandate in Rwanda, received very few people because of staffing and resource constraints during the same period. The United Nations has put 38,599 military personnel in Yugoslavia and 28,000 in Somalia, while sending only 2500 to Rwanda, which indirectly contributed to the miserable end of the Rwandan genocide⁸⁷. Moreover, the military support of UNAMIR is also grossly inadequate. It is reported that even the most substantial troop in UNAMIR

84 United Nations Peacekeeping, "FORMING A NEW OPERATION", *United Nations Peacekeeping*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/forming-new-operation>.

85 United Nations Peacekeeping, "WHAT IS PEACEKEEPING", *United Nations Peacekeeping*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/what-is-peacekeeping#:~:text=UN%20peacekeeping%20is%20a%20unique%20global%20partnership.%20It,combined%20effort%20to%20maintain%20international%20peace%20and%20security>.

86 United Nations Peacekeeping, "Establishment of a Peace-keeping Reserve Fund : resolution / adopted by the General Assembly", *UN. General Assembly (47th sess. : 1992-1993)*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/159156?ln=en>.

87 United Nations Peacekeeping, "Rwanda - UNAMIR Facts and figures", *United Nations Peacekeeping*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unamirF.htm>.

faced problems with recycled material and a lack of arms. The Bangladeshi contingent arrived even without the most basic supplies, no need to mention whether they had experienced the necessary training or not⁸⁸. Intense peacekeeping operations, large-scale peacekeeping personnel, and arrears of contributions by Member States have placed a tremendous strain on the UN military and financial conditions and thus seriously affected the efficiency of peacekeeping operations.

Additional Problems during the Progress

Peacekeeping troop quality is defined as the technical and personal capability of a peace operation, including training as well as equipment such as weapons and battle dress, but also larger equipment such as helicopters, transport planes, or military vehicles⁸⁹. That is to say, the quality of a peacekeeping mission will largely depend on the troop contributing countries. Due to the fact that the personnel of United Nations peacekeeping forces come from different countries, speak different mother tongues, and receive different educations, the quality of peacekeeping personnel is uneven, consequently creating difficulties while operating missions.

During the process of deployment of peacekeeping forces, the United Nations usually first sends out observer missions and contingents to the country involved to research and report the situation on the ground. However, after the arrival of the peacekeeping force, the retention of the Mission will be an issue, and thus, its obligation becomes obscure.

In the case of peacekeeping operation in Rwanda, the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda was initially set up in June 1993 to monitor the border. The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda was soon established in October 1993 with the integration of the Observer Mission⁹⁰. Nevertheless, the two missions seemed to operate relatively independently, with the headquarters of UNAMIR located in Rwanda and that of UNOMUR in Uganda. Moreover, the financial record of the two missions remained unclear. Until 21 December 1993, the costs related to UNOMUR were reflected in the costs of UNAMIR⁹¹.

Besides the problems of lack of clarity of mandates and financial data, there is also the potential conflict among the different peacekeeping organizations contributed by the United Nations. In June 1994, France was authorized by the Security Council to intervene in the peacekeeping operation in Rwanda by leading another troop known as Operation Turquoise.⁹² When the Security Council authorized two forces, how to balance and cooperate became a problem. In fact, some countries believed that the operation also enabled some of the perpetrators of the genocide, who were allies of the French, to escape⁹³, which caused conflicts between French peacekeepers and RPF, resulting in UNAMIR to take on a mediation role.

88 United Nations Peacekeeping, "Letter dated 15 December 1999 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council", *UN. Secretary-General*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/405039?ln=en>.

89 United Nations Peacekeeping, "Better peacekeepers, better protection? Troop quality of United Nations peace operations and violence against civilians", *Felix Haass and Nadine Ansorg*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/epub/10.1177/0022343318785419>.

90 United Nations Peacekeeping, "Resolution 872 (1993) / adopted by the Security Council at its 3288th meeting, on 5 October 1993.", *UN. Security Council (48th year : 1993)*, Jan 26, 2024 Accessed, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/197341?ln=en>.

91 United Nations Peacekeeping, "Uganda - Rwanda - UNOMUR Facts and Figures", *United Nations Peacekeeping*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/unomurfacts.html>.

92 *Ibid.*

93 United Nations Peacekeeping, "Understanding the 1994 Rwandan Genocide: Facts, Responses & Trials", *GENOS CENTER*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://genoscenter.org/understanding-the-1994-rwandan-genocide-facts-responses-trials/>

During the Cold War, many regional international organizations started to conduct peacekeeping operations in certain areas. The troops of RIOs generally have more advanced equipment and a more robust military force. However, they are also more likely to become tools for a few countries to pursue regional hegemony and interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.

The peacekeeping operations were supposed to be neutral, with the main obligations of protecting civilians, promoting human rights and delivering field support⁹⁴. The basic principles of peacekeeping operations include impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defense⁹⁵. Recently, more and more peacekeeping missions are being undertaken because of domestic turmoil rather than the conflicts and wars between two countries. According to statistics, four of the five peacekeeping missions operated in 1988 were deployed in response to inter-State conflicts, while nine of the 11 peacekeeping operations conducted in 1988-1994 were due to a civil war in a country⁹⁶. If a peacekeeping operation intervenes in a war, it could easily fuel one of the domestic forces or be criticized for doing so.

94 United Nations Peacekeeping, "WHAT WE DO", *United Nations Peacekeeping*, Jan 30,2024 Accessed, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/what-we-do>

95 Hasegawa Peacebuilding Academy, "The Peace Support Operations under the Basic Principles of UNPKO and the Agricultural Transformation in Economic Development," Jan 30,2024 Accessed, *Hasegawa Peacebuilding Academy*. <http://www.shasegawa.com/archives/10181>

96 李一文：《蓝盔行动：联合国与国际冲突》，当代世界出版社，1998年版。

Possible Solutions

Insisting on the Existed Principles and Mechanism

According to the experiences and lessons brought by past actions, UN peacekeeping still needs to insist on the existing principles and mechanisms. That is the parties' consent, impartiality, and non-use of force in self-defense and defense of the mandate.

After the "June 5" occurrence, the Unified Countries Security Chamber passed Resolution 837, requiring the capture of aided, and the peacekeeping powers completed persistent assaults on aided and annihilated numerous fortifications and ammo stations of aided.

After the tragedy, the operation aimed to capture aided became the main task and driving force of UNOSOM. The peacekeeping forces and aided faction exchanged gunfire many times, and the armed conflict continued, with heavy losses on both sides and a large number of civilian casualties. The behavior of the peacekeeping forces in Somalia deviated from the principles of neutrality and impartiality.

Due to the significant changes in the international situation after the Cold War, dealing with the internal affairs of sovereign states has become an unavoidable problem for peacekeeping operations. During the UNAMIR, the unjust actions of the major powers have led the United Nations to be accused of not helping people in disaster and to face decision-making difficulties.

Therefore, peacekeeping forces must be carefully involved and must maintain the standpoint of impartiality and neutrality.

During the UNOSOM, the presence of peacekeepers in Mogadishu has been met with outright resistance from Somali factions, seriously damaging the reputation of the United Nations and the execution of the action. This highlights the significance of sticking to the parties' consent principle.

Besides, during the action, peacekeeping forces carried out numerous military offensives against armed factions. They forcibly disarmed them to achieve the goal of imposing peace rather than maintaining peace. It violated the basic principle of non-use of force and was also alien to the original goal of peacekeeping.⁹⁷

In summary, insisting on the existing principles and mechanisms is the initial step in peacekeeping reform.

⁹⁷ John, "Where we operate?-past operations", *United Nations Peacekeeping*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/recommendations-of-special-committee-peacekeeping-operations-c34>.

Adjustment of Peacekeeping Policy

a. Recalling the Human Rights Norms

Human protection is a subset of the more encompassing concept of human security. The latter reminds us that the security of “we the peoples” matters every bit as much as the security of states. Human protection addresses more immediate threats to the survival of individuals and groups.

International human rights law is an integral part of the normative framework for United Nations peacekeeping operations. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which sets the cornerstone of international human rights standards, emphasizes that human rights and fundamental freedom are universal and guaranteed to everybody.⁹⁸ United Nations peacekeeping operations should be conducted in full respect of human rights and should seek to advance human rights through the implementation of their mandates

Take Somalia as example, although a series of United Nations relief activities effectively alleviated the humanitarian crisis in Somalia during the first phase of UNOSOM. The repeated battles between the United Nations and Aided in the later phase of the operation failed to clearly distinguish between combatants and non-combatants, hurting a large number of innocent Somalis. Since the United Nations Operation in Somalia began in December 1991, nearly 6,000 Somalis have been killed in the conflict.⁹⁹

In addition, there have also been ugly incidents of rough treatment of the people of the countries affected by the intervention by UN peacekeeping personnel. In 1993, more than 10 Italian peacekeeping soldiers gang-raped a woman in Somalia, triggering the “Somalia scandal” that shocked the international community. The great irony is that the peacekeepers are in Somalia under a humanitarian banner, but their actions show a profound disregard for the human rights of Somalis.¹⁰⁰

United Nations peacekeeping personnel – whether military, police or civilian– should act in accordance with international human rights law and understand how the implementation of their tasks intersects with human rights. Peacekeeping personnel should strive to ensure that they do not become perpetrators of human rights abuses. They must be able to recognize human rights violations or abuse, and be prepared to respond appropriately within the limits of their mandate and their competence. United Nations peacekeeping personnel should respect human rights in their dealings with colleagues and with local people, both in their public and in their private lives. Where they commit abuses, they should be held accountable.

The failure of UN peacekeeping operations, which failed to reduce civilian casualties caused by local military operations and failed to prevent the violence against civilians by peacekeeping forces, has been repulsed and opposed by the local government and the international community and has also been strongly condemned by the international community.

Human rights is a core pillar of the United Nations. All staff in peace operations have the responsibility to ensure the protection and promotion of human rights through their work.¹⁰¹

⁹⁸ Christopher Clague, “Contract Intensive Money: Contract Enforcement, Property Rights and Economic Performance,” *Journal of Economic Growth*, no.4(1999):157.

⁹⁹ ICPSR, “Data Collection 6035”, *University of Michigan*, 1993.

¹⁰⁰ Christopher Coyne, “Reconstructing Weak and Failed States: Foreign Intervention and the Nirvana Fallacy,” *Foreign Policy Analysis*, no.4(2006):344.

¹⁰¹ Hanne Fjelde and Indra de Soysa, “Coercion, Co-optation, or Cooperation? State Capacity and the Risk of Civil War, 1961-2004,” *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, no.1(2009): 9-13.

Over thirteen years, the human rights component of MINUSTAH supported Haitians with the protection and promotion of human rights. With the support of the component, police and justice oversight bodies, as well as the national human rights institution, increased their capacity to investigate allegations of human rights violations. The Government's capacity to respond to international human rights mechanisms such as Universal Periodic Review was also strengthened.¹⁰²

The teams implement the human rights-related mandates given to missions and they help to mainstream human rights across all mission activities. The goals of human rights teams can be¹⁰³:

- a. To contribute to the protection and promotion of human rights through both immediate and long-term action,
- b. To empower the population to assert and claim their human rights,
- c. To enable State and other national institutions to implement their human rights obligations and uphold the rule of law.

The human rights component has worked to empower Civil society organizations to act as guardians of the respect of human rights and the Haitian constitution. Most multi-dimensional UN peace operations have a human rights team. Some of the core activities undertaken by the human rights section should include:¹⁰⁴

- 1) Conducting human rights monitoring, investigations and analysis
Issuing public reports on human rights issues of special concern
- 2) Preventing human rights violations, including through mission-wide early warning mechanisms
- 3) Responding to violations of human rights by providing human rights advice
- 4) Advising and assisting other mission teams in integrating human rights

Human rights teams work in close cooperation and coordination with other civilian and uniformed components of peace operations. In particular, in relation to the protection of civilians; addressing conflict-related sexual violence and violations against children; supporting transitional justice and accountability mechanisms; strengthening respect for human rights and the rule of law through legal and judicial reform, security sector reform and prison system reform.

At the mean time, the office of the high commissioner for human rights (OHCHR) can play an important role during the peacekeeping mission. OHCHR provides expertise, guidance and support to these human rights teams. The head of the human rights team is the most senior human rights advisor to the Head of Mission and is also the representative of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in-country.

b.Reaffirming the Perception of Force Intervention

Peacekeeping operations based on the collective security mechanism of the United Nations have traditionally focused on the peaceful settlement of disputes, with non-force and non-coercion as its essential features. Since the end of the Cold War, domestic and international conflicts have become more frequent, and the original contradictions

¹⁰² Lewis Snider, "The Political Performances of Third World Governments and the Debt Crisis," *American Political Science Review*, no.4(1990):12-15.

¹⁰³ UN, "PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS," *United Nations*, Jan 30,2024 Accessed, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/promoting-human-rights>.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid*.

have been further intensified. UN peacekeeping missions are faced with more tasks and challenges. Adopting more coercive measures in peacekeeping operations is a new trend in post-Cold War peacekeeping operations, primarily when peacekeeping missions are assigned to solve domestic conflicts.

The failure of coercive measures in United Nations peacekeeping operations is precisely the case of the peacekeeping operation in Somalia. The relevant aspects of the operation in Somalia have been described above.

A successful example of coercive measures in United Nations peacekeeping operations is the peacekeeping operation in Haiti.

In 1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected president of Haiti. However, in 1991, a military coup led by the commander of the Haitian Armed Forces, General Raoul, ended democratic rule and sent the newly elected president into exile. The military coup in Haiti has shaken the international community and prompted a strong condemnation from the United Nations.¹⁰⁵ Finally, in 1994, the Council authorized Member States to establish a multinational force to take coercive measures to restore democratic rule in Haiti and to remove the military regime from the country.¹⁰⁶ Troops from the United States, Argentina, and Central and North American countries formed the United Nations Peacekeeping Force, designed to impose coercive measures to restore peace in Haiti.

This phase of the peacekeeping operation alone has been a complete success, owing mainly to the timing and manner in which the enforcement action was undertaken. The timing of the enforcement action was well controlled, giving the military government no time to organize a civil revolt and ending the action quickly, reducing the risk of violating Haiti's sovereignty. It maintains an impartial stance in its actions, does not intervene in the disputes between Haitian factions, does not get involved in the internal conflict in Haiti, and thus is less under the pressure of international public opinion.¹⁰⁷

One of the keys to the effectiveness of coercive measures in UN peacekeeping is to ensure the principles of neutrality and impartiality and never get caught in the quagmire of a country's internal conflict. In the above cases, the UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia failed because it did not abide by the principles of neutrality and impartiality stipulated in the UN Charter. On the other hand, the UN peacekeeping operation in Haiti has mainly remained neutral in its enforcement actions, enhancing its international legitimacy. Only by maintaining the principle of neutrality and impartiality can we stay within the essential purpose of peacekeeping, ensure the results, and avoid getting involved in internal conflicts.

Peacekeeping operations must be carried out promptly and withdrawn quickly. Former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan once said, "The failure of the United Nations to take strong action immediately after the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was the main reason for the subsequent massacres." The above case of the United Nations peacekeeping operation in Haiti also illustrates the need to take timely and coercive measures when the crisis intensifies.

Otherwise, serious consequences will be produced. The earlier adoption of coercive measures would have brought peace sooner and minimized civilian casualties and losses to United Nations forces. Coercive measures should, therefore, be taken when all peaceful

¹⁰⁵ Cameron Thies, "The Political Economy of State Building in Sub-Saharan Africa," *Journal of Politics*, no.3(2007):723.

¹⁰⁶ Jose Cheibub, "Political Regimes and the Extractive Capacity of Governments: Taxation in Democracies and Dictatorships," *World Politics*, no.3(1988):156.

¹⁰⁷ Emizet Kisangani and Jeffrey Pickering, "Rebels, Rivals, and Post-colonial State-Building: Identifying Bellicist Influences on State Extractive Capability," *International Studies Quarterly*, no.1(2014): 194-195.

means have failed. The means of coercion must be adopted both early and too late: too early and too dependent on force. It is too late; you missed an excellent opportunity. At the same time, forced means to achieve peace should be quickly evacuated to avoid a country's domestic nationalist sentiment and international public opinion pressure. The essential purpose of UN peacekeeping is to restore peace, and there is no reason to stay long with the ultimate goal of establishing a democratic government in line with the wishes of Western countries.¹⁰⁸ Therefore, the timely and rapid withdrawal of peacekeeping operations by mandatory measures is one of the keys to success. Otherwise, it is easy to fail.

Coercive measures must be in the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, which deals with issues of international peace and security arising from inter-State or regional and global conflicts. Article 2, paragraph 7, of Chapter 1 of the Charter of the United Nations prohibits interference in "matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State."¹⁰⁹ After entering the 1990s, due to the end of the Cold War, domestic conflicts became increasingly frequent, and more and more United Nations peacekeeping operations were involved in the internal conflicts of a country under the banner of "humanitarian."

Suddenly, coercive measures are increasingly used in peacekeeping operations.

The United Nations and the great powers are at the core of how to prevent circumvention. In the past, the United Nations relied heavily on the United States to take enforcement action, and American troops dominated the peacekeeping force formed. Although the United States has received a mandate from the United Nations General Assembly to form a peacekeeping force, it also raises the question of whether the United Nations or the United States has a central role in peacekeeping operations.

What is the position of the United Nations once the United States requests a peacekeeping operation based on its request? Will we act at the whim of the United States, or will we not be afraid to offend the United States? In the case of Somalia, UN enforcement relied too heavily on the United States and allowed UN peacekeepers to get caught up in Somalia's internal conflict. The leading role of the United Nations must be strengthened in United Nations peacekeeping operations to conduct peacekeeping operations for the Charter of the United Nations and prevent mandatory peacekeeping from going astray.

c. Extending Functional Authority and Subject

With the changes in the international situation after the Cold War, peacekeeping operations have significantly changed contents and forms.

In addition to the traditional dimensions and forms initially formed to supervise ceasefires and isolate the counter party, peacekeeping operations have also undergone significant changes. Preventive diplomacy (establishing peace), peace enforcement (enforcing peace), peace-building (building peace), and other concepts gradually formed.¹¹⁰

Strengthen political involvement and promote democracy and peace. The United Nations strongly promotes "democratic peace" and "good governance" as ways to "prevent war and disaster." Since the 1990s, most United Nations peacekeeping operations have had mandates related to "election assistance" and "election supervision."¹¹¹ The United Nations organizes, mobilizes, and monitors elections in post-conflict countries, providing security protection, technical advice, logistical support, personnel training, voter education, computer applications, and short-term inspections.

108 Hanne Fjelde and Indra de Soysa, "Coercion, Co-optation, or Cooperation? State Capacity and the Risk of Civil War, 1961-2004," *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, no.1(2009): 9-13.

109 UN, "United Nations Charter", *United Nations*, p2.

110 Robert Muggah, "Stabilizing Fragile States and the Humanitarian Space," Routledge, 2010, p.35.

111 Roger Mac Ginty, "Against Stabilization," *International Journal of Security and Development*, no. 1 (2012): 20-30.

“Facilitating ceasefire agreements, assisting in the holding of elections and assisting in the building of national institutions and the rule of law” has become the basic approach and means of United Nations peacekeeping and peace building and the regular mandate of United Nations peacekeeping operations since the 1990s.

The United Nations established the Electoral Assistance Division of the Department of Political Affairs to serve as the United Nations system’s focal point for electoral assistance. It will strengthen judicial involvement and promote the rule of law at home and abroad. Suppose the United Nations’ strengthening of political involvement in peace and security issues is a “democracy for peace” approach. In that case, it is matched by the “rule of law for peace” promoted by the United Nations.¹¹²

At the same time, the United Nations has stepped up efforts to promote the construction of the rule of law in member States and the construction of international justice and sought to close the relationship between the Security Council, the International Court of Justice, and the International Criminal Court, including referring relevant situations to the International Criminal Court. The United Nations also conducts rule of law activities worldwide, particularly in Africa, through criminal and hybrid tribunals.¹¹³

UN peacekeeping is undergoing a multidimensional and comprehensive transformation from peace enforcement and peacekeeping to peace building. Since the end of the Cold War, the UN has also shown a tendency to strengthen both military and non-military means of maintaining peace and security.

On the one hand, the UN emphasizes dealing with new global threats through non-military means, such as maintaining peace and security and preventing conflicts through political, rule of law, and economic means mentioned above. On the other hand, the United Nations authorizes all measures by Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations¹¹⁴, and neutral peacekeeping based on the traditional “three principles” has developed into multi-level and comprehensive “peace operations,” including “peace enforcement” with mandatory military operations, and “peace-building” involving elections, institutional building, the rule of law construction and other contents.¹¹⁵

The number of Member States and other actors participating in and supporting the activities of the UN in peace and security has increased, and the role and legitimacy of the UN in this field has gained greater recognition.

In the early days of peacekeeping operations, for reasons of neutrality, large countries generally did not participate in the dispatch of peacekeeping troops, and small and medium-sized countries were the primary sources of peacekeepers. Most issues involving significant powers are also not referred to the UN, making it difficult for the Security Council to adopt resolutions and take concerted action. Since the end of the Cold War, the Security Council’s permanent members have been more coherent, able to reach agreements on many security issues, and have given incredible support to UN peacekeeping operations. The Security Council adopted two resolutions in 1954, 14 in 1964, 14 in 1984, and 73 in 1994.¹¹⁶

¹¹² Aditi Gorur, “Defining the Boundaries of UN Stabilization Missions”, *Stimson Center*, 2016, p. 3-6.

¹¹³ Aditi Gorur and Paul Holtom, “Resonating, Rejecting, Reinterpreting: Mapping the Stabilization Discourse in the United Nations Security Council”, *International Journal of Security & Development*, no.1(2015):1-18.

¹¹⁴ UN, “United Nations Chapter”, *United Nations*, p2.

¹¹⁵ Charles T. Hunt, “All Necessary Means to What Ends? The Unintended Consequences of the Robust Turn’ in UN Peace Operations,” *International Peacekeeping*, no.1(2017):108-131.

¹¹⁶ UN, “UN PEACEKEEPING: 70 YEARS OF SERVICE & SACRIFICE”, *United Nations*, Jan 30,2024 Accessed, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/un-peacekeeping-70-years-of-service-sacrifice>.

After the Cold War, with the expansion of the scale and tasks of peacekeeping operations, the participation of significant countries in personnel dispatch has become necessary and even a critical factor in the success of some peacekeeping operations. In the 1990s, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and Canada were significant contributors to peacekeeping troops. For example, in May 1995, France ranked first among contributing countries, the United Kingdom second, the United States fifth, Canada seventh, and Russia fifteenth.¹¹⁷ In the future, the five permanent members of the Security Council will need to contribute more peacekeeping troops and police. Unlike during the Cold War, UN peacekeeping operations require the authorization of a Security Council resolution with the consent of the permanent members by giving away power in exchange for greater participation by the great powers.

Emerging economies and some regional powers have gradually become significant contributors to UN peacekeeping operations, and major contributors to peacekeepers. Countries such as India, South Africa, and Brazil should become essential contributors to peacekeeping.¹¹⁸ In addition to India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and other traditional peacekeeping contributors, more countries have joined the ranks of UN peacekeeping contributors. Some African and Middle Eastern countries should also become major peacekeeping contributors.¹¹⁹

d. Redefining the Neutrality and Non-Intervention Condition

The principle of neutrality in peacekeeping operations has been weakened. The three traditional principles of peacekeeping put forward the principle of neutrality: "Peacekeeping operations must not interfere with the rights, claims, and positions of the countries concerned, must remain neutral, and must not favor any party in the conflict."

As UN peacekeeping practices face new tasks and environments, the number of situations in which peacekeeping operations help to resolve internal conflicts in a country is increasing, and the principle of neutrality of peacekeeping operations is often impacted, especially in the peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia, which makes peacekeepers intervene in a country's internal affairs and become a party to the conflict. In subsequent UN documents, more and more emphasis were placed on the distinction between impartiality and neutrality, and the principle of impartiality was emphasized. In contrast, the principle of neutrality was weakened.¹²⁰

In the first phase of the UNOSOM, the United Nations troops have made specific contributions to the relief of victims and improved social security. However, with the deepening of the peacekeeping operation, the United Nations troops are deeply involved in the "domestic affair" of Somalia, trying to rely on external forces to forcibly "create peace" in Somalia. It is precisely because the UN Operation in Somalia, which was initially a "humanitarian relief" operation.¹²¹

The degree of interference in peacekeeping operations in regional affairs has gradually deepened, and in some aspects, there has been a contradiction with national sovereignty.

For example, the United Nations develops peace processes in conflict areas, including several country portfolios under the PBC, and conducts comprehensive surveys semi-

117 *Ibid.*

118 Arthur Boutellis, "Can the UN Stabilize Mali? Towards a UN Stabilization Doctrine?" *International Journal of Security and Development*, no.1(2015):1-16.

119 *Ibid.*

120 David Curran and Charles Hunt, "Stabilization at the Expense of Peacebuilding in UN Peacekeeping Operations," *Global Governance*, no.1(2020):46-68.

121 Mats Berdal, "NATO's Landscape of the Mind: Stabilization and Statebuilding in Afghanistan," *Ethnopolitics*, no.5(2019):1.

annually or annually to monitor the government. In addition, the contributions and loans made by some financial institutions worldwide for post-conflict reconstruction are often accompanied by requirements for regular disclosure of national fiscal expenditures. According to the three judgments of the sovereign power according to the tradition, the action of harmony has been produced by the conflict with the sovereign power.¹²²

Nowadays, international conflicts mainly belong to "spillover" conflicts, the spillover of domestic contradictions. In order to solve and deal with the contradictions caused by such conflicts, the international academic circle looks for a breakthrough from the Angle of "sovereignty transfer." Based on the divisible property of the principal right, the theory of "the principal right to cross" makes the principal right exist in the expression of different degrees.

The concept of "sovereignty transfer" is more conciliatory than the theory of "sovereignty weakening," and the concept of "sovereignty transfer" is expounded separately from the dimensions of globalization, international law, and global governance.¹²³

However, countries caught in conflict and civil unrest are more sensitive to the sense of sovereignty. This is also one of the most important reasons why it is challenging to develop dimensions and actions. "The Lord's right to cross" still stops at the level of theory in dimension and action, especially for the country, but also from the Angle of "protecting the responsibility" to find the breakthrough point.¹²⁴

Conflict management should, therefore, also address the social root causes.

First, we should not only focus on the interests of political factions but also the causes of social conflicts. On the one hand, while mediating the conflict parties to stabilize the situation, on the other hand, should start to resolve social contradictions. That is, peacekeeping and peace building should go hand in hand.

Second, intervention in national sovereignty should not be "imperative" but "participatory." Peacekeeping operations should play the role of "police to maintain order" for the people in conflict areas rather than the role of "foreign occupying forces."¹²⁵ At the same time, partners such as the World Bank should refrain from making too much political interference in lending aid to the discontent of local social forces.¹²⁶ While it is impossible for political forces to join a conflict area because of conflicting interests, the undue overreach of peacekeeping operations can reinvigorate the trend towards common avoidance in the region. Mainly, when the conflict occurs within a country, even if the country has a "multi-person personality" within the country, the country still can take action on the foreign issue.

Thirdly, in planning the redevelopment process, consideration should be given to the sustainability of the society. The ultimate goal of peace building is restoring civilian life and returning social stability in the region. The process of peace building should not be speedier to reduce budgetary expenditure. Otherwise, the social shield will quickly intensify, and the community will become unstable. On the contrary, it may create instability in the local governance situation.¹²⁷

122 Arthur Boutellis, "Can the UN Stabilize Mali? Towards a UN Stabilization Doctrine?" *International Journal of Security and Development*, no.1(2015):1-16.

123 UN, "United Nation Security Council Resolution 2217", *United Nations*, 2015, p.8.

124 UNDP, "Governance for Peace: Securing the social contract", *United Nations Development Programs*, no.2(2011):15.

125 Aditi Gorur, "Defining the Boundaries of UN Stabilization Missions", *Stimson Center*, no.3(2011):16.

126 World Bank, "Human Development Report: Conflict, Security and Development", *Peace and Development magazine*, no.1(2011):12.

127 UNDP, "Governance for Peace: Securing the social contract", *United Nations Development Programs*, 2011, p.19.

There are two different understandings of the principle of non-interference.

In the world, "failed states" have no official position to govern their own countries. When a country is unable to stop political chaos or even genocide at home, responsible states can disregard their sovereignty and intervene for humanitarian purposes. Another understanding is that once the international community acquiesces to the existence of such interference, domestic conflicts will be compounded and prolonged under the influence of external forces. At the same time, breaking the principle of "non-interference in other countries' internal affairs" will only encourage hatred between countries, which is not conducive to world peace and security.

However, both the former and the latter recognize that the United Nations should actively assume the "responsibility to protect" to simultaneously prevent the escalation of internal conflicts and civilian casualties. It is also necessary to prevent some countries from exploiting their political interests in the name of peacekeeping operations or even willfully trampling on the sovereignty of the countries concerned. Otherwise, things like the NATO bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the name of "humanitarian aid" will be carried out again.¹²⁸

Western countries are increasingly keen to bring "human rights over sovereignty" into their foreign policy. This development trend has to bring "sovereignty transfer" into people's vision. Putting aside the pretext of "the supremacy of human rights" as a political pretext by Western countries, the concept of "sovereignty transfer" alone has specific reference value for solving the problem of interference in sovereignty by peacekeeping operations.

Strictly speaking, when a peacekeeping operation begins, the concept of "absolute sovereignty" does not exist in the target country because absolute sovereignty does not allow to be included in the action.

Therefore, the promotion of "relative sovereignty" is conducive to providing a theoretical basis for the temporary transfer of sovereignty during peacekeeping operations and provides a good premise for developing peacekeeping operations. At the same time, the real issue that cannot be ignored is the negative impact of the interest entanglements of various political factions in the domestic parties on the "transfer of sovereignty."¹²⁹ Traditionally, tribal forces in Africa, in particular, are averse to outside powers, which will put obstacles in the way of peacekeeping operations involving sovereign powers.

Alignment of Peacekeeping Actions

a. Mobilizing UN Institutional Dynamism and Efficiency

The Department of Peace Operations (DPO) is the legal institution that assists Member States and the Secretary-General in their efforts to maintain global peace and security. DPO provides direction to UN peacekeeping operations worldwide and is in charge of the coordination between the Security Council, troop and financial contributors, and parties involved in conflicts for mandate implementation. The Department aims to integrate the efforts of UN, governmental, and non-governmental entities within the context of peacekeeping operations. It also standardizes and supports military, police, mine action, and other relevant issues to other UN political and peace building missions. DPO was established in 1992 as the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) when Ghali took office as the Secretary-General of the United Nations.¹³⁰

128 Edward Newman, Roland Paris, and Oliver P. Richmond, "New Perspectives on Liberal", *Peacebuilding*, 2009, p.15.

129 Astri Suhrke, "Statebuilding in Afghanistan: A Contradictory Engagement," *Central Asian Survey*, no.3(2013): 271-286.

130 UN, "Department of Peace Operations Peacekeeping," *United Nations*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/department-of-peace-operations>.

DPO consists of three main offices: The Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) supports the rule of law components in UN peace operations and special political missions. The Office of Military Affairs (OMA) ensures the deployment of appropriate military capabilities to support UN objectives and aims to enhance the performance and efficiency of military components in peacekeeping missions. The Policy, Evaluation, and Training Division (DPET) is responsible for developing and disseminating the policies and doctrines that guide peacekeeping work. They also maintain strategic cooperation with various UN and external partners.¹³¹

To raise the dynamism and efficiency of the UN peacekeeping institution and mechanism, we could consider the four components of the DPO accordingly:

1. Military and Civilian Police Division

Military and civilian police officers in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) are required by the United Nations to serve for three years on active duty. If they want to continue working beyond that period, they are not allowed to return to their previous positions in their national military or police services. As a result, there is a high turnover rate in the military and police offices of DPKO. This frequent turnover leads to the loss of institutional memory, which takes a significant amount of time and on-the-job learning to replace.¹³²

It is recommended that the Military and Police Division of DPKO be separated into two separate entities: one for the military and another for the civilian police. The Military Adviser's Office should be expanded and restructured to align more closely with the structure of military headquarters in UN peacekeeping operations. This will enable more effective support to the field and provide better-informed military advice to senior officials in the UN Secretariat. The Civilian Police Unit should also receive additional resources, and consideration should be given to upgrading the rank and level of the Civilian Police Adviser.¹³³

To maintain a minimum level of continuity in DPKO's military and civilian police capacity, a certain percentage of the new positions in these units could be reserved for individuals who have previous UN experience and have recently left their national services. These personnel can be appointed as regular staff members. This approach follows the example set by the Logistics and Communications Service of the Field Administration and Logistics Division, which includes former military officers.

2. Field Administration and Logistics Division

The Financial and Administrative Liaison Division (FALD) does not have the power to finalize and present budgets for the field operations it plans, nor to procure the necessary goods and services. These authorities lie with the Peacekeeping Financing and Procurement Divisions of the Department of Management (DM). The procurement requests made at headquarters are handled by procurement officers funded by the Support Account, who prepare larger contracts for review by the Headquarters Committee on Contracts. They also negotiate and award contracts for goods and services that are not procured locally by the field missions. Additionally, they develop United Nations policies and procedures for both global and local mission procurement. The complex process involved in this system, combined with staffing limitations, seems to be a contributing factor to the reported delays in procurement by field missions.¹³⁴

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

¹³² UN, "Identical Letters Dated 21 August 2000 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council," *United Nations*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/420963?ln=en>.

¹³³ UN, "Department of Peace Operations Peacekeeping," *United Nations*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/departement-of-peace-operations>.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

To improve procurement efficiency, it is suggested to delegate peacekeeping budgeting, presentation, allotment issuance, and procurement authority to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) for a trial period of two years. This would involve transferring relevant positions and staff accordingly. In order to maintain accountability and transparency, the Department of Management should retain authority over accounts, assessment of Member States, and treasury functions. They should also continue to oversee policy setting and monitoring in areas such as recruitment and administration of field personnel, as these authorities are already delegated to the DPKO.¹³⁵

3. Lessons Learned Unit

The impact of DPKO's current Lessons Learned Unit on peace operations practice appears to be limited, as lessons are often compiled after a mission has concluded. This is unfortunate because new experiences and lessons are generated daily within the peacekeeping system. It is crucial to capture and preserve this knowledge for the benefit of current and future operations. Lessons learned should be regarded as part of information management, contributing to the continuous improvement of operations.¹³⁶

There is an urgent need to enhance this function and it is recommended that it be located in a position where it can closely collaborate with ongoing operations, mission planning, and the development of doctrine and guidelines. The Office of Operations, which oversees the functions of Integrated Mission Task Forces to integrate planning and support for peace operations at headquarters, would be an appropriate choice for this purpose.

4. Senior management

Currently, there are two Assistant Secretaries-General in DPKO: one in charge of the Office of Operations and the other responsible for the Office of Logistics, Management, and Mine Action (FALD and the Mine Action Service). The Military Adviser, who also serves as the Director of the Military and Civilian Police Division, reports to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations either through one of the two Assistant or directly to the Under-Secretary-General, depending on the nature of the specific issue.

The efficiency and dynamism of the Department's work could be enhanced through the rationalization of additional staff to share different tasks.¹³⁷

b. Establishing New Peacekeeping Institution

On 27 July 1994, at its 3408th meeting, the Security Council placed on its agenda the report of the Secretary-General of 30 June 1994 on the progress made in establishing standby arrangements with Member States in connection with their possible contributions to United Nations peacekeeping operations. In that report, the Secretary-General recalled that the purpose of the standby arrangements was to provide a precise picture of the forces and other capabilities under an agreed standby status should a Member State agree to contribute to a peacekeeping operation. The Secretariat will maintain a comprehensive database with detailed information on the number, quantity and size of troops and other capabilities covered by the standby arrangements for planning purposes, in particular with about transportation and the possible need to procure items.¹³⁸

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*

¹³⁶ UN, "Identical Letters Dated 21 August 2000 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council," *United Nations*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/420963?ln=en>.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*

¹³⁸ UN, "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council: Supplement 1993-1995," *United Nations*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/703174?ln=en>.

As at 31 October 1995, 47 Member States had confirmed their willingness to provide standby resources, totaling 55,000 personnel. The purpose of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS) is to provide a Member State that agrees to contribute to a peacekeeping operation with a clear understanding of the forces and other capabilities that should be available to that State in an agreed state of readiness.¹³⁹ These resources may include military forces, individual civilian and military personnel (e.g., police, military observers), specialized services, equipment and other capabilities. A key element of the Standby Arrangements System is the exchange of detailed information to assist participating Member States and the United Nations in planning and preparedness. However, the commitments received to date have not included the resources required to establish and implement future peacekeeping operations. Resources are still lacking in key areas such as communications, multi-role logistics, health care, supply, engineering and transportation.¹⁴⁰

The aim of this initiative is to reduce the lead time for new or expanding peacekeeping operations and to improve efficiency and coordination between the Secretariat and the missions. The Standby Arrangements System is based on the provision by Member States of designated resources, in accordance with conditions, to be made available to United Nations peacekeeping operations within an agreed response time frame. Resources include military personnel or troops, civilian police, specialized personnel (civilian or military) and services, as well as material, equipment, etc.

Resources are "on standby" in their home country, where they are trained in accordance with United Nations guidelines to prepare them to perform specific tasks or functions. Standby resources would be utilized in peacekeeping operations in accordance with Security Council mandates, but should be distinct from peace enforcement forces. In standby arrangements, Member States retain full command responsibility for standby resources that remain in their country. During assignment to a peacekeeping operation, personnel contributed by participating Member States remain under their own military status but are under United Nations command.¹⁴¹

The first six to twelve weeks after the signing of a ceasefire or peace agreement are usually the most critical period for establishing a stable peace and building the credibility of peacekeepers. Firstly, they oversee and monitor compliance with the terms of the ceasefire or peace agreement. Peacekeepers act as impartial observers, ensuring that all parties involved adhere to the agreed-upon conditions and commitments. Moreover, peacekeepers foster confidence and trust among conflicting parties by facilitating communication channels and providing a platform for dialogue. This enables the resolution of grievances, prevents misunderstandings, and promotes mutual understanding and reconciliation. Another significant contribution is the protection of civilians. Through patrolling, establishing security zones, and providing physical protection, peacekeepers contribute to rebuilding trust and confidence among local populations.

Credibility and political momentum lost during this period are often difficult to regain. Matching deployment schedules should therefore be tailored accordingly. However, even rapid deployment of military, civilian police and civilian personnel will not help to consolidate a fragile peace and build operational credibility if they are not equipped to carry out their tasks. For a mission to be effective, its personnel need to be provided with

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁰ UN, "Progress Report of the Secretary-General on Standby Arrangements for Peacekeeping," *United Nations*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/229901?ln=en>.

¹⁴¹ UN, "YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 1995," *United Nations*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, https://www.unmultimedia.org/searchers/yearbook/page_un2.jsp?volume=1995&page=2.

materiel (equipment and logistical support), financing (cash for the procurement of goods and services), intelligence resources (training and briefings) and operational strategies, and, for operations deployed into situations of uncertainty, a military and political “center of gravity” sufficient to enable them to anticipate and overcome a backlash from one or more of the parties against moving the peace process forward.¹⁴²

c. Cooperating with Regional International Organizations

While the Security Council holds the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, Article 24 in Chapter V of the Charter acknowledges the role of regional organizations and arrangements in maintaining peace and security within their respective regions. According to Article 33(1) in Chapter VI, parties involved in a dispute that poses a threat to international peace and security “shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.”¹⁴³ Under Chapter VIII, Article 52(1) states that “the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action.” It further encourages Member States to utilize these regional arrangements or agencies to resolve local disputes before bringing them to the attention of the Security Council.¹⁴⁴

The *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, issued on 3 January 1995, outlined the forms that cooperation between the UN and regional organizations was taking at the time in the context of maintaining peace.¹⁴⁵

- 1. Consultation:** This collaboration aims to exchange perspectives on conflicts that both the UN and regional organizations are attempting to resolve. Consultation can take various forms, ranging from formal reports submitted to the General Assembly to informal meetings organized by the Secretary-General with the heads of regional organizations cooperating with the UN.
- 2. Diplomatic Support:** Regional organizations have supported the peace-making efforts by participating in diplomatic initiatives and activities that led to the establishment of peacekeeping operations. Examples include the OAU, the League of Arab States (LAS), and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) supporting the UN's endeavors in Somalia.
- 3. Operational Support:** The level of operational support provided by regional organizations varies depending on the specific needs on the ground. One example is NATO providing air power to assist the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia, although NATO does not classify itself as a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII. The European Union has also provided support in Eastern Slavonia, Bosnia, and Liberia, while the Western countries have aided the UN peacekeeping forces in Iraq/Kuwait.
- 4. Co-deployment:** The UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) demonstrates co-deployment, where multiple organizations work together in different roles to

¹⁴² UN, “Identical Letters Dated 21 August 2000 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council,” *United Nations*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/420963?ln=en>.

¹⁴³ Administrator, “COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS/ARRANGEMENTS IN A PEACEKEEPING ENVIRONMENT,” *Regional Organizations and UN Peacekeeping*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://archive.globalpolicy.org/security-council/peacekeeping/regional-organizations-and-un-peacekeeping.html>.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

maintain peace. The International Police Task Force (IPTF), under UNMIBH, monitors the local police. The NATO-led multinational peacekeeping force (IFOR/SFOR) ensures a safe and secure environment. The OSCE assists in organizing elections. The UNHCR provides care for refugees. The European Union provides development assistance. The Office of the High Representative oversees coordination. Each organization is responsible for monitoring human rights protection.

- 5. Joint Operations:** In Haiti, the UN and the OAS collaborated on the International Civilian Mission (MICIVIH). This joint mission involved shared staffing, direction, and financing between the UN and the OAS. This arrangement was a potential model for future collaborations, which should be carefully evaluated.

There also existed some recommended principles and mechanisms for better cooperation between the UN and regional Bodies:

Establishing a universal model to define the ideal relationship between the UN and regional/sub regional organizations in peacekeeping operations is neither feasible nor appropriate. This is due to the varying levels of cooperation required in different peacekeeping operations and the significant differences in characteristics, available resources, and institutional capacity of each regional organization. However, certain general principles can guide cooperation.¹⁴⁶

The Security Council is primary possibly for maintaining international peace and security, and effective cooperation must occur within this framework. Regional organizations should not be seen as diminishing this responsibility, and the Security Council's consistent engagement is crucial for the UN's credibility.

Regional organizations have a Charter-mandated responsibility to address regional conflicts, but they should regularly inform the Security Council about the measures they are taking or considering. When authorized by the Security Council prior to establishment, peacekeeping operations by regional organizations garner greater consensus.

Cooperation between the UN and regional/sub-regional organizations should be an ongoing and flexible process to reap the benefits of the partnership in various aspects such as preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and post-conflict reconstruction. Clear and concise mandates are essential for effective cooperation, especially regarding humanitarian and human rights aspects.

When planning a mission, the UN and regional/sub-regional organizations should make use of each other's expertise as much as possible. A cooperation framework should be agreed upon before establishing respective operations, clearly defining the responsibilities of each entity in the mission area. In their individual and joint activities, both the UN and regional/sub-regional organizations should prioritize the respect for human rights and the principles of international humanitarian law. They should also encourage conflicting parties to uphold human rights and address issues of official impunity.

The UN and regional/sub-regional organizations should establish a cooperation mechanism, led by senior officials of equal rank, to facilitate regular consultations, communication, and coordination in a shared mission area. Empowering the heads of operations to make operational decisions without constant reference to their respective headquarters will enable quick decision-making and responsiveness to on-ground situations.

¹⁴⁶ Administrator, "COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS/ARRANGEMENTS IN A PEACEKEEPING ENVIRONMENT," *Regional Organizations and UN Peacekeeping*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://archive.globalpolicy.org/security-council/peacekeeping/regional-organizations-and-un-peacekeeping.html>.

Additional cooperation mechanisms may include liaison officers between the UN mission headquarters and the regional/sub-regional organization operating in the same mission area. Negotiating of understanding encourages communication at all levels and can have positive effects. However, the effectiveness of liaison officers may be limited if their functions are perceived as intrusive or irrelevant by either entity. There may be exceptions where maintaining close ties is not necessary, such as when one entity is responsible for organizing elections and the other for monitoring them, in which case some distance is advisable to avoid any perception of undue influence.

It is recommended that an international conference be convened at the inter-governmental level to bring together the UN, its agencies, relevant regional/sub-regional organizations, the donor community, multilateral financial institutions, and concerned States. This conference would enable the international community to gather essential resources and garner global support for the peace process.¹⁴⁷

An option worth considering is for the UN and regional/sub-regional organizations working together in a mission area to adopt a standard code of conduct for their personnel to address grievances from the local population resulting from the actions of international staff. Furthermore, to foster teamwork and avoid risky competition, it is advisable for the UN mission and the regional/sub regional organization operating in the same mission area.¹⁴⁸

d. Strengthening Political Support and Legal Interventions

1. Implementation of an Agenda for Peace to improve the political environment

On January 3, 1995, then-UN Secretary-General Gali issued a position paper entitled "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace," which supplemented the 1992 Agenda for Peace, setting out new recommendations and specifically mentioning several areas where unforeseen or only partially foreseen difficulties had arisen that required Member States to take in the 1992 report called "hard decisions". At the same time, a summary statement was provided on the critical distinction between peacekeeping and enforcement action and the use of military force to the detriment of diplomacy and diplomacy.¹⁴⁹

Following an in-depth discussion of the Supplement, the Security Council issued a presidential statement supporting the position paper on January 18 and 19, 1995. The Security Council encouraged all Member States to make full use of the methods of preventive action, including the good offices of the Secretary-General, the dispatch of special envoys, and the deployment of small field missions with the consent of one or more host countries, as appropriate, for preventive diplomacy and peace building. The Security Council hopes that the General Assembly and other organizations and entities will prioritize the Supplement. It was encouraging that current experiences in peacekeeping were appearing not only in United Nations documents but were also beginning to appear in the training materials of some Member States. The Open-ended Informal Working Group of the General Assembly on an Agenda for Peace continued in 1995 to study the matters referred to in the Agenda for Peace and its Supplement.

In this context, at the initiative of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, three substantive departments of the Secretariat, namely, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, the Department of Political Affairs, and the Department of Peacekeeping

¹⁴⁷ Edward Newman, Roland Paris, and Oliver P. Richmond, "New Perspectives on Liberal", *Peacebuilding*, 2009, p.15.

¹⁴⁸ Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, "An Agenda for Peace," *United Nations*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/145749>.

¹⁴⁹ UN, "YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 1995," *United Nations*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, https://www.unmultimedia.org/searchers/yearbook/page_un2.jsp?volume=1995&page=2.

Operations, developed a flowchart of actions: information-sharing, consultation and joint action to harmonize their work in the planning and implementation of complex operations in this area. This mechanism, known as the "Framework for Coordination," encompasses the work of the three Departments on routine monitoring and early warning analysis, assessment of possible preventive actions, fact-finding, planning, and implementation of field operations, and evaluation of lessons learned.¹⁵⁰

In the Agenda for Peace, many proposals for strengthening political support are mentioned, including:¹⁵¹

- 1) Confidence-building measures: This includes establishing crisis relief centers at regional or sub-regional levels, promoting the unrestricted flow of information through regional organizations, organizing consultations on confidence-building measures, and offering specific guidance to the Secretariat.
- 2) Fact-finding to enhance preventive diplomacy: The Secretary-General can gather detailed information on concerning issues through communication with member states' governments, often by sending senior officials for consultations to capitals or other locations. The Security Council or the General Assembly may authorize formal fact finding, which could involve sending a mission under their direct authority or requesting the Secretary-General to take necessary actions, including appointing a Special Envoy.
- 3) Improvement of the early warning network: In cases of internal crises within a country, the option of preventive deployment can provide assistance in various ways to alleviate suffering and mitigate or control acts of violence. This can be done either upon the request of the government or with the agreement of the involved parties.

2. Strengthening the support of the international legal system for peacekeeping:

The International Court of Justice, which had a growing docket of cases, remained an underutilized peaceful means of settling disputes. A greater focus on the role of the International Court of Justice would contribute to peace building. Under Articles 36 and 37 of the Charter, the Security Council can recommend that Member States refer disputes to the International Court of Justice, arbitration, or other dispute settlement mechanisms.

It is recommended that the Secretary-General be authorized to use the Court for advisory opinions, per Article 96, paragraph 2, of the Charter, and that other UN bodies that have been so authorized request advisory opinions from the Court more frequently.¹⁵² To strengthen the role of the Court, Gali also made the following proposals in his Agenda for Peace:¹⁵³

Before the end of the United Nations Decade of International Law in the year 2000, all Member States should accept, without reservation, the universal jurisdiction of the Court in accordance with Article 36 of its Statute. Suppose this is not possible because of domestic structures.

In that case, States should agree, bilaterally or multilaterally, on a detailed list of matters they would be willing to refer to the International Court of Justice and withdraw their reservations concerning the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in the dispute settlement clauses of multilateral treaties.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁵¹ Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, "An Agenda for Peace," *United Nations*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/145749>.

¹⁵² Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, "An Agenda for Peace," *United Nations*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/145749>.

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*

It should be submitted to a chamber if it is impossible to submit a dispute to a full court. States should support the trust fund established to assist States that cannot afford the costs of submitting a dispute to the International Court of Justice; such States should make full use of the fund to settle their disputes.

e.Guiding and Regulating World Public Opinion

Building adequate public information and communications capacity in mission areas is essential.

Effective communication helps to dispel rumors, correct misinformation, and gain the cooperation of the local population. It can provide a bargaining tool in dealing with leaders of competing groups, enhance the security of United Nations personnel, and serve as a force multiplier. Therefore, every peace operation must develop strategies for launching public information campaigns, especially for key aspects of the mission's mandate, and such strategies, as well as the personnel needed to implement them, must be included in the first deployments to help start new missions.¹⁵⁴

United Nations field operations must also communicate effectively with their own personnel, keep staff informed of mission policies and developments, and establish links between departments and between the bottom-up and top-down chain of command. New information technology provides an effective tool for such communication, which should be included in the start-up kits and equipment stocks stored at the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi.

Additional resources dedicated to public information and related staff and information technology should be allocated in accordance with the mandate, size, and needs of the mission, as well as the need to establish effective internal communications links for the dissemination of information on peace operations, which rarely exceeds 1 percent of the mission's operational budget.

Publicizing the work of United Nations peace operations to the public is essential to support existing and future missions. Not only is it important to project a positive image early on to create a conducive working environment, but it is also essential to maintain a sound public information campaign to gain and retain the international community's support.

Currently, the body officially responsible for publicizing the work of United Nations peace operations is the Peace and Security Section of the Department of Public Information at Headquarters.¹⁵⁵

Unlike military, civilian police, mine action, logistics, telecommunications and other mission components, there is no single unit at Headquarters with specific responsibility for the operational needs of the public information components of peace operations. The most centralized responsibility for public information aspects of a mission rests with the Office of the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General, as well as with the missions' own spokespersons and public information offices. The Peace and Security Section of the Communications and Planning Service of the Public Affairs Division of the Department of Public Information at Headquarters comprises.

The Peace and Security Section, under the Communications and Planning Service of the Public Affairs Division of the Department of Public Information at Headquarters,

¹⁵⁴ UN, "Identical Letters Dated August 21, 2000, from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council," *United Nations*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/420963?ln=en>.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

comprises four Professional officers responsible for the preparation of publications, drafting and updating web sites on peace operations and dealing with a wide range of other issues, from disarmament to humanitarian assistance. The Section also prepares and manages information on peacekeeping. However, there needs to be more capacity for developing doctrinal strategies or standard operating procedures for public information in the field, which is done only sporadically and on an ad hoc basis.¹⁵⁶

The Peace and Security Section of the Department of Public Information is being expanded due to staff redeployment within the Department. However, with a significant increase in the number of staff in the Section and its availability, support functions will be distributed to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, which may have officers on loan from the Department of Public Information.

Wherever this function is placed, public information needs should be anticipated. The skills and personnel required to meet those needs should be identified, priorities should be set, standard field operating procedures developed, and support should be provided during the start-up phase of a new mission. Support and guidance should be provided continuously through participation in integrated mission task forces. Peace operations should establish an operational planning and support unit for public information in DPKO or the new Peace and Security Information Service of the Department of Public Information, reporting directly to the Under-Secretary-General for Communications and Public Information.

Existing processes for public information production and the posting of data on the United Nations website have slowed the updating cycle. However, missions often need to update information daily in the context of rapidly evolving events. Existing processes also limit the amount of information available for each mission. The Department of Public Information and field staff have expressed interest in removing this bottleneck by developing a "website co-management" model.

In addition, Headquarters and field missions should be encouraged to develop a website co-management approach, whereby Headquarters would continue to provide oversight. However, missions would authorize staff to develop and post web-based information compliant with basic reporting standards and policies.

f. Implementing Assessment of Outcome and Neutrality

How to assess the success or failure of a peacekeeping operation is an inextricable topic of peacekeeping work and a highly controversial international debate. Because of the failures and limitations of many United Nations peacekeeping operations before 1995, establishing a scientific and accurate system of integrated planning and performance evaluation is of great importance. In this section, the views of many scholars and experts on evaluating peacekeeping operations will be presented, which will help delegates reflect on establishing the core latitude and criteria for evaluating peacekeeping operations at the Conference.

In his 1994 *Mershon International Studies Review*, Robert Lohansen reviewed Paul Diehl's 1993 book *International Peacekeeping*, which raised several issues on which analysts disagree. Peacekeeping, a review of Paul Diehl's 1993 book, raises some issues analysts disagree with.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁷ Daniel Druckman, Paul C. Stern, Paul Diehl, A. Betts Fetherston, Robert Johansen, William Durch, and Steven Ratner, "Evaluating Peacekeeping Missions," *Mershon International Studies Review*, No. 1(1994): 151-165.

Johansen takes issue with two of Diehl's criteria for evaluating peacekeeping operations, namely that they (1) limit armed conflict and (2) facilitate conflict resolution. According to Johansen, these criteria demand more peacekeeping forces than can reasonably be expected because they are not designed to prevent war in general and resolve potential conflicts.

Controversial issues include what missions can be expected to achieve, whether short- or long-term impact should be assessed, whether to assess the impact on the local population or the ruling party, and whether to impose external standards that can be used to assess many cases or to develop mission-specific assessment criteria. In addition, analysts disagreed on methodological issues such as distinguishing between mission-specific impacts and determining appropriate conditions for comparison.¹⁵⁸

Paul Diehl argues that an obvious criterion for evaluating success at the macro level is the extent to which a mission has achieved the purposes set out in its mandate. Mandates, of course, are usually political documents developed by the United Nations or other agencies to communicate broad objectives while maximizing political support for them. As a result, mandates can be ambiguous, with considerable room for disagreement on how to define objectives and how best to implement them. Indeed, this ambiguity may be the price of approval in multilateral coalitions. Some operations, such as the Multinational Force in Beirut, have different mandates among coalition partners.

Moreover, given that clear mandates are often cited as a factor in the overall success of a peacekeeping mission. If mandate implementation is used as a criterion for success, this avoids the issue to some extent; an alternative approach is to consider the specific achievements of the operation: these might include how many people were fed, ceasefires achieved, and so on.

This type of assessment allows the analyst to see tangible items, but it still leaves room for error; other measures of success are more about what was accomplished than how it was accomplished. For example, objectives specific to the organization (or domestic political interests) may be more valuable than those related to the conflict or the local population. Thus, the efficiency of the operation, the neutrality or impartiality of the mandate, or the ability to avoid violence may be valued. Success might even be defined in terms of the ability of peacekeeping forces to avoid casualties.¹⁵⁹

According to Betts Fethers, criteria are primarily based on military/diplomatic "wish lists," which are developed to set standards that enable countries to participate with minimal risk (financial or otherwise).

The real significance of conceptualizing criteria for assessing peacekeeping operations lies in thinking about them in the larger context of peacebuilding and conflict transformation. Understanding success based on such conceptual thinking opens up a whole range of questions about peacekeeping mandates that are overlooked when we follow the "traditional" way of thinking, where success is linked to the particular interests of national Governments and national military organizations rather than to the interests and needs of societies in conflict.¹⁶⁰

Steven Ratne argues that an abstract or non-accidental definition of success or failure in peacekeeping is impossible. Arrive at four different, relative methods of assessment: (1) comparison with the mission's mandate, (2) comparison with the results of other

¹⁵⁸ Daniel Druckman, Paul C. Stern, Paul Diehl, A. Betts Fetherston, Robert Johansen, William Durch, and Steven Ratner, "Evaluating PeaceKeeping Missions," *Mershon International Studies Review*, No. 1(1994): 151-165.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

peacekeeping operations, (3) the impact on the country in question, and (4) the impact on the United Nations or other implementing organizations.¹⁶¹

Acknowledging Emerging Non-traditional Security Concerns

The UN peacekeeping Force is a means by which the United Nations maintains international peace and security. Its main functions are to carry out peacekeeping tasks authorized by the Security Council, such as monitoring ceasefire agreements, maintaining peace and stability, protecting civilians, assisting in political transition, and promoting nation-building.

Non-traditional security refers to a series of security issues in addition to military threats and political conflicts, which involve all levels of the state and society, and they may be economic, environmental, social, cultural, technological, and other aspects. Non-traditional security threats include but are not limited to, terrorism, cyber security, public health (such as epidemics of infectious diseases), food safety, environmental change, natural disasters, energy security, economic and financial risks, and social instability.

The importance of non-traditional security is reflected in the following aspects:

Impact of globalization: With the Development of globalization, non-traditional security issues are often not limited to a single country and are easy to spread across borders, posing challenges to the international community.

Human security: Non-traditional security issues have a direct and far-reaching impact on human security because they are closer to everyday life and directly related to people's health, survival, and Development.

Intricacy: These threats are frequently more complicated, necessitating multi-layered, and diverse solutions as well as state cooperation. In addition, non-traditional security threats are often urgent and require prompt response and response.

Therefore, paying attention to and strengthening the study, prevention, and response to non-traditional security issues has become essential to the national security strategy and world peace. Countries can effectively improve their ability to deal with non-traditional security challenges and promote global stability and development by working together internationally and establishing multilateral mechanisms. Since the non-traditional security problems are usually cross-country and require global cooperation, and the United Nations aims to maintain international peace and security, UN peacekeeping should acknowledge emerging non-traditional security concerns.

Peacekeeping forces need to accurately identify threats, including enhanced intelligence gathering, analysis, and sharing on the ground. Using high-tech information and intelligence tools, such as drones, satellite imagery, and network monitoring, can improve the perception and prevention of non-traditional threats.

While the traditional mandate of United Nations peacekeeping operations has been to monitor ceasefire agreements and maintain peace, in the face of non-traditional security threats, peacekeepers have to adapt to a more complex and dynamic security environment, which may require cooperation with other international organizations, non-governmental organizations and local administrations from different backgrounds.

While the traditional mandate of United Nations peacekeeping operations has been to monitor ceasefire agreements and maintain peace, in the face of non-traditional

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

security threats, peacekeepers have to adapt to a more complex and dynamic security environment, which may require cooperation with other international and regional organizations, local administrations from different background and other UN agencies.

Specifically, it is crucial to enhance the capacity of regional organizations to actively engage in peacekeeping operations and establish stable partnerships with them. Experience has demonstrated that regional organizations possess inherent advantages in maintaining regional peace and security.

Firstly, setting a heightened awareness of conflict situations and a better understanding of emergency circumstances. Secondly, they can promptly take practical actions and collaborate with UN peacekeeping operations to prevent conflicts from escalating further. Therefore, strengthened cooperation and coordination between the United Nations and regional organizations are vital prerequisites for success. However, it is essential for regional organizations to consistently adhere to the provisions outlined in Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations without attempting to replace the role played by the United Nations.¹⁶²

Besides, reforms are also crucial in the face of emerging non-security concerns. UN peacekeeping missions can play a role in building the capacity of host countries to address non-traditional security threats. This may involve training local security forces, enhancing intelligence capabilities, and developing strategies for counter-terrorism or countering organized crime. Developing and implementing effective early warning systems is essential for identifying and responding to potential non-traditional security threats before they escalate. This involves intelligence gathering, monitoring, and analysis to provide timely information for decision-making. More than a sound system is required.¹⁶³

Last but not least, non-traditional security threats often have humanitarian dimensions. Incorporating humanitarian assistance into the peacekeeping mission's activities can address the immediate needs of affected populations and contribute to long-term stability.

In the modern security environment, the United Nations is constantly adapting to new challenges and adapting its peacekeeping strategy to respond more effectively to traditional and non-traditional security threats.

¹⁶² UN, "Identical Letters Dated August 21, 2000, from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council," *United Nations*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/420963?ln=en>.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*

Country Positions

Permanent Members of UNSC

China

In 1981, China voted for the UNSC Resolution to extend the duration of operations in Cyprus, marking the first time for China to support UN peacekeeping. Several investigation groups and civil personnel teams started participating in missions in the Middle East and Namibia from 1985 to 1989.¹⁶⁴

In the 1990s, China sent more military observers to mission areas. The military engineer team of around 800 soldiers appointed to Cambodia in 1992 and 1993 was the beginning of China's organized troops participating in peacekeeping operations.¹⁶⁵

Regarding the UN as the most representative and authoritative international organization in the world, China is fulfilling its duty according to the principles in the UN Charter. Chinese peacekeeping workings stick to the original intention to help operation regions regain peace and promote development. Under the challenges facing UN peacekeeping after the Cold War, China views the UN as needing reform to effectively address complex global governance issues.¹⁶⁶

China plays an indispensable role in providing sources of peacekeepers and funds. As a major developing country and one of the permanent members of the UNSC, China is willing to expand the scale of engagement in peacekeeping operations by increasing the number of service members, training more personnel, constructing infrastructures, and transporting supplies for people in need.¹⁶⁷ The Chinese government is also working to promote information sharing and strategic support for a peaceful and sustainable future on behalf of developing countries. Given the status quo that developed countries controlled the decision-making process in the UN and the limited comprehensive strength, the demands of developing countries could not be fulfilled in international organizations. Though China did not send many troops to the major missions in the 1990s, the Chinese government assigned military observers to these areas to gain more experience and build an image of developing countries contributing to peacekeeping.

China seeks to deepen cooperation with the UN and optimize peacekeeping operation guidelines and regulations. Some scholars and politicians criticize China for ignoring aspects including human rights, transparency, and accountability, indicating an urgent need for both sides to build mutual understanding and mutual trust with international organizations as a communication platform.

¹⁶⁴ 何星、周洋：《为联合国维和行动贡献中国力量》，中华人民共和国国防部，2021年11月2日，<http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/jxsd/wh/4898311.html>。

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁶ Courtney J. Fung, "China's Small Steps into UN Peacekeeping Are Adding Up," *The Global Observatory*, May 24, 2023, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://theglobalobservatory.org/2023/05/chinas-small-steps-into-un-peacekeeping-are-adding-up/>.

¹⁶⁷ CGTN, "Chart of the Day: China's global peacekeeping journey," *CGTN*, Oct 24, 2021, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://news.cgtn.com/news/2021-10-24/Chart-of-the-Day-China-s-global-peacekeeping-journey-14AH0nBSZZ6/index.html>.

USA

As the country with the most economic and military strength worldwide after the Cold War, the USA contributed to the establishment of the UN and peacekeeping operations. The USA's attitude toward peacekeeping is decided mainly by geopolitical interests and domestic public opinions. Shortly after the Cold War, the USA paid the arrears of the UN operations and shifted the military emphasis to peacekeeping, leading to a surge in the number of peacekeeping mandates. The collapse of the Soviet Union enabled the USA to intervene in global affairs and build a new order under its command, which is regarded by the USA as its duty as a major power. The decisions made by the UN regarding peacekeeping operations were influenced by the USA in accordance with its national interests. The sanction of the UN to establish UNITAF empowered the USA to utilize "all necessary measures" to guarantee the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Somalia, indicating the USA's predominance in UN peacekeeping.¹⁶⁸

The US government led the operation in Somalia under the permission of the UNSC. "Effective Internationalism" became its central policy in peacekeeping operations, giving rise to robust peacekeeping actions.¹⁶⁹ In 1993, "Assertive Multilateralism" replaced the former principle, guiding the US to contribute to peacekeeping operations and reduce threats to its allies. The USA provided \$1 billion in the total output of the UN peacekeeping was \$3.6 billion.¹⁷⁰

Despite the USA's decisive and positive actions before the middle of 1993, its later performance was controversial. Because of disinformation and lack of coordination, its military helicopters in Somalia were attacked and crashed. The US government considered the event a strategic mistake and withdrew from the area. Given the USA's essential position in peacekeeping operations, its departure left a massive shortage of personnel and equipment. Consequently, the UN changed its peacekeeping policy in Somalia to minimize the loss. Still, a large number of peacekeepers and local soldiers died in the wars.

After the failure, the US government changed its peacekeeping intervention policies to "American Internationalism", showing a more negative attitude toward similar issues.¹⁷¹ The lessons learned in Mogadishu made the US military worry about potential casualties and risks of letting foreign commanders take charge of the US troops. Therefore, the US government cut financial support for peacekeeping operations and urged the UN to reform its peacekeeping mechanisms. The USA attaches importance to long-term capacity-building partnerships and peacekeeper protection in higher-risk environments. Anticipating emerging non-traditional security threats and attempting to maintain its superpower position, the USA intends to adjust its relationship with the UN considering its national interests, especially those related to its influence in the Middle East and Asian-Pacific region.

Russia

Russia accumulated military power during the World Wars and the Cold War, and in the post-Cold War era, the Russian government is applying this strength to peacekeeping. Russia has participated in preventing or eliminating conflicts in the territories of the

168 周晓：《美国的联合国索马里维和政策研究》，外交学院硕士论文，2021年6月，第34页。

169 赵磊：《冷战后美国维和政策的演变及特征》，《美国研究》，2011年第4期，第111页。

170 *Ibid.*, 113.

171 *Ibid.*

former USSR Republics and other countries. The Russian peacekeepers are experienced and well-equipped. Besides, Russia sends many military observers to missions in Western Sahara, Congo, Sudan, etc.¹⁷²

After the Cold War, Russia faces an uncertain future, especially regarding its clout in international organizations. The Russian government utilizes the UN and its permanent membership in the UNSC to maintain its influence after the collapse of the former USSR. Russia takes responsibility for maintaining security in the Commonwealth of Independent States by appointing peacekeeping forces such as the operation in Transnistria. Peacekeepers from Russia, Moldova, and Ukraine were deployed to the conflict zone to separate the belligerents and discover instances of safety breaches.¹⁷³ Russia is also working under the frameworks of international organizations to ensure its security under NATO's expansion to the east.

During this period, Russia's foreign policy tended to be prudent. In MINURSO missions, Russia only sent around 300 observers to the area, showing an indifferent attitude toward the issue.¹⁷⁴ On one hand, the Russian government was concerned with the risks of intervening too much in peacekeeping operations. On the other hand, Russia did not want to miss the opportunity to participate in global governance. Therefore, it appointed more senior officials in the UN missions than troop soldiers. Russia is opposed to establishing a reserve force for UN peacekeeping, but it is willing to participate in peacekeeping workings, especially those concerning its relationships with former USSR Republics.

Confronting the current situation, Russia will conduct reform on its military units and advocate the reform of UN peacekeeping operations. The Russian government plans to provide more peacekeeping personnel by organizing new brigades for operations. Meanwhile, the decisions and deployment of peacekeepers should avoid power abuse, reaching the balance of national influence and peaceful world order under multi-polarization.

UK

The UK has participated in several important UN peacekeeping missions and provided a considerable proportion of the budget. The British military has assigned many soldiers to operations, including UNPROFOR and UNFICYP. More than 3,000 soldiers were sent to UNPROFOR missions in July 1994.¹⁷⁵ In Cyprus, British soldiers who serve with the UN Force are responsible for maintaining the integrity of the Buffer Zone and preventing armed conflicts.¹⁷⁶

The British government intends to raise its international position as a major power in the new world order after the Cold War, especially its strength in international organizations. Therefore, it will likely join more peacekeeping missions and continue to invest in peacekeeping operations. Additionally, the UK's role in the European Union is pivotal in peacekeeping activities. After adopting the Petersburg Declaration in 1992 and joining

¹⁷² Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, "Russia's Participation in Peacekeeping Operations," *Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, https://eng.mil.ru/en/mission/peacekeeping_operations.htm.

¹⁷³ Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, "Peacekeeping operation in Transnistria," *Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, https://eng.mil.ru/en/mission/peacekeeping_operations/more.htm?id=10336232@cmsArticle.

¹⁷⁴ 安娜: 《参与联合国维持和平行动: 俄罗斯和中国决策和行动比较研究》, 上海师范大学硕士论文, 2022年4月, 第59-60页。

¹⁷⁵ United Nations Peacekeeping, "Troops and police contributions," *United Nations*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>.

¹⁷⁶ Nigel Walker, "Britain's role in UN peacekeeping operations," House of Commons Library, Apr 1, 2014, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/britains-role-in-un-peacekeeping-operations/>.

the Treaty of Maastricht on European Union in 1995, the British government worked closely with other European countries on peacekeeping. An armed force was organized by some Member States to conduct peacekeeping operations to achieve common security and defense.¹⁷⁷ The UK jointly dealt with issues in Bosnia and Yugoslavia by forming an emergency troop with Germany, Netherlands, and Belgium.

Considering new security obstacles and complex situations, as a developed European country, the UK is willing to work with the UN to sustain peace, which is also a method to expand its worldwide influence and right of speech. By providing resource support, the British government attempts to secure the delivery to mission areas and maintain the effective and efficient management of resources. Therefore, existing problems concerning peacekeepers' lack of resources can be alleviated. Meanwhile, assistance can support the UK's allies, building a closer tie between the UK and them. The UK favors the reforms proposed by the UN and is willing to discuss and implement consensus-based resolutions in pursuit of a high-performing, accountable, and well-managed UN and peacekeeping organization.¹⁷⁸

France

The European Union cooperates closely with the UN on peacekeeping operations. As one of the initiators of the European Union (EU), France participates in the UN's workings to promote peace and development. The period from the end of the Cold War to 1995 is marked by France's positive participation in peacekeeping activities. France was one of the first countries to voice support for adopting the 1992 report "An Agenda for Peace: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping" submitted by the Secretary-General.¹⁷⁹ The French government issued several memorandums to emphasize the legitimacy of peacekeeping and the necessity of organizing troops authorized by the UN for peacekeeping needs. To transform its support into actions, France gradually raised the number of French peacekeepers, which peaked in 1993. From 1992 to 1995, more than 5,000 peacekeepers from France were deployed annually to missions in Africa, Asia, South America, etc.¹⁸⁰

Africa is the policy focus of France in many aspects, involving military, humanitarian assistance, and trade. After the end of the Cold War, France had more opportunities to interfere with African issues and regain its influence on the continent. Still, there exists a plight concerning France's political stance in some regional disputes. Generally, France's strategy of participating in peacekeeping operations in Africa aimed at achieving political goals rather than genuine humanitarian consideration. The focus on national interests affected the implementation and eventual failure of the operations. France is responsible for the deterioration of the Rwanda Genocide due to its support for the Hutu administration and the ambition to secure its clout in Africa. The French government was accused of directly participating in the political preparation and action of the genocide. After the genocide, its credibility as a responsible major power is under doubt.

177 姜子健：《欧盟维和行动研究》，国防科技大学外交学硕士论文，2017年12月，第10-11页。

178 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "Supporting UN Peacekeeping," GOV.UK, May 6, 2024, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/supporting-un-peacekeeping>.

179 肖涵：《冷战后法国参与联合国维和行动的阶段性变化动因研究》，硕士论文，四川外国语大学比较制度学专业，2018年6月，第19页。

180 United Nations Peacekeeping, "Troops and police contributions," *United Nations*, Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>.

Powerful Countries

Japan

In the early 1990s, Japan deployed its military forces abroad for peacekeeping missions, marking a significant historical moment. In June 1992, the Japanese government passed the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Cooperation Law, allowing the Japanese armed forces to partake in limited peacekeeping operations. These operations were restricted to nonmilitary activities like election monitoring, humanitarian relief, and transport engineering. Japan initially sent civilian volunteers and units of the Self-Defense Forces to Cambodia in 1992, followed by deployments to Rwanda in late 1994 and the Golan Heights on the Israeli-Syria border in February 1996.¹⁸¹

The involvement in international peacekeeping poses both a policy dilemma and an opportunity for Japan. If Japan expands its peacekeeping activities, particularly in operations requiring force, it would have far-reaching implications beyond the practical aspects of peacekeeping itself. The debate in Japan revolves around sensitive issues in domestic and defense politics, potentially causing deep divisions within their society. Therefore, deciding the future of Japanese peacekeeping is a process that takes time and effort for policymakers.

A key point of contention in the domestic debate regarding Japan's involvement in peacekeeping is Article 9 of the Constitution, which restricts the Japanese military to self-defense roles. This means that the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) cannot use force overseas or participate in collective security arrangements. Expanding Japan's commitment to peacekeeping operations challenges these long-standing interpretations of the Constitution. Even reactivating the clauses of the 1992 law will require approval from the Diet, making constitutional legitimacy a crucial factor. It would likely necessitate either a change in interpretation of Article 9 or an amendment to the Constitution itself.¹⁸²

For the Japanese Foreign Ministry, Japan's participation in international peacekeeping is closely tied to its goal of obtaining a permanent seat on the Security Council. This objective is considered a top foreign policy priority, along with maintaining solid relations with the United States. While Japan may hold a subordinate position in the bilateral relationship, it seeks greater equality in global affairs by increasing its visibility in multilateral institutions. The Foreign Ministry views a permanent seat as a symbol of international prestige, representing the global community's recognition of Japan's economic success.

The United States remains an essential source of international support for Japan's role in international peacekeeping. Initially, Japan's engagement in peacekeeping and foreign aid was aimed at deflecting American pressure for greater burden-sharing during the latter stages of the Cold War. Some elements within the United States still view Japanese peacekeeping through this lens and have explicitly called on Japan to increase its contributions to global peacekeeping and share America's responsibilities.

However, in general, the Clinton administration has supported Japan's peacekeeping efforts and has cooperated to some extent by providing transport facilities and equipment. Nevertheless, the past two years have seen a period of reassessment. The United Nations secretary-general's vision for peacekeeping has become less ambitious than his 1993 Agenda for Peace, which proposed the establishment of special peace-

¹⁸¹ Mulgan, Aurelia George, "International Peacekeeping and Japan's Role: Catalyst or Cautionary Tale?" *Asian Survey* 35, Dec 1, 1995, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2645833>.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*

enforcement units under his command, in which Japan was invited to participate. More recently, in visits to Tokyo, the secretary-general has only mentioned the organization's need for "more involvement, more assistance, and more participation by Japan in international affairs" without specifically requesting an increase in Japan's peacekeeping contributions.¹⁸³

The pace at which Japan's peacekeeping policy changes is predominantly influenced by domestic political factors, with regional and international influences playing a secondary role. However, if there were to be a major international event like the Gulf War, the likelihood of rapid change would increase. One of the main factors limiting change is the national defense consensus, particularly public attitudes toward deploying Japanese military forces overseas and the associated constitutional issues..

Another critical issue that remains is the balance between military and nonmilitary efforts. Japan is generally hesitant to deviate from its global civilian power model, positioning it as a nation committed to peace. The balance will likely continue to be skewed towards nonmilitary contributions in international affairs, including limited personnel commitments.

Egypt

In the 1990s, Egypt played a significant role in various peace operations, ranging from UN observer missions to more complex operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Somalia. Egypt's bilateral experience in establishing peace and building confidence with Israel is particularly noteworthy. The success of the MFO mission served as a foundation for the broader regional peace process and offers valuable insights for future treaties aimed at promoting confidence and security.¹⁸⁴

Throughout the 1990s, Egypt actively sought to maintain a leading position in the Arab, African, and Islamic regions. The appointments of its senior diplomats exemplified this, Esmat Abdel Meguid and Boutros Boutros-Ghali, as heads of the Arab League and the United Nations. Boutros-Ghali's concern triggered the UN's intervention in Somalia that too much attention was being given to conflicts in Europe while similar atrocities were occurring in Africa without adequate response. This realization prompted African nations to take more responsibility for controlling wars and adopting a more decisive approach to addressing their challenges.¹⁸⁵

Egypt's contribution to UN peacekeeping operations in 1994 included 2,192 troops, making it the second-largest Arab contingent after Jordan. In April 1995, Egypt expressed willingness to contribute to the UN's standby forces, explicitly focusing on peacekeeping missions in Africa. Additionally, in July 1995, the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Amre Moussa, sought assistance from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in coordinating efforts and sharing expertise with the recently established African mechanism for resolving disputes and preventing conflicts within the Organization of African Unity (OAU) context.¹⁸⁶

During the 1990s, Egypt played a significant role in peacekeeping operations worldwide. Egypt was in Bosnia, Croatia, Georgia, and Macedonia in Europe. In Sarajevo, Egypt initially sent a mechanized battalion and later increased its participation with a second

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁴ Carlos Echeverria, "THE INVOLVEMENT OF WEU'S MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERS IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS," *European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) (1999)*, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep06947.7>

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

battalion. By May 1994, Egypt had contributed ten police officers, 429 military personnel, and 12 observers to the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR). In Croatia, Egypt provided four observers and nine civilian police officers to the UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (UNTAES).¹⁸⁷

Egypt's peacekeeping efforts were concentrated in Africa in response to requests from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and national governments. However, since the successful resolution of the Suez Canal Crisis, Egypt's power has gradually grown and it has gradually become one of the better-developed countries in the African region, and as a result.

Egypt has often been involved in interfering in the internal affairs of other countries in order to expand its power. Egyptian military and civilian observers were involved in peacekeeping and electoral processes in various regions of Africa. In North Africa, Egypt contributed nine military observers to the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) in 1994, which increased to 12 in 1996 and 18 in 1997. In West Africa, 14 Egyptian military observers participated in the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). In the Great Lakes region, Egypt detached ten military observers to the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in 1994. In southern Africa, Egypt deployed 50 police observers to Namibia, 20 military observers and 51 police observers to the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), and 34 civilian observers and one diplomat to South Africa to oversee electoral processes.¹⁸⁸

Brazil

Brazil had participated in UN peacekeeping operations since 1956 when it sent an infantry battalion to the First UN Emergency Force in the Sinai Peninsula. Over the years, Brazil has been involved in missions in the Congo, Western Guinea, Cyprus, the Dominican Republic, and India-Pakistan.

However, apart from its substantial contribution to the UNEF I, Brazil's involvement in peacekeeping during this period could have been improved in terms of numbers. During the dictatorship from 1964 to 1985, Brazil distanced itself from multilateral forums and ceased participating in UN peacekeeping operations. This resulted in its non-participation in UNEF II, UNDOF, and UNIFIL and its withdrawal from the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in 1977.¹⁸⁹

The 1988 constitution of Brazil marked a break from authoritarianism and laid down essential guidelines for the country's foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. These guidelines emphasized promoting human rights, non-intervention, self-determination, peaceful conflict resolution, diplomacy, and multilateralism.

Since 1990, under democratically elected presidents, Brazil has actively participated in UN peacekeeping operations, particularly second-generation ones. The country underwent a series of political transitions, transitioning from military dictatorship to a democratically elected government. These political changes provided Brazil with a broader platform to actively participate in UN peacekeeping operations and propelled its engagement in peacekeeping policies. Brazil has led military observers and troops contingents in various missions, such as UNAVEM and ONUMOZ, and has also taken on the role of special representative of the secretary-general and transition manager in UNTAET.¹⁹⁰

187 *Ibid.*

188 *Ibid.*

189 Rita Santos, Teresa Almeida Cravo, "Brazil's rising profile in United Nations peacekeeping," Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/144049427.pdf>.

190 *Ibid.*

In the post-Cold War era, Brazil has positioned itself internationally based on respect for non-intervention, sovereignty, peaceful conflict resolution, development, and non-use of force.

However, recent shifts in Brazil's foreign policy have led to contradictory commitments of non-indifference and involvement in controversial external interventions. This change is evident in Brazil's increased interest in playing a more significant role in peace and security.

Brazil's participation in UN peacekeeping missions has undergone significant changes in size, nature, and geographical scope compared to its engagement. However, Brazil still needs to become a significant contributor in personnel or finances. Instead, it is symbolic in many UN missions while assuming leadership positions in operations that align with its specific foreign policy interests. This suggests that Brazil needs help to establish its position among more considerable powers, presenting itself as an advocate for the Global South and endorsing peace and development agendas while also accommodating the interests of traditional powers.

Brazil's increased international responsibility has amplified its influence in political and institutional arrangements, participation in debates on international intervention in vulnerable states, enhanced regional defense cooperation and strengthened ties with least-developed countries outside its traditional areas of interest. Greater participation in peacekeeping operations has also provided valuable training and experience for the Brazilian armed forces. However, Brazil's supposedly distinct approach to traditional international peace and security modes has yet to have a transformation impact.

As Brazil strives for a more assertive presence in global affairs, it grapples with the simultaneous legitimization and consternation of the international power structure. The current president's stance is yet to be fully revealed, but Brazil may follow the path of other emerging powers that came before it.

Germany

In July 1994, the German Supreme Court ruled that there were no constitutional restrictions on deploying the German armed forces outside Germany. On the same day, the German Defense Minister issued guidance for future development of the Bundeswehr. In March 1995, the German cabinet approved a detailed plan for restructuring the Bundeswehr, including the individual services, to expand its range of missions. These developments serve as a practical blueprint for Germany's plans to enhance its military capabilities and contribute to peacekeeping efforts in the future.¹⁹¹

Since the end of the Cold War, Germany has been more proactive and rapid in removing limitations on using its armed forces than initially expected. While the debate on the restructuring and utilization of the German armed forces continues, the legal obstacles to deploying the military beyond territorial defense have been eliminated, and many political constraints have diminished. The discourse has shifted due to real-world events and the emergence of new political dynamics. Germany has officially embraced a new political and strategic rationale for the Bundeswehr, explicitly encompassing peace support and potential combat missions.

Germany has undergone significant changes in its foreign policy and the role of its Bundeswehr since the fall of communism. The crucial challenge for the German government is to ensure that the reasons for deploying the Bundeswehr in peace support

¹⁹¹ Rand Company, "Germany's contribution to peacekeeping: Issues and outlook," Jan 30, 2024 Accessed, https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR602.html.

operations are well-defined and aligned with German interests. It is essential that critical allies are involved and that there is a clear mandate for such missions. Moreover, the success of these operations is crucial as failure could undermine the emerging consensus in favor of Germany playing a military role.

German officials and lawmakers have engaged in open discussions regarding the criteria for deciding when to approve requests for German forces to participate in peacekeeping operations. The principles put forward by leading officials from the foreign and defense ministries include the following:¹⁹²

Germany is not automatically obliged to comply with requests from the UN or OSCE. The German government retains the right to refuse requests and make decisions on a case-by-case basis. Priority will be given to peacekeeping missions in Europe and its vicinity. Multilateral involvement, especially by NATO and WEU allies, will be essential. The greater the participation of Germany's allies, the more likely Germany will participate.

Historical factors should not restrict the deployment of German troops. As long as their presence is seen as a stabilizing factor, German forces can go to places historically associated with the Wehrmacht. The consent of all parties involved in the conflict will be significant.

An essential criterion is the existence of a credible political prospect for the success of the mission. In particularly hazardous situations, having a clear timetable and concept for political success becomes crucial.

A political mandate from the OSCE or the UN and achievable operational goals are required. Reflecting on the experience in Somalia, German officials highlighted that it may be preferable not to engage in an operation rather than withdraw in failure.

¹⁹² *Ibid.*

Questions to Consider

How do peacekeepers distinguish between refugees and deserters in war situations?

How can the accountability and transparency of UN peacekeeping operations be improved?

How to balance the efficiency and order of decision-making in peacekeeping operations?

What role should regional organizations play in peacekeeping operations, and how can they be integrated with the UN's efforts?

What reforms are needed in the training and capacity-building of peacekeeping personnel?

What steps should be taken to address the issue of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeeping personnel?

Should the UN consider expanding the scope of its peacekeeping operations to include issues such as climate change and cyber warfare?

How can Member States avoid massive losses in peacekeeping operations by improving current guidelines?

How can major powers reach the balance between international consensus and political interests?

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